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During the second half of the 20th century the Stock Car Racing enjoyed 
substantial growth and development. For the National Association for Stock Car 
Automobile Racing (NASCAR) control over the technology of competition and the 
conduct of race events was crucial to building respectability and profitability as an 
entertainment phenomenon between 1949 and 1979. The power to specify technology 
offered NASCAR leverage over the actions of racers who, despite their status as 
independent contractors, were fiercely loyal competitors. Control over the technology of 
competition also helped maintain ‘strictly stock’ perceptions of NASCAR racing that 
made corporate sponsorship attractive to automakers and held the interest of the 
general public. After initial forays across the nation, NASCAR chose advantageous 
concentration on the southeastern markets where racing spectacle found the most 
enthusiastic and devoted audience. This thesis is an account of the process of 
systematization that brought the grass-roots phenomenon of production-based to a 
region and an nation, and how NASCAR relied on a stock-appearing racecar as a device 








The American automobile was born of the minds and methods of pragmatic men. 
Lacking a body of scientific theory or access to precision measurement devices, 
motoring pioneers often turned to endurance runs and speed contests to test their 
machinery. Such empiricism ultimately refined the car through the initial period of novelty 
status into a device of some reliability and utility. As a consequence, early automobile 
racing was as much about finding the practical limits of automobile use as about posting 
impressive speeds. In the first race staged in the United States, in 1895, only two cars 
finished out of a field of 83 entrants.1 In the face of such dramatic technical challenges, 
how long and how fast cars could be made to operate became objectives with 
tremendous cultural gravity. Early cars were as much a novelty as a practical 
technology, a plaything for wealthy patron or curious mechanics, enthusiast tinkers 
engaged in empirically refining the car. 
 As the designs and business practices of the American automotive industry 
became more refined, racing in either top speed events or contests staged on horse 
tracks gained popularity as a means not only of testing, but also of promoting the virtues 
of a specific model. These contests soon attracted attention on the basis of their 
entertainment value as much as test runs, product demonstrations, or promotional 
opportunities. After all, how often could the public see inventors working in the 
laboratory? Though by the close of the 1920s the demands of the track and the 
exigencies of production had all but completely severed similarities between racecar and 
production car, the idea that racing could prove something about production cars would 
persist throughout the 20th century. Production-based racing, as it emerged after the 
                                                 
1 James J. Flink, The Automobile Age, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), p.23 
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Second World War, would depend heavily upon the idea of automobile racing as a 
laboratory for automakers to suggest practical benefits of racing that might feed directly 
into consumer products. This suggestion typically was paired with assertions about the 
entertainment value of racing and was most frequently made in media accessible to the 
general public.2 
Racing vehicles from the “stock” of an automobile manufacturer were, from the 
very first days of the car in America, part of the automotive landscape. Auto racing was a 
means of attracting publicity to motoring, advertising the durability of a model or 
manufacturer, or simply enjoying a technical challenge accompanying the dawn of the 
motor age. Promoters continually staged races in a variety of formats throughout the first 
decades of the 20th century.3 Sportsmen, manufacturers and promoters displayed 
automobiles for recreation, promotion or profit and they attracted audiences because of 
popular fascination with the sophisticated equipment and because of the entertaining 
aspects of racing competition. Speed record runs, hill climbs, cross-country endurance 
runs, 24hour races, European-style road racing, races on half-mile dirt “bullrings,” and 
races on massive, high-banked oval wooden tracks celebrated the power of 
automobiles. Claims that building a better racecar might help develop technical 
knowledge applicable to building regular cars for the public often acccompanied auto 
racing during these early decades. This claim, and the publicity accompanying motor 
sport in an era of explosive popularity for the car, helped automakers justify participation 
and better advertise success in racing. 
                                                 
2 There was not much discussion of these so-called practical applications of racing in 
publications like the National Speed Sport News or the NASCAR News that catered 
primarily to racers. 
3 Russ Catlin, “History of the AAA”, Speed Age, July 1954, p.39, Levine 
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Journalists described competition with production cars as “stock car racing” as 
early as 1909.4 Promoters suggested that his sort of racing offered a public 
demonstration of the relative merits of vehicles of differing makes.5 The introduction of 
standardization and huge quantities of such cars through the techniques of mass 
production changed the definition of a “stock car.” In a time when automakers produced 
cars on a one-off basis and racecar design was in its infancy, ambitious car builders 
often blurred the distinction between a stock vehicle and a race vehicle. After the 
introduction of mass-production, the term came to mean vehicles produced on assembly 
lines using mass-production techniques.  
Though perhaps subtle, this distinction suggested that the availability provided by 
mass production made “stock” racecar performance available to the public when often it 
did not. Much of the history of stock car racing in America is about building a racecar 
while maintaining visual association with mass produced cars. From the racer’s 
perspective, the cost difference between mass-produced stock cars and products from 
the craft-built automakers’ stock mattered. “Stock” racecars built after the adoption of 
mass production, if not actually vehicles built on an assembly line, were composed of 
production components. At minimal cost, talented mechanics cobbled together 
“stockers” for less expense than highly specialized racecars used in other types of 
competition.  
The tension between production-based and purpose-built vehicles characterized 
relations in the racing world long after the craft-built Deusenbergs, Packards, Pierce-
Arrows and Cords had vanished from showrooms. For most of the 20th century the 
crowning event of the purpose-built racing world (indeed of all of the automobile racing 
world) was the Indianapolis 500. From that event, and the racing series that fed talent 
                                                 
4  “Stock Car Races,” Motor, October 1909, p.43 
5 Levine, Leo, Ford: The Dust and Glory, (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p.27 
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into the highest echelon of circle track racing in the U.S., disdain was focused on 
production-based racing. Many thought that proper racing involved sportsmen or their 
hired drivers on oval racetracks in custom-built speedway specials. This sort of racing 
traced its roots to the earliest era of motor sport, and remained bound up in the elitist 
connotations that accompanied the first automobiles.  
Mass production, a system devised in concert with demand for the automobile, 
altered the way Americans organized work and consumption. The Ford Model T 
established the automobile as a simple transportation appliance by the close of the 
1920s. After production capacity and product longevity surpassed the demands of the 
market, institutions depending on mass production created reasons for consumption that 
were unrelated to utility. In order to sell more cars, more romantic notions of 
empowerment, status and identity augmented perceptions of the car as a modern, labor 
saving invention of tremendous practical capability. By the 1930s, increasing emphasis 
on sales romanticized the automobile as bestowing benefits far beyond the practical 
applications of a transportation device. Advertising celebrated cars as givers of personal 
freedom, as mobile status symbols, and as the prime object offering identity to its owner. 
The assertion that a car was more than just a means of transportation transformed the 
industry. As first successfully suggested in the marketing efforts of Billy Durant’s General 
Motors, color, not just price and a reputation for Spartan reliability, could sell cars.6 
Eventually, images of style, speed, performance, and luxury suggested that the 
automobile was far too important a device to be judged by how efficiently it might carry 
passengers or a reasonable payload. This transformation of the industry mainly involved 
an increased emphasis on sales, promotion and marketing and was enacted fully during 
resumed production and prosperity after the Second World War.  
                                                 
6 Flink, p.230. John B. Rae, The American Automobile: A Brief History, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1965), p.98-99 
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The development of auto racing relied heavily on exploiting the relationship 
between the practical use of the automobile and the romance of automobility’s more 
symbolic dimensions. The racetrack offered a chance to show how stock cars could 
perform and suggest that the status won by a racer could be transferred to consumers. 
Automakers used racing to suggest and demonstrate a set of practical virtues for their 
products. Claims of stamina, strength, and durability flowed naturally from racing 
contests between stock cars. Paramount of these virtues was speed and the horsepower 
required to produce speed. In Cold War America, consumers readily adopted the notion 
that owning more power than you might need. Yet the speed and spectacle of stock car 
stock car racing offered more seductive inducements targeting consumers. Through 
vicarious association, consumers could experience the illicit thrill of high speed racing. 
Despite a fertile environment for selling automotive speed and spectacle, racers 
and promoters struggled to unify and spread stock car racing during the 1950s. The 
animosity between purpose-built racing and production-based racing heightened when 
the latter began to threaten the popularity and profits of the former. Though less 
sophisticated than purpose-built racecars, the public identified more easily with the 
“stockers” on the racetrack. Racing series using production-based cars ultimately 
enjoyed an advantage because of the material plenty resulting from mass production. 
With plentiful and economical components, stock car racers more easily built racecars. A 
steady supply of production-based racecars translated into more racers and more race 
events. 
Because of the long shadow cast over the racing world by the “Indy 500,” and 
continuity of regulation offered by the Contest Board of the American Automobile 
Association (AAA), racing with purpose-built cars dominated the American scene for the 
first six decades of the century. Automotive writer Ray Kuns described the dominance of 
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purpose-built racing in his 1947 book “There are three general classes of racing cars in 
use in America,” Kuns suggested.  
The largest of these is Championship Speedway car as typified by the 
Indianapolis cars where the wheelbase must be 99 inches or more. The second class in 
size is the dirt track race … where the wheelbase is 91 inches. The third class is the 
Midget which, as a rule, has a wheelbase of around 70 inches.7  
Open wheel, purpose-built cars comprised what Kuns represented as the three 
forms of American motor sport. Such open-wheeled racing series ultimately fed talent 
into the annual 500-mile championship race in Indianapolis.  
Despite the dominance of purpose-built racing before the Second World War, 
racers using modified production automobiles thrived on the margins. Small tracks and 
amateur enthusiasts brought racing to the masses through contests between modified 
production cars. Protean contests used modified production cars in racing competition 
as early as the 1920s. During the mid 1930s enthusiasm and mass production 
coalesced into a consistent form of racing that came to be known as “Modified” racing.8 
Contests put organized by the RPM car club of San Jose California in 1933 initiated use 
of the term “Modified.”9 By 1936, the term “modified” had spread across the nation. 
Existing racing activity using modified production cars were drawn into the spotlight as 
notoriety begun in California brought grass roots contest to the attention of the motoring 
press. By 1936, races using modified production cars were regularly sanctioned in 
places like Daytona Beach, Florida; Langhorne, Pennsylvania; and the Lakewood 
Fairgrounds in Atlanta, Georgia. The largest of these races typically presented contests 
between “Modifieds” as opening acts for events featuring purpose-built racecars in the 
AAA sanctioned Midget or Championship racing series.  
                                                 
7 Ray Kuns, Automobile Racing, 6th edition, 1947, p.23 
8 Roger Huntington, “How Did We Get This Way?” Speed Age, June 1952, p.37 
9 “Modified Roadsters,” National Speed Sport News, December 15, 1933, p.5 
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Before the emergence of a national “strictly stock” racing series threatened the 
dominance of purpose-built racing, dirt tracks across America hosted events featuring 
cars based on mass production components. With ancillary weight such as seats, body 
trim, and spare tire removed, and heavier springs, hubs and axles installed, these cars 
staged races in small racing series across the nation. These so-called “Modifieds” 
typically sported stripped-down production cars with reinforced suspensions and engines 
modified to produce maximum horsepower. Devotees of purpose-built racing most often 
derided these more-economical racecars as “jalopies.” Oval track racing using 
production-based equipment existed in the nether region of motor sport, utilizing small-
time dirt tracks and local governing sanctions with widely varying rules, protocol and 
order enforced at a variety of racetracks. While purpose-built cars contested the most 
notable events in racing, races like the Indianapolis 500, the majority of motor sports 
contests were fought between production-based cars on the grass roots level.  
If some racers and some racing organizations disagreed on the pedigree of a 
real racecar, neither established or aspiring racers contested the proper form of track. 
Since the earliest days of speed contests, Americans preferred racing on oval courses. 
Increases in the number of racing events staged after the initiation of quantity 
production, and increasing racing speeds during the 1910s, drove most automotive 
contests onto closed course tracks removed from the general public. Frequent use of 
horse racing tracks for motor racing events probably encouraged the normative oval 
closed-course configuration. Enthusiasts and promoters built many large, dirt ovals 
during the first decades of the 20th century. Elsewhere, investors utilized cheaper wood 
construction to construct purpose-built auto racing venues. Some of these high-banked 
ovals exceeded two miles in length. Large wooden tracks at Charlotte North Carolina; 
Omaha, Nebraska; Sheepshead Bay, New York; and Alatoona, Pennsylvania hosted 
races during the 1920s, the so called golden age of American Motor racing. Despite the 
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fantastic speeds possible on these giant, high-banked wooden ovals, they were not 
financially successful.10 They required a lot of maintenance and frequently succumbed to 
rot and fire. These drawbacks and austerity brought about by the Great Depression 
meant that the bulk of motor sport before the Second World War occurred on oval dirt 
tracks. Indeed, except for the massive annual event at Indianapolis, dirt tracks hosted 
virtually all American racing before 1945.11 Even after the Second World War, the 
majority of American racing events remained dirt track contests.  
At the end of World War II, the American motor sport scene consisted primarily of 
oval track races between purpose-built cars. The three classes of purpose-built cars 
known as “Midget,” “Sprint” and “Big” or “Championship” cars, represented the 
beginning, intermediate and expert levels of competition.  The Contest Board of the 
American Automobile Association presided over these forms of racing, and indeed all 
other forms of motor sport. Composed of prominent businessmen appointed by the 
president of the AAA, the 15 member Contest Board governed the top tiers of racing in 
the United States. The AAA fostered continuance of the status quo and focused on 
purpose-built racing after becoming official U.S. representative of the Federacion 
Internacional d’Automobile (FIA) in 1927. “With the consolidation of its position as U.S. 
representative of the FIA,” commented one reporter, “the Contest Board contented itself 
with representing only the top events in the nation.”12  
When NASCAR formed to sanction a national championship series for 
production-based racing in 1947, it faced the task of drawing into direct competition with 
the national championship series sponsored by the AAA. Despite the obstacles, 
NASCAR established production-based racing as a legitimate, nationally practiced form 
                                                 
10 Roger Huntington, “How Did We Get This Way?” Speed Age, June 1952, p.38,54 
11 Though there were speed contests on dry lake beds, and road races between 
sports cars before the Second World War, the vast majority of races, as reported in 
the National Speed Sport News were conducted on oval tracks. 
12 Eugene Jaderquist, “Competition and the AAA,” Motor Trend, July 1952, p.28 
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of motor sport over the next three decades. The existing modified ranks initially 
organized by NASCAR into a championship, and the strictly stock series that followed in 
1949, successfully exploited shifting public expectations for the automobile. During the 
Cold War, Americans believed that they wanted more from their cars than simply 
transportation. In addition to style and luxury, Americans perceived horsepower as an 
automotive virtue.13 thriving hot-rod speed culture begun by West Coast enthusiasts 
working in the margin between practical production-based use and high-performance 
cultivation of the automobile influenced general fascination with speed. Automakers, 
racers and NASCAR cultivated curiosity about hot rodding while advertising and 
promoting their own products. 
Fortuitously timed to take advantage of widespread fascination with fast cars, the 
National Association for Stock Car Automobile Racing (NASCAR) initiated a new form of 
racing using late model, “strictly stock” cars that closely resembled the cars in dealer 
showroom. Rules mandating an unaltered, late model exterior.  distinguished NASCAR 
from most earlier production-based racing. Regular-looking cars performing in fantastic 
spectacles, immediately linked strictly stock NASCAR Grand National racing to both the 
automakers and the public. The association possible between the spectator and the 
equipment on the track automatically infused this new form of production-based racing 
with elements of promotion and advertising. fast cars, driven by prominent racers 
naturally attracted a lot of attention. When campaigned on a national scale, the 
recognizable forms of strictly stock racecars combined familiarity with celebrity. This 
combination proved a potent advertising medium. In high-profile events utilizing purpose 
built racecars, spectators could only dream of owning a car like the one in victory circle. 
Easy association with the cars and competitors, not perpetuation of a technologically 
sophisticated racing series, was the key to NASCAR’s growth and prominence.  
                                                 
13 Roger Huntington, “Detroit Corner,” Speed Age, May 1952, p.46 
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NASCAR stock car racing realized tremendous growth during the fifty years 
following its first stock car race in 1949. By the dawn of the 21st century, stock car racing 
had achieved national prominence as an entertainment and advertising phenomenon. As 
the second largest spectator sport in the United States, people, places, and 
merchandise related to stock car racing occupied at least a peripheral place in the 
consciousness of most Americans. Products and productions related to NASCAR filled 
store shelves, broadcast schedules, and recreational time available to fans nation wide. 
The ubiquity of racing celebrities promoting cereals, shoes, insurance, diet pills, candy, 
furniture rental, and soft drinks made the vigor and breadth of stock car racing’s growth 
readily apparent. That racecar drivers have achieved celebrity suited to selling 
mainstream consumer goods suggests that stock car racing has also become a widely 
accepted form of entertainment. 
During the second half of the 20th century NASCAR stock car racing became the 
most prominent form of motor sport. Following the traditional oval track format favored 
by American racers, it eclipsed more established forms of racing like “Sprint car” series 
and the “Championship” series culminating in the Indianapolis 500. By 2000 its drew 
more fans, conducted more races, and enjoyed more media coverage than any other 
type of racing. As a measure of its success, several superspeedway events each year 
register crowds that rival those at the famed Indy 500.  
Beyond attracting huge live crowds, NASCAR experienced extensive 
broadcasting growth during the 1990s. Every one of the 36 events that compose a 
season in the highest level of NASCAR competition is broadcast live nationally. Indeed, 
the broadcasts are so lucrative and so expensive that in an unprecedented deal 
beginning in 2001, two major television networks, Fox and NBC, split seasonal 
broadcasting rights. Fox airs the first half of the season, while NBC broadcasts the 
second half. In addition to incredible amounts of exposure through these broadcasts, 
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television time devoted to NASCAR’s lower echelons of “Busch Grand National” and 
“Craftsman Truck” racing series also garner substantial television coverage. With these 
event broadcasts, and lesser programming devoted to more peripheral matters like the 
technical issues of stock car racing or the lifestyles of NASCAR drivers, the popularity of 
stock car racing continues to grow. 
The number of historical accounts describing the early years of NASCAR has 
increased along with the popularity stock car racing. While many of these accounts 
chronicle NASCAR events in great detail, few attempt to place the development of stock 
car racing in historical and technological context. Typically, the primary focus is on the 
details of race events and the personality of participants. This sort approach ignores the 
contributions of many participants while diminishing the importance of communities and 
technology. Most often the eventual success of NASCAR is attributed to the clever 
prescience of founder Bill France, and not the collaborative and occasionally contentious 
achievements of the stock car racing community as a whole. While often entertaining, 
such histories suffer from over-simplification and a sense of inevitability traceable to 
press releases designed to elevate stock car racing in the minds of fans and sponsors. 
This thesis attempts to salvage a historical account of NASCAR’s first thirty years 
from mythologies that have become accepted as fact. Conventional lore suggests that 
stock car racing was pioneered by Bill France, who later formed NASCAR to organize 
speed loving moonshiners into a racing series that quickly swept into celebrated 
prominence across the South. Such stories typically focus on the liquor-running roots of 
early racers, heroic accounts of specific races, and the benevolent dictatorship of Bill 
France. Though there is truth in this hagiographic, “moonshine and magnolia” telling of 
the early years of NASCAR, the narrative is more complex. Though it is true that Bill 
France’s role was pivotal, that stock car racers were exceptional individuals, and that 
moonshiners were among the early racers, these elements comprise only part of 
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NASCAR’s story. Stock car racing was organized within a national context of widespread 
fascination with the automobile, and became inextricably linked to social groups, 
regions, and technologies in flexible and interdependent ways. How the ambition and 
technologies of grass roots enthusiasts became transformed into a regularized system of 
entertainment and promotion within the American South better describes the story of 
NASCAR’s crucial early years. This history of stock car racing evaluates issues such as 
the formation and structure of communities and business networks, negotiating 
controlled technological innovation, and the influence of regional and national cultural 
expectations. As a clear, contextual account of NASCAR’s early development, sensitive 
to the broader influences and implications of stock car racing, this study will help 
disperse the existing myths that cloud understanding of an important technological and 
cultural phenomenon.  
There can be little argument that the automobile possesses sufficient social and 
cultural gravity as a topic of analysis in western society. As Iain Carson commented, “By 
the middle of the 20th century, there were 2.6 billion people on earth; between them they 
had 50 million cars. Less than 50 years later, the totals have risen to 5.5 billion people 
and 500 million cars.”14 As the population doubled, the number of cars increased tenfold. 
Stock car racing occupied very visible terrain between the consumer and the producer 
during the sustained growth of automobility. If the sheer quantity of production and use 
are any indication of significance, during the second half of the 20th century, the 
automobile stands alone in importance. This work adds to our understanding of the 
relationship between consumer, producer and product promotion related to the 
automobile in American society.  
As a sport of emerging significance during the 20th century, stock car racing 
combined cars with entertainment and advertising in novel ways. The notoriety of stock 
                                                 
14www.sjsu.edu/depts/PoliSci/faculty/haas/MTM201/Living_with_the_Car 
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car racing as an influential (if peripheral) influence on this relationship deserves 
continued scrutiny. As H.F. Moorhouse comments, “There can be few activities if any 
which have been so thoroughly studied as the production of cars . . . [yet] the myriad of 
ways the car has been used and exhibited, the social relations and institutions it has 
inspired in the rest of life, what it may have occasioned and connoted outside the factory 
gates, have been quite neglected.”15 By addressing the history and growing influence of 
a group of enthusiasts group on the periphery of mainstream American society, this 
thesis explores the social relations and institutions influenced by and influencing 
American automobility.  
Perhaps the immense size of American automobility after the Second World War 
has limited the number of historians willing to tackle auto racing as a subject. Sifting 
through vast amounts of information to distill accurate and relevant information, 
especially when the topic has stirred such enthusiasm, is a daunting task. This project 
represents a unique effort heavily dependent on internal sources. I have read hundreds 
of popular magazines, poured over NASCAR rule books from all of the first thirty years, 
sifted through cabinets of newspaper clippings, identified and analyzed rare racing 
artifacts and participated in interviews of dozens of NASCAR participants. Reaching 
historical clarity required sifting through NASCAR mythology to attempt an accurate, 
inclusive, and context-sensitive telling of the NASCAR’s early development.  
The study also seeks to relate the historical narrative of the NASCAR 
phenomenon to broader themes within the history of technology. Much of the history of 
NASCAR demonstrates how the enthusiasm possessed by some became channeled 
into a profitable form of mass entertainment. On one level, then, this work expands upon 
the technological enthusiasm found among devotees of motor sport explored by 
                                                 
15 H.F. Moorhouse, Driving Ambitions, (New York: Manchester University Press, 
1991), p.5 
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historian Robert C. Post in his study of the drag racing culture.16 As NASCAR imposed 
order, system, and control over technological enthusiasm, however, it represented a 
successful effort to combine and promote existing human and technical resources on a 
larger scale. Similar to the case studies investigated by Thomas P. Hughes, NASCAR 
represented an attempt by entrepreneurial figures to define, serve, and profit from 
national markets.17 But the systemization of NASCAR racing differed in that the activities 
and outcomes that brought people and technologies together were far downstream from 
the point of production. Their experience with what David A. Hounshell has termed the 
“ethos of mass production” has come from the bottom up.18 The technological landscape 
surrounding the history of NASCAR is thus cluttered with artifacts wrought by large 
corporations, and the expectations of racers and fans shaped by the larger image of the 
automobile in modern society. 
Another useful tool of analysis employed in this study is the concept of 
“technological frame” as suggested by Weibe Bijker.19 During the second half of the 20th 
century, various elements coalesced into the phenomenon of stock car racing. At the 
center of these actors was the NASCAR “formula stock” racecar. By casting the history 
of stock car racing as a series of elements bound by relationships within a technological 
frame, one can understand the social inputs that influenced technological change. Within 
this frame, we can also chart the influence of technologies on relevant social groups. As 
the “stock car” evolved as an odd conglomeration of production-based components 
refined by generations of users to produce an entertaining racing vehicle, it also 
                                                 
16 Robert C. Post, High Performance: The Culture and Technology of Drag Racing, 
(Balitmore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1994), p.298. 
17 Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and Technolgical 
Enthusiasm, (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), p.1. 
18 18 David Hounshell, From the American System to Mass production, 1800-1932, 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), p.303-330. 
19 Weibe Bijker, The Social Construction of Technological Systems, eds. Wiebe E 
Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987), 
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represented an example of the actions of communities of practitioners described by 
historian of technology, Edward W. Constant, II. The development of the NASCAR 
“formula stock” racecar closely resembles Constant’s “model of technological knowledge 
[as] expressed in well-winnowed traditions of practice that are the possession of well-
defined communities of technological practitioners.”20 
The story of early stock car racing is also contributes to the history of small 
businesses in the American South and the story of specialized producers everywhere. 
As Randall L. Patton suggests, there is much opportunity to describe the history of 
smaller firms whose profit strategies did not focus on economies of scale resulting from 
highly rationalized production.21 Like other specialized producers, racers relied more 
heavily on what the economist Alfred Marshall described as “external economies.”22 The 
sorts of networks and institutions developed through shared experience, camaraderie, 
and the practical demands of racing in NASCAR were essential external contributions to 
economic viability. The racers who worked to produce a favorable impression for 
sponsors and an entertaining spectacle each week, formed elaborate and necessary 
networks that were integral to success that were typically centered around the 
equipment and process of racing. 
The examination of technological communities suggested by Constant’s work 
opens up another related and fruitful area of inquiry – the study of specialized networks 
of production. The sorts of networks explored by Patton, Philip Scranton, AnnaLee 
Saxenian, and others are fundamentally different than those built among NASCAR 
racers. In these studies of specialized networks, producers are categorized, compared 
                                                 
20 Edward W. Constant II, “The Social Locus of Technological Practice: Community, 
System, or Organization?” in The Social Construction of Technological Systems, 
eds. Wiebe E Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1987), p.224. 
21 Randall L. Patton, Carpet Capital: The Rise of the New South Industry, (Athens, 
GA: University of Georgia Press, 1999) p.3 
22 Ibid.  
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and studied according to the products they render. Stock car racers used technology in 
dramatic ways to render a product that was much more ephemeral.23  
More traditional production circumstances depended on technology to produce 
tangible goods. In the case of stock car racing, the technology of production, not the 
product, was the element through which networks were constructed. For stock car racers 
the product is entertainment and advertising. Though less tangible than the goods 
studied in other specialized production circumstances, the same sorts of networks and 
negotiations were involved in creating racing spectacle. Exploring networks built largely 
on communal experience with production technologies is one novel contribution of this 
work to the literature on specialized producers. 
Another contribution to the literature on specialized producers that this work can 
claim is theorizing how business networks can develop powerful social dimensions of 
commonality and cohesion. Using and regulating technology to promote entertaining 
action on the racetrack were crucial to the survival and success of NASCAR stock car 
racing. The stock car racing fraternity epitomizes the sort of specialized network 
dependent on “trust, mutual forbearance, and reputation” conceptualized by sociologists 
Walter W. Powell and Laura Smith-Doerr.24 In the case of NASCAR a specialized 
network built technological conventions and codes of behavior that served to 
“supplement and/or replace the price mechanism or administrative fiat.”25 As an informal 
institution bound by practical considerations as well as esprit-de-corps, the fraternity of 
                                                 
23 Patton, Ibid, Philip Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American 
Industrialization, 1865-1925 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997) 
AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Networks: Industrial Adaptation in Silicon Valley and 
Route 128, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994)  
24 Walter W. Powell and Laura Smith-Doerr, “Networks and Economic Life,” in The 
Handbook of Economic Sociology, eds. N. Smelser and R Soudeberg, (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994) p.370 
25 Ibid. 
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racers, under the guidance of NASCAR effectively managed technology to perpetuate 
and grow their sport.  
The specialized production perspective also helps enrich the history of small, 
grass-roots businesses in the South. In this sense, this thesis is also a contribution to the 
history of what Randall Patton describes as industries that grew “from the bottom up.”26 
Stock car racing was a sport that was born on the margins of motor sport and at the 
edge of mainstream American society. After an initial burst of intense growth, stock car 
racing concentrated in the South only to re-emerge and grow into a position of national 
prominence. Like the carpet industries studied by Patton and others, NASCAR’s 
development depended heavily on a cohesive and flexible network of business 
relationships to become a successful southern export. As stock car racing became a 
southern enterprise, these networks also frequently became linked to the region. 
As Powell and Smith-Doerr suggest, business networks have “essential linkages 
between economic and organizational practices and the institutional infrastructure of a 
region or society.”27  This thesis attempts to explore some of the linkages between stock 
car racing, southern white mill culture, and southern business institutions. 
Contextualizing the interplay between these institutions offers a fresh look at the history 
of NASCAR as a regional phenomenon. That NASCAR blossomed as a Southern sport 
just as external forces spurred by the civil rights movement began to shape Southern 
institutions is a meaningful coincidence. For many fans, stock car racing combined 
regional identity, rebellion, and uniqueness in an entertaining form of escape during 
times of social upheaval 
NASCAR was attracted to the South in large part because southern fans were 
attracted to stock car racing. The concentration of stock car racers in central North 
                                                 
26 Patton, p.4 
27 Powell and Smith-Doerr, p.370 
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Carolina was an outcome of the early development of stock car racing rather than a pre-
condition. From the outset of NASCAR’s organization, the skills and equipment used by 
stock car racers were very portable. When the chassis were truly like production cars, 
these skills and equipment were rather specialized. Even though the vast majority of 
races were conducted in North Carolina, car builders remained spread across the 
country. Early NASCAR racecar builders worked in small shops as far flung as central 
Virgina, Florida, Indiana, and North Alabama.28  
As the design of the NASCAR racecar converged into a uniform machine and the 
market for racing entertainment concentrated in the southern Piedmont, racers began to 
gravitate toward Charlotte, North Carolina. Technological uniformity offered the material 
basis for, what historian Philip Scranton has termed, “supple networks of interfirm 
contracting and alliance.”29 The central location in Charlotte also ensured easy access to 
the bulk of NASCAR events. This work explores the context of technology-based 
networks to help explain of how and why stock car racing became a Southern 
phenomenon.  
Because of the vigor and versatility of the actors involved, and the dramatic 
changes in American society that coincided with the first thirty years of NASCAR, the 
early history stock car racing touches on many other rich historical and sociological 
themes. Issues of gender and the gendering of technology permeate any study of motor 
sport. So too does discussion of the process and regulation of technological innovation. 
These themes receive some treatment here, but, because of the limits of this work, 
remain only partially explored. 
                                                 
28 Wood Brothers in Stuart, Virginia, Smokey Yunick, Marshall Teague and Ray Fox 
in Daytona, Ray Nichels in Highland Indiana, and the Allison Brothers in Hueytown 
Alabama 
29 Philip Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American 
Industrialization, 1865-1925, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), p.354 
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The thesis is organized around chapters separately exploring key elements in the 
history of NASCAR from 1949 through 1979. These elements include the influential hot 
rod speed culture, NASCAR, the racecar, racers, superspeedways, and broadcast 
communications. Each set of actors has its own chronology, and they are arranged 
according to their influence on the trajectory of stock car racing. 
The second chapter addresses the general enthusiasm for automotive speed 
culture, expressed nationally as a popular fascination with hot rodding. Grass roots 
enthusiasts had, for decades before NASCAR, built and raced vehicles of humble 
origins. After the Second World War, this pastime achieved vast popularity and 
heightened status. Popular acceptance of the idea that a street car should be fast set the 
stage for the acceptance of production-based racing.  
The struggle to bring a structured form of auto racing forth from the plenty of 
mass production is the subject of chapter three. It covers the institutional machinations 
that defined and nurtured stock car racing in the United States, in particular it covers the 
history of NASCAR. This sanctioning body, that harnessed popular enthusiasm for motor 
sport offered, a new direction for organizing and capitalizing on automotive spectacle. 
NASCAR was first to recognize the potential of existing grass-roots production-based 
racing and organize it on a national scale. Though formed in a spirit of collective 
cooperation, NASCAR soon became a dictatorship under the control of Bill France. In 
this form it consolidated control over the existing forms of production-based racing and 
fended off a threat from the American Automobile Association’s Contest Board, the 
existing giant among sanctioning agencies. After the dissolution of the Contest Board in 
1955, NASCAR took advantage of the strong demand for racing concentrated in some 
southern states by building a strong fan base across the Southern Piedmont. This period 
of southern retrenchment ultimately flavored NASCAR stock car racing as a distinctly 
regional phenomenon. 
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Chapter four offers a description of the development of the vehicles used in stock 
car racing. Rather than use actual production models, the technical details of the 
NASCAR “stock car” were negotiated between the needs of NASCAR, stock car racers 
who worked in the NASCAR championship series, and the automakers. Over the course 
of NASCAR’s first three decades, the strictly stock cars of competition were reshaped 
into a particular conglomeration of production-based components uniquely suited to 
creating “stock car” racing spectacle. Through occasional wholesale substitution of 
components from production cars and light trucks, and constant incremental alteration 
and reinforcement of components, the strictly stock formula describing the technical 
details of the NASCAR “stock car” was transformed into a “formula stock.” This “formula 
stock” was unlike anything ever produced on any assembly line, yet it came to represent 
the fruits of mass-production to consumers and fans. Though the creation of this chassis 
and driveline was not always a smooth process, it did render a vehicle that was 
inexpensive to build and maintain, strong enough to withstand close, often violent 
competition, capable of representing of the larger commercial environment, and well 
adapted to competing in long, fast races on large speedways. 
The fifth chapter offers an analysis of the fraternity of racers who provided labor, 
organization, and training to keep the tracks full of competitive action and popular 
enthusiasm for racing high. As a fraternity these racers cultivated a group identity that 
divided the world into categories of racers and non-racers. Using systems of proprietary 
knowledge tied to the technology of stock car racing, racers limited access to their ranks. 
Racers also used organizational logic and ritual common to more traditional fraternities. 
They organized themselves hierarchically within each race team and recognized the 
centralized control of Bill France and NASCAR. The procedure of each race, in particular 
the hyper-masculine ritual of the pit stop, publicly re-affirmed their control exercised by 
their fraternity over stock car racing. The strong similarities between the informal 
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fraternity of stock car racers and more traditional fraternities offers clues about how 
continuity and participation was assured without a rigid business arrangement between 
NASCAR and individual racers. 
The key component in building the credibility of stock car racing, prescribing the 
technical details of the NASCAR “stock car,” and the fraternity of stock car racers was 
the construction of impressive edifices to host races. Chapter six is an historical 
exploration of the spaces where stock car races were staged. It focuses primarily on the 
transition from dirt tracks to paved speedways, and from speedways to 
superspeedways. It also covers issues of how larger, more modern venues shaped 
perceptions and values within the sport, and ultimately precipitated conflict between 
American automakers and NASCAR. For NASCAR and stock car racing, the scale of the 
superspeedway was a springboard into mainstream mass media, and as such the lure 
that brought the full power of Detroit engineering to bear on the issue of winning races. 
The consequence of the superspeedway was assumption of complete control over 
racing technology by NASCAR and the attraction of permanent broadcast media 
attention to the sport. 
The final chapter traces the expansion of stock car racing beyond the race venue 
via broadcast media. Development of the stock car racing machine was all but over by 
the close of the 1970s. Innovation of the “formula stock” vehicle that carried advertising 
messages and racing heroes at alarming speeds on tracks and across the televisions of 
consumer fans had all but ceased. Simultaneously, the development of the larger 
machine of NASCAR-managed promotion spectacle had just reached the final phase of 








Among racers, the axiom, “The quickest way to make a small fortune in racing is 
to start with a large one” is often repeated as a universal truth.30 One thing in common 
between all racers, regardless of historical context or form of motor sport, are the hard 
constraints of economic reality. The rule that more money equals more time spent racing 
and “more” car, and that these should add up to faster times, is inescapable. Indeed, for 
well-developed race programs, going faster is sometimes described as a need for more 
“cubic dollars, not cubic inches” (reference to engine size).31 For this reason, mass 
production of low cost automobiles exerted as profound an impact within motor sport as 
it did anywhere else in American society. The lower cost and greater availability of cars 
produced in mass reshaped recreational as well as utilitarian use of the automobile.  
Most notably, mass production facilitated racing by creating vast reserves of 
spare parts. Potential racers could obtain those parts through regular supply networks, 
or from automotive recyclers once the cars themselves had finished their useful lives. 
Such material abundance prompted the development of the second user benefit of mass 
production. Because availability of technology is a precondition for experience with 
technical systems, mass production indirectly supported the creation of vast bodies of 
mechanical knowledge. When technical knowledge became common, and the raw 
materials for a racecar were available at low cost, conditions were right to support 
widespread participation in motor sport. 
With mass production, automobile races were less often events staged between 
sportsmen of means driving exotic purpose-built machinery, and more frequently 
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contests between semi-professional enthusiasts using equipment that originated on an 
assembly line. Though more exclusive forms of motor sport continued, after the 
introduction of mass production, contests between purpose-built cars, such as the 
annual Indianapolis 500, came to represent a decreasing percentage of racing. Once 
cars became more affordable, using them for recreation became more affordable. As a 
consequence, an underclass of racing series developed across the country in the years 
before the Second World War. Participants did not enjoy (and indeed would have little 
benefited from) recognition by the premier sanctioning body in the United States, the 
American Automobile Association (AAA). The racers typically were organized on a small 
scale to compete at a limited number of local tracks.32 Though based on mass-
production components, the cars competing in these smaller series were sometimes 
heavily modified with “speed parts” produced for the performance “aftermarket” or a 
conglomeration of production components from different makes and models.33 Locally 
maintained rules governing these events were frequently less focused upon the 
mechanical details of competitor’s mounts than the quantity and quality of racing 
entertainment. Nevertheless, the important feature that distinguished them from the cars 
under AAA sanction was that they were, as creations largely composed of mass-
produced components, less expensive to build, modify, and maintain. 
A purpose built racecar is conceived and built as a racing machine. As such 
these cars are typically expensive to operate and offer few ancillary uses. Before the 
Model T, there were also plenty of production models (though not mass produced) that 
were pressed into competition service. Like all production-based racers, these vehicles 
were conceived primarily as transportation appliances and pressed into recreational use 
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on the racetrack. The designs facilitating assembly speed that were necessary for mass 
production heightened the distinctions between purpose-built and production-based 
racing equipment even as it expanded the ranks of sporting competitors across the 
nation.34 Though typically outclassed by purpose-built cars, a production-based racing 
vehicle had the advantage of being less expensive. As such there were fewer 
considerations of cost and supply attached to racing with production-based cars. For this 
reason, fields of competitors at production-based racing events were usually composed 
of more cars than competed in purpose-built events. Though overall speeds were 
typically slower, contests between production-based cars had the advantage of being 
contested between more competitors. This situation had the added benefit of potential 
association within the fan’s mind between the cars on the track and their personal 
vehicles. After the introduction of mass-production cars to the tracks of America, racing 
offered the possibility of association between spectator and competitor as well as 
association between spectator and the tools of competition. 
Because racers based on products of mass production were easily associated 
with vehicles in use on public roads, automakers saw the publicity advantage of 
successful racing from the beginning. While few spectators ever ran with a football or 
stood at home plate by the middle of the 20th century, most people drove cars with some 
regularity. Indeed, for most Americans past the age of 16, driving a car was most often a 
necessity. In racing that featured production-based equipment; the public could feel an 
association with the competitors and possibly affection for the winning car. Introducing 
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 24
“performance”35 as a desirable characteristic of an American automobile depended 
heavily on demonstrations of the competitive virtues of a make or model.  
The distinction between more traditional sporting equipment and that used by 
automobile racers has another important dimension. Even though the average spectator 
was more likely to associate with using a car than a baseball bat, the car was a much 
more costly investment. It is useful to remember that in motor sport, moreso than in 
other sports like baseball or tennis, equipment represents a large investment. 
Understanding this expense and the motivations that get cars onto the track is crucial in 
sorting out how racing became a mass phenomenon attracting attention from some of 
the largest commercial institutions that ever existed. The concept of racing a production 
car, and at the same time selling this car, straddles the domains of recreation and utility. 
For production-based racing, the manufacturer of the sporting equipment could facilitate 
sport while simultaneously advertising a durable good of considerable cost enjoying 
widespread demand. For this reason, marketing and promotion efforts as attached to 
                                                 
35 Within automotive culture, the term performance is generally construed broadly as 
the physical aspects of operating a vehicle near maximum capacity. Performance in 
the physical dimension involves processed typically understood in the vocabulary 
and perspective of physics. Conventional definitions within the more physical 
dimension of automotive performance offer measures of physical phenomena such 
as horsepower, cornering load, or weight. Other physical characteristics such as 
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theatrical aspects of automotive performance. That is to say, these phenomena can 
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elements offer the suggestion that a vehicle is capable of physical performance. 
Clearly some of the cars produced by enthusiasts were intended to operate 
according to both aspects of the term performance. Therefore, the significance of 
performance modifications made by amateur enthusiasts should not be measured in 
what discernable physical gains were rendered, but rather in the aspirations of the 
actor. In gauging the impact of the hot rodding movement, even in its infancy, 
wanting your car to look fast or special, is as important as how fast or special it truly 
was. 
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automobile racing assumed a cultural and financial gravity probably never associated 
with selling more conventional sporting equipment.  
Before stock car racing came to epitomize the height of Detroit-funded 
performance, hot rodders shaped the expectations of consumers by developing a 
production-based aesthetic of performance all their own.36 Hot rodders produced one-off 
creations that offered speed, style, and, in some cases, luxury from a mass-produced 
car. As many Americans embraced and celebrated the technological enthusiasm of hot 
rod culture, the public began to expect an opportunity to acquire speed, style, and luxury 
in the cars they bought from Detroit automakers.37 As the age of mass consumption 
resumed after the Second World War, recognition of this factor helped shape the 
aspirations of stock car racers, the men that organized the series they raced in, and the 
factories that sponsored them. 
As racing and general enthusiasm for speed grew, mass producers soon had a 
vested interest in seeing their products applied to use in competition. Whether cars were 
racing on a track or cruising on city streets, the assertion that racing performance suited 
the needs of the average user found a remarkably receptive audience. The idea that a 
vehicle could be at once capable of utilitarian use and worthy of racing competition is an 
important cultural feature of the relationship between mass production and motor sport. 
In cold War American society where power, especially latent power, meant status and 
security, this combination became a powerful sales tool for the automobile industry.38 As 
we shall see, this audience was first introduced to high performance through the 
popularity of California Hot Rod enthusiasts. 
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Initially hot rodding enthusiasts attempted the combination of speed and 
everyday utility through altering their production-based vehicles to resemble and perform 
more like custom-built racing vehicles. Though hot rodders often focused on 
accentuating either speed or luxury, when these perspectives were absorbed by Detroit, 
they were combined. In time the ideal of combined speed, style and luxury would drive 
the design and marketing of American automobiles. During the 1950s and 1960s, the 
notion that a vehicle could be simultaneously mass-produced, operated most often as a 
utilitarian appliance, and be suitable for racing competition ultimately eclipsed reason. 
Though the suggestion that a racecar could be a utilitarian passenger car became a 
powerful tool for vehicle sales, the idea was not wholly formed in the advertising 
departments of American automakers. The suggestion that a consumer car could or 
should possess the capacities of a racecar was also not conceived by devotees of the 
checkered flag. Though it found expression in the advertising copy of corporations and 
on racetracks across the nation, the kernel of this ideal is a consequence of applied 
enthusiasm for automotive speed. The idea that you could have a car that was equally 
suited to street use and performance on the track resulted from the passion for 
automotive “improvement” and “experimentation” that began with widespread availability 
of the elements necessary for modification. To explain how this notion that stock cars 
were appropriate for use in motor sport competition came into being, we must logically 
begin with the hotbed of production-based automotive enthusiasm after World War Two, 
California. 
In the wake of the First World War, Henry Ford’s “Model T” forever altered the 
automotive landscape. It brought the virtues and vices of automobiles to the 
multitudes.39 Mass production changed the car from an expensive luxury, or capital 
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investment, into a ubiquitous appliance. The Model T signaled the divergence between 
automobiles built by hand for the few and cars built through mechanization for the many. 
With the “Tin Lizzie,” everyone could experience the power, personal freedom, and 
entertainment of mobility.  
The decade of the 1920s saw drastic change in the automotive industry, as many 
producers unable or unwilling to realize the economies of mass production techniques 
were driven from business. Yet changes wrought by Fordism on the workshop floor and 
in the marketplace only explain a portion of the impact of mass production on 
automobility in the United States.40 After Ford brought the possibility of auto ownership 
to the masses, a substantial number of Americans owned and operated automobiles for 
the first time. Among those experiencing cars for the first time, mass production offered 
an opportunity to experience an automobile as an owner/mechanic and motor sport as a 
participant. The ubiquity, standardization, and mechanical simplicity of the Model T 
helped swell the ranks of motoring enthusiasts. Frequently, ownership of a “T” was 
accompanied by the cultivation of basic skills as a mechanic. Indeed, as a budding do-it-
yourself mechanical culture developed using the Model T, some enthusiasts found as 
much delight under the hood as behind the wheel.41 No longer the domain of wealthy 
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sportsmen and specialist “mechanicians,”42 amateur automotive repair and sporting use 
experienced a boom during the decade before the depression.43 
Evidence of the impact of mass production on the world of automotive 
enthusiasm is offered by the myriad of accessories produced for the Model T. Items 
varying in cost, ranging from simple to complex and entailing minor or extensive 
modification of original specifications, were advertised in automobile-oriented 
publications, newspapers, and travel guides.44 By 1920, an array of accessories as 
diverse as a steering wheel locks, pneumatic starters, snow tractor conversions, and cut 
glass bud vases were available for the Model T.45 The interchangeability and mass 
consumption of the Model T facilitated the creation of an “aftermarket” for motorists 
interested in altering the performance or appearance of their car.46 The genesis of this 
market is significant because it signaled the transformation of the relationship between 
car and owner. Though the Model T and later mass-produced cars were built to be 
identical, with modest investment owners could transform their car from an appliance 
into an expression of individual ability and preference.47 This suggests that, if the owner 
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was inclined, any model T could be altered to become less like a utilitarian appliance, 
and more like a personalized custom-built technology. 
Though many aftermarket products were intended to make normal repair, 
maintenance and operation easier or more economical, some items were advertised 
only on the basis of increasing vehicle performance.  Although advertising copy typically 
emphasized the economic benefits of a more efficient engine, it was clear that the 
possibility of greater acceleration or higher top speed was the intent. In one 
advertisement, the copy begins describing an overhead- valve cylinder head as “A 
Revolution in Power – Makes the Ford a Real Racer” and goes on to mention how the 
modification was “… practical for Ford pleasure cars and Ford trucks whether you care 
for speed or not.”48 Many of the more elaborate items, requiring more developed 
degrees of mechanical ability, were intended to make the Model T performance more 
like that of a racecar.  
Among such performance accessories were streamline replacement bodies that 
promised to give “… your Ford that snappy, European racing look,”49 and ignition 
systems that would render “a tremendous, power-giving explosion that puts the Ford in 
the class with the higher priced cars.”50 Even before the term “hot rod” was coined, the 
practice of building what came to be known as hot rods was established.51 In this 
process, enthusiasts amended automobiles through building or buying performance 
enhancing accessories to replace or supplement existing production components. 
Whether enthusiasts sought actual increased speed or a car with a speedy appearance, 
their efforts shared common elements. In both cases enthusiasts were working to meet 
their conception of high performance. For some, high performance was more about 
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mastering the physics of horsepower. For others, performance involved attention to the 
aesthetics of speed and luxury. This “do it yourself” ethic and dual emphases on speed 
(physical performance) and style (theatrical performance) formed the ideological basis of 
protean hot rod culture as it emerged nationwide during the 1920s.  
 After discontinuation of Model T production in 1927, aftermarket entrepreneurs 
continued to concentrate their efforts on Ford parts.52 There were plenty of “T’s” for 
tinkerers to work with, and the new Model “A” proved as plentiful and adaptable as its 
predecessor.53 Economies of scale realized through standardized mass production 
continued to heavily determine which components were most available to creative 
enthusiasts willing to tinker. This brand loyalty was likely due to convenience as well as 
technical criteria. Despite losing new car market share during the late 1920s, Ford still 
managed to produce massive quantities of light cars with robust engines amenable to 
modification. As they reached the used car market, the Model A and later all Fords with 
the flathead V8 became the car of choice for hot rodders.54 Though the era of single 
model dominance was over in the new car market, Ford models retained a hold on most 
of the aftermarket parts production. Enthusiasts chose four-cylinder and eight-cylinder 
Fords because of sturdy simple design, and the overwhelming availability of both stock 
and custom parts. Likewise, manufacturers of speed parts were willing to build and 
market accessories for successive Ford models because there were so many out there 
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for enthusiasts to tinker with.55 Eventually these vehicles came to be known as “rods” or 
“hot rods.” 
Though the ubiquity of mass production provoked a truly national trend of 
automotive tinkering, in certain areas the hot rod ideal flourished with greater intensity 
than elsewhere. Around the Los Angeles area, “hot rodding” developed into a movement 
of sizeable proportions before the Second World War. Though there were many reasons 
for this concentration, chief among these was the role of the private car during the rise of 
hot rodding. Unlike most cities elsewhere in the United States, Los Angeles developed in 
a place and time that permitted expansive horizontal growth. As other cities developed 
skyscrapers, with the help of trolley lines and the automobile, Los Angeles sprawled into 
a major city of a very different form. The city grew to suit automobiles. As historian 
James J. Flink relates,  
the combined effect in the 1920s of improved roads, better tourist services, and 
the closed car was that increasingly people came to Southern California in their 
motorcars. Motorization proliferated much faster than population. Between 1919 
and 1920, while the population of Los Angeles roughly doubled, automobile 
registration increased 550 percent, from about 141,000 to 777,000.56  
This trend did not reverse during the 1930s. By the close of the Second World War, the 
city and its inhabitants, therefore, were accustomed to accommodating the car. More 
importantly, substantial use of the automobile in Los Angeles prior to the war guaranteed 
an ample supply of used parts, technical knowledge, and specialty automotive 
machining and fabrication services. 
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Other factors helped Southern California spawn a thriving hot rod culture. The 
mild California climate permitted near year-round experimentation and use. On most 
evenings and weekends, enthusiasts could test their skill as tuner or driver at numerous 
oval track events, drag races and car shows. In comparison, speed enthusiasts in most 
of the eastern U.S. had a more limited season of activity. Along with climate and a 
bounty of cars and their support industries, the geography of California was suited to 
amateur speed contests. The long flat dry lake beds, long boulevards, and straight flat 
farm roads common in the valleys of Southern California provided perfect places to try 
out a fast car. As one frustrated New York hot rodder confessed, “we boys up here in the 
Northeast don’t have the money or time to put into straightaway or competition cars. It’s 
not that we don’t like them, but even if we did build one, we have no place to run that 
type of machinery.”57 Geography and climate certainly helped fuel the vigorous speed 
culture in southern California after World War II.  
The possibility of working and racing with cars for most of the year probably 
explains much of the existing technical knowledge and institutions that also helped 
southern California become a center of automotive speed enthusiasm. By chance, the 
growing region became home to a number of very talented mechanics, machinists, and 
designers. Consequently, Los Angeles hosted the facilities of several purpose-built 
racecar fabricators whose precedent and expertise helped educate and inspire local 
enthusiasts. Racers like Harry Miller, Eddie Meyer, Frank Kurtis, Leo Goosen, Fred 
Offenhauser, and Clay Smith built cars to run in AAA’s premier Championship series, 
and also supplied parts to enthusiasts using production-based equipment.58 The shops 
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that concentrated on purpose built racecars, likely also provided services, materials, and 
employment, to aspiring hot rodders. 
As a car-based city, Los Angeles offered ample opportunities for good speed 
mechanics to hone their skills maintaining unmodified production cars. Often the talents 
of such practiced mechanics turned to recreational use of automobiles. The skills of 
tinkerer geniuses like Ed Winfield, and Vic Edelbrock, Frank McGurk, Ed Iskenderian, 
Wayne Horning, Stu Hilborn and others were directed primarily at production-based 
equipment and came to have profound influence on the postwar hot rod scene as well.59 
The close relationship between cars and southern California, as well as a geography 
and climate suited to automotive recreation helped feed expertise and speed parts to hot 
rodders both before and after the Second World War.60  
After the Second World War, California speed culture enjoyed a renaissance that 
influenced auto enthusiasts and ultimately automobile consumers nationwide. Hot 
rodders carried on the tradition of altering production vehicles by modifying stock 
components, hand-crafting custom accessories and fitting aftermarket add-ons. For hot 
rodders, one happy consequence of the War was the vast supplies of surplus 
metalworking skills, machinery and supplies that wound up in and near Los Angeles. 
Early accounts of hot rodding describe a bounty of surplus materials and tools that 
supplied the raw materials for amateur technical innovation.61 One well-known example 
of using military surplus to build a hot rod was a version of speedster best known as a 
“belly tanker.” These were high-speed streamlined cars built by stuffing a V8 engine and 
rudimentary chassis into an streamlined, torpedo-like auxiliary “drop tank” leftover from 
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the war.62 The pages of Hot Rod and Rod and Custom magazines from the early 1950s 
are filled with examples of other military surplus, things like seat belts and airplane 
engines that were pressed into service as hot rod parts.63 After the Second World War, 
geography, industry, and rekindled American passion for automobiles combined to make 
southern California the hotbed of hot rodding.64 
Fascination with the skill and creativity of the hot rod sub-culture quickly spread 
eastward and outward among automotive circles. A 1949 study conducted by 
sociologists at the University of Chicago describing “Hot Rod Culture” was reprinted in 
the winter 1950 American Quarterly.65 The fact that hot rodding attracted the attention of 
academics in Chicago and the editor of the American Quarterly suggests that the 
influence of hot rod culture was growing. In drawing distinctions between the sorts of 
individuals who participate in hot rodding, the author, Gene Balsey, classified 
enthusiasts according to the types of cars they build. With this categorization, he 
developed distinctions between hot rodders interested in an aesthetic of speed and 
those more interested in the application of speed. These distinctions described the two 
sorts of influence hot rodding exercised over the creative imaginations of Detroit 
designers and engineers as the decade of the 1950’s wore on.  
Balsey also suggested that hot rodding was an implicit critique of mass 
production.66 He described hot rodders as creators of new engineering and styling 
aesthetics, altering products intended for mass consumption to suit their own ends. He 
suggested that the sense of rebellion embodied in the unconventional recreational use of 
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automobiles was a rejection of the stock production automobiles offered by Detroit for 
conventional use. “The hot rodder and his circle are highly articulate in their objection to 
the Detroit product as an automobile,” Balsey wrote, “and the reason is that they have 
little respect for the Detroit solution of a problem in transportation, engineering, and 
esthetics.” He continues, “The huge scale of the hot rodder’s protest is immediately 
suggested by the sales of its parts industry – a cool eight million per year gross 
income.”67 Balsey’s article suggested that consumers wanted excitement and status 
from their car purchase, not just utility. He also suggested that Detroit was aware of what 
hot rodders were up to.  
Though other cultural phenomena probably influenced public opinion, as 
expressed in printed media, the scale of fascination with the hot rod overshadowed most 
other popular automotive movements. Both in the media available to the general public 
and in that targeted to the automobile industry, the attention devoted to other forms of 
automobile enthusiasm did not compare with that given hot rodding. Stock car racing, as 
conducted by the AAA and NASCAR during the early 1950s, was a growing example of 
the fusion of mass production and automotive recreation. Yet at the time it did not attract 
the same attention as hot rodding. Likewise, sports car racing, as prompted by the influx 
of imported European sports cars and performance sedans, did not receive the same 
attention as hot rodding. A review of mainstream automotive publications like Motor 
Trend and Car Life show much more attention to hot rodding activities on the West coast 
than any other sort of popular automotive movement. 
More specialized automotive literature mirrored this fascination with hot rodding. 
During the decade of the 1950s, there was but one, brief article on stock car racing in 
Automotive Industries, the major trade journal for the world of car making. During that 
same period, there was little mention of the growing amateur sports car rally and road 
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racing movement. In the early postwar years, enthusiasm for the emergent culture of hot 
rodding dominated mainstream discussions of automotive enthusiasm and filtered 
across geographic and class lines to all of America. In November 1945, Life magazine 
published an article describing how hot rodders raced at “100 mph across the California 
desert.”68 Another Life article in 1949 entitled “The Hot Rod Problem: teen-agers 
organize to experiment with mechanized suicide” explored the youthful exuberance of 
California speed culture.69 And the fascination with youthful speed culture was not 
restricted to the United States. Fascination with hot rodding automobiles even stretched 
to America’s closest European counterpart. A New Yorker article republished in the 
October 21, 1949 issue of the British motoring magazine The Autocar, described the 
U.S. hot rod industry as a 12 million dollar a year phenomenon capable of attracting over 
100,000 fans to a car show.70 
The notoriety and popularity of hot-rodding nation-wide was not due solely to 
publicity in mainstream publications. Magazines such as Hot Rod, Rod and Custom and 
Car Craft emerged during the late closing years of the 1940s to exploit the growing hot 
rodding market. These monthlies offered a goldmine of information for hot rodders 
including feature pictorials of other enthusiast’s vehicles, speed parts advertisements, 
“how-to” technical information, and drag racing rules and schedules. Articles with titles 
like “Compression Ratio,” “Fuel Injection Facts” and “Chop Your Top” described in great 
detail techniques useful for increasing horsepower or altering the exterior of production 
automobiles.71 As one Rod & Custom editor pointed out, “I like to think of Rod & Custom 
as a sort of gathering place for ideas and for reports on projects that auto enthusiasts 
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throughout the country have seen fit to undertake.”72 Through editorials and 
correspondence columns they also refereed the evolving custom car engineering and 
styling aesthetic as participants shaped the performance parameters of their hobby.  
Booming popular attention to speed sport as fostered by the explosive national 
growth of hot rodding helped these magazines become nationally influential in shaping 
speed culture. One enthusiast publication in particular helped organize and expand the 
hot rod movement. Hot Rod magazine realized fantastic popularity and launched an 
automotive publishing empire. As an indication of the popularity explosion enjoyed by 
the hot rodding movement, by 1949, only two years after its introduction, Hot Rod 
magazine enjoyed a monthly national circulation of 290,000 readers.73 In 1951, Hot Rod 
was the central organizer of the National Hot Rod Association, a confederation of 
enthusiasts, promoters, vendors, and local car clubs that organized drag racing events 
nation wide.74 Soon competing magazines such as Hop Up, Honk, Rod and Custom, 
Speed Mechanics, and Car Craft propped up to tap the burgeoning readership of the 
pioneer.  
Even as hot rodding, horsepower and automotive performance became popular 
phenomena, widespread fascination with speed culture found expression in more 
traditional popular mediums. In one notable crossover, Hot Rodding staked a claim in 
the music and dance arenas of popular culture. In 1955 Jack Benny’s Sportsmen quartet 
launched the single title, “The Hot Rod Hop.” According to Hot Rod magazine, “The 
setting for the lyric is a hot rod garage, where the gang dances to a beat-up piano, 
augmented by extemporaneous automotive rhythm sounds” rendered by notable studio 
musicians Buddy Cole, Don Raffell, Chuck Gentry, and Sam Weiss. Meant as a fusion of 
youthful interest, the “Hop” included authentic hot rodding sounds such as “the click of a 
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jack, a fender grinder, a mallet hitting tire beading, a brake drum being tapped by a 
wrench, and a twin-pipe Cad draggin’ wagon engine.”75 Even if “The Hot Rod Hop” did 
not secure an exalted place in musical history, it does demonstrate consciousness of hot 
rodding among scions of popular culture. 
Beyond coverage in conventional popular venues, the ideas and ideals of hot 
rodding appeared in influential industry publications. At first, such widespread popular 
fascination with speed and speed styling seemed almost to catch publishers of 
automotive industry periodicals off guard. A February 1949 article written by the 
technical editor of Automotive Industries posed the question, “What makes Hot Rod 
Engines Hot?” The discussion that followed offered technical descriptions of engine 
modification techniques tried and trusted by the hot rodders.76 1950 editions of Ford 
Field, described the mechanical details and profit potential of the “Ardun” overhead valve 
conversion for a “flathead” Ford V8, a popular (though costly) hot rod modification.77 
Industry fascination with the technical developments of hot rodders extended beyond 
trade publications into the professional societies in part responsible for American cars. In 
1951, representatives from Hot Rod magazine were invited to speak at the annual 
meeting of the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) and exhibit an actual hot rod.78  
By 1952, Ford Field was reporting the establishment of an annual Ford-funded 
scholarship to be awarded to a victorious hot rodder competing at the annual speed 
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events held on the salt flats in Bonneville, Utah.79 Clearly, hot rodding was seen both as 
a place to find new technical ideas and cultivate new technical talent. 
Attention directed toward hot rodders in these magazines and through these 
contests suggests that auto manufacturers were as fascinated with the burgeoning cult 
of hot rod enthusiasts as the rest of the country. Numerous articles throughout 
1949,1950 and 1951 in the trade publication Automotive Industries suggest that the 
creativity and popularity of Hot Rodding were known to automotive executives and 
engineers. The February 1949 article entitled, “What Makes Hot Rodding Hot?” 
describes in great technical detail how hot rodders coaxed extra performance from 
production machinery.80  
A subsequent article in Automotive Industries described how the youthful hot rod 
culture had changed the automotive market, “The higher compression, lower 
center of gravity, improved ignition, and streamlining that are so popular in 
today’s advertising headlines,” noted its author, “are old hat to the youngsters 
whose cars are turning 150 mph in their speed runs.”81  
 
Another article entitled, “$150,000 Worth of Hot Rods”82 described recent hot 
rodder styling and horsepower-producing innovations in evidence at a large hot rod 
show in Los Angeles. Ample photographs of engines and whole vehicles from this large 
west coast hot rod show articulated the growing size, dynamism, and popularity of hot 
rod culture.  
Fascination with hot rod culture included speculation about how it might influence 
American automotive culture in general. In his article, “Size and Scope of the Hot Rod 
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Industry,” Robert Barsky observed that “…every hot rod owner is a customer for the 
products and supplies of the conventional automotive market” and that “…the taste of a 
generation of perspective new car buyers is being shaped by the refinements they are 
making on their own cars.”83 He described how the youthful hot rod culture had changed 
the automotive market. Barsky continues,  
Certainly the taste of a generation of new car buyers is being shaped by the 
lessons they are learning in making … refinements on their own cars. They are 
going to demand of Detroit the characteristics they prize so highly: absolute 
functionalism in design and decoration; a high level of engineering efficiency; and 
simplicity of maintenance and repair. 84  
Popular fascination with the combination of horsepower, speed, and style resulted in part 
from the influence of hot rodding. This aesthetic of performance, of speed, luxury, and 
speedy styling as expressed in the creations of hot rodders would shape the 
expectations of American automotive consumers.  
By 1950 two forms of vehicles, alternately focused on speed and style, emerged 
within the hot rodding movement. Expanding horsepower and the plethora of speed 
parts incorporated into factory designs resulted more from the hot rodders purely 
interested in drag racing and horsepower. As drag racing competition began to require 
heavy financial commitment, a different sub-group of hot rodders began to focus more 
on the external appearance of their cars.85 Car shows, hot rodding magazines, and 
increasing public dislike for the dangers of speed contests on public roads helped boost 
the status of the purely stylistic dimension of hot rodding.  
Though the movement probably began as an attempt to mimic the technically 
sophisticated pure-racing variety of hot rod, the customizers, as they came to be known, 
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soon developed an aesthetic of their own. Rooted in the appearance of speed, custom 
culture also celebrated luxurious comfort, personalized styling, and high standards of 
workmanship. If these enthusiasts could not build a car that was fast on the lake beds 
and drag strips, then they could build one that looked and sounded fast – albeit with a 
few more amenities than their racier cousins within the movement. These hot rodders 
extended the hot rod ethos of sound craftsmanship into an aesthetic expressing the hot 
rod culture’s philosophy of performance. Though not built to race on drag strips, these 
cars were most often mechanically sophisticated and fast. Additionally, these vehicles 
carried elements of luxury and novelty in exterior and interior augmentations or 
modification. Cars emphasizing individual style and personal craftsmanship, that were 
not specifically intended for competition or timed speed runs, were known as customs. 
Hot rodders focused on styling the exterior of their “custom” cars were the first to exert 
influence on automobile production. 
The notion that consumers wanted a production car that was stylish and fast and 
technically sophisticated began influencing Detroit stylists, advertisers and promoters 
during the early 1950s.86 As George Walker, styling consultant and later vice president 
of styling for Ford Motor Company, commented in 1951, ” influence on tomorrows 
designs comes from hot rods and low silhouette cars like the California customs.”87 
Clearly the activities of enthusiasts exerted some influence on the actions of automotive 
designers.  
Cars influenced by the custom movement foreshadowed changes in regular 
Detroit production models. On the outside, such cars were stripped of chrome, lowered, 
and simplified even as engine displacement and horsepower increased. Popular 
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operations such as “chopping,” “sectioning,” “channeling,” and “zeeing” were applied to 
production vehicles to lengthen their proportions and move them closer to the ground. 
These procedures often required complete disassembly of the vehicle and highly skilled 
metal craft. “Chopping” referred to removing a section of the vehicle’s roof support pillars 
to lower the top of the car. “Sectioning” described the practice of adding pie shaped 
sections of frame rail to the custom’s frame in order to move suspension mounting points 
higher. Higher suspension mounting points lowered the remainder of the car over the 
suspension. The third procedure, “Channeling,” was the most elaborate. It involved 
lowering the body of a vehicle on its supporting frame by building channels in the 
floorpans. Using these techniques, cars were lowered or given rake (lower nose and 
higher rear end) to mimic the silhouette of drag racers. The lengthened, low and often 
raked body of a hot rod helped maintain traction with weight transfer and stable 
aerodynamics at speed. The long, low, streamlined body of a customs often 
exaggerated this look. That is not to say that custom car builders did not care what was 
under the hood of their creations. As mentioned earlier, like all hot rodders, the 
customizers were devotees of enhanced horsepower. But their primary focus was on 
how their car looked. Though much attention was paid to the quality and power of the 
engine, the main focus was style.  
By 1950, design trends in the auto industry reflected at least one automaker’s 
growing understanding of the selling power of the hot rod aesthetic. In an apparent play 
to cash in on the custom car vogue, the 1950 Mercury and Lincoln lines of cars together 
featured three “Customized” models.88 Ford Field, a monthly trade magazine intended 
for dealers, described how California custom techniques were applied as new option 
packages in 1950.  These versions were “marked by unusual customized interior and 
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exterior trim treatment” including extra chrome, extra plating and elaborate two-tone 
color schemes inside and out. The General Manager of Sales for Lincoln- Mercury 
commented that these models “. . . introduce a new style trend for the owner who seeks 
custom distinction for his personal car.” Ford was quick to capitalize on the popular 
appeal of hot rodding by offering ornamental options just two years after postwar car 
production resumed in earnest.89 That they introduced more cosmetic changes that were 
optional and required less tooling cost suggests that Ford was both unprepared to offer 
increased horsepower and unwilling to make serious mechanical changes without 
gauging the scale and scope of emerging popular fascination with automotive speed. 
Like the custom variety of hot rodders, American automakers soon stressed 
lower, longer designs, novel use of chrome elements, and elaborate paint. The 
aesthetics of American automobile design drew heavily on the experimental creations of 
Custom car builders. These cars exaggerated or even predicted styling details from 
Detroit. As Eugene Jaderquist relates,  
For years, while autos were appearing on the streets with exposed headlights, 
the body craftsmen [customizers] patiently tucked, or ‘frenched’ them into the 
fender metal [and] the Cadillac method of bringing the exhaust pipes through the 
rear bumper is something that Barris (one of the more influential California 
Customizers) and friends have been digging for years. 90 
Hand-done bodywork sporting larger tailfins, exaggerated chrome elements, air scoops 
on the hood, or fenders evocative of the jet age were sculpted, and unique paint 
schemes were applied in shimmering metalflake. The interior of these cars received 
similar attention. Seats were covered in lavish upholstery in colors and patterns intended 
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to complement the exterior color scheme and mechanical controls received plating, paint 
or polish.  
Eventually the custom car aesthetic seemed to exert influence on the overall 
dimensions of production vehicles. Detroit approximated the long and low look cultivated 
in California. Rather than create a lower center of gravity by chopping, sectioning, or 
channeling, American automakers simply lengthened their models. One Ford 
advertisement proudly announced that the 1955 model was the “Longest, Lowest, 
Roomiest and Most Powerful Ever Built.”91 Even with the introduction of “compact” 
models in response to the recession of 1958, the average length of automobiles 
increased over seven inches between 1940 and 1960. In 1958, John Keats estimated in 
The Insolent Chariots, his lampoon of the 1950s American automotive obsession, that if 
one foot were cut off each car in New York City, an extra 80 miles of roadway would 
become available.92 
In time, automakers further moved to cultivate and capitalize on these 
expectations by offering options that brought some of the hot rod speed aesthetic with a 
new car purchase. Horsepower enhancing features pioneered by hot rodders and later 
offered by manufacturers included multiple carburetors, dual exhaust, mechanical fuel 
injection, and supercharging. 93 Of dual exhaust, one writer in Ford Field commented, 
“When Cadillac recently adopted dual muffler equipment for use with its new improved 
V-8 engines, it only did what hundreds of builders of Ford “hot rods” have already done 
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by providing an earlier escape for the burned gasses.”94 Though it would be years before 
Ford products were offered with dual exhausts, it was clear that automakers initially 
adopted this power enhancing configuration after it was pioneered and popularized by 
hot rodders. Similar circumstances surrounding the adoption of multiple carburetors, fuel 
injection, and supercharging suggest that the lessons learned by hot rodders were not 
lost on Detroit.  
In 1953, high performance engineer Arkus Duntov suggested to his General 
Motors boss that market share could be enhanced by pursuing high performance focus 
for Chevrolet products. In a memo titled “Thoughts pertaining to youth, hot rodders, and 
Chevrolet” he stated that 
The Hot Rod movement and interest in things connected with hop-up and speed 
is still growing. As an indication, the publications devoted to hot rodding and 
hopping-up, of which some half dozen have a very large circulation and are 
distributed nationally, did not exist some six years ago. From cover to cover they 
are full of Fords. It is not surprising that the majority of hot rodders are eating, 
sleeping and dreaming modified Fords. They know Ford parts from stem to stern 
better than the Ford people themselves. A young man buying a magazine for the 
first time immediately becomes introduced to Ford. It is reasonable to assume 
that when hot rodders or hot rod-influenced persons buy transportation, they buy 
Fords. As they progress in age and income, they graduate from jalopies to 
second-hand Fords, then to new Fords. Should we consider that it would be 
desirable to make these youths Chevrolet-minded? I think that we are in a 
position to carry out a successful attempt. However, there are many factors 
against us:  
1. Loyalty and experience with Ford 
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2. Hop-up industry is geared to Ford 
3. Law of numbers – thousands are and will be working on Fords for active 
competition 
4. Appearance of Ford’s overhead [valve] V8, now one year ahead of us. 
 
Concerned about the timing of Ford keeping young hot-rodders attached to 
Ford’s virtual monopoly over hot-rodding use, Duntov proposed to get involved indirectly 
in the race for the prestige of speed and horsepower. He suggested that 
The slide rule potential of our RPO V8 engine is extremely high, but to let things 
run their natural course would put us one year behind – and then not too many 
hot rodders would pick Chevrolet for development. One factor which can largely 
overcome this handicap would be the availability of ready-engineered parts for 
higher output.95  
 
Clearly, influential decision makers in Detroit were familiar with the marketing 
potential of speed parts, as well as the popular cache associated with hot rod cars. Such 
awareness suggests that steadily increasing horsepower figures during the fifties and 
sixties can be attributed in part to the popularity of hot rodding. It also suggests that 
factories devoted attention to maximizing the horsepower potential of their engines long 
before there was much use in stock car racing. Even if hot rodders were not active 
participants in the so-called horsepower race, a period during the 1950s when 
competing makes of vehicles upped horsepower ratings each year, they helped create 
an atmosphere conducive to spiraling horsepower figures. Clear evidence of this 
increased demand for horsepower is suggested by the increasing power to weight ratio 
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of American cars. In the years between 1930 and 1958, the average weight of an 
American made automobile went up 60 percent.  Over that same time period, the 
average horsepower increased 400 percent.96 Between 1950 and 1963, the 
displacement of the largest Ford passenger car engines increased from 232 to 427 cubic 
inches. Between 1955 and 1963 the size of Chevrolet’s largest engines increased from 
255 to 427 cubic inches.97 Chrysler products between 1953 and 1965 increased in 
maximum available engine size from 250 to 426 cubic inches.98 Eventually the lure of 
horsepower would draw the automakers’ racing teams onto the stock car tracks of 
America and speed conscious consumers into automotive showrooms, but more power 
meant new engines, engineering and retooling. Detroit addressed the custom style 
movement before expanding engine capacity and horsepower ratings.  
Other features pioneered by hot rodders in general, and customizers in 
particular, soon appeared on mass production vehicles as optional equipment. Gadgets 
like electric door locks, electric trunk locks, and power windows appeared on customized 
cars before they became options on mass-produced sedans. Other more elaborate 
options, difficult to build without substantial capital and an engineering staff, were offered 
by automakers during the 1950s. Gadgetry such as power retractable convertibles, 
automatic headlight dippers, powered retractable hardtops, and power seats would all 
become optional throughout a wide price range of models allowing consumers to evoke 
the spirit of custom car craft through a transaction with their car dealers. Indeed, by 1958 
the variety of options had reached staggering proportions. By figuring the number of 
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permutations in vehicles made possible through custom order at dealerships, one 
physicist determined that there were more possible combinations of automotive 
accessories, options, trim packages and paint schemes than atoms in the universe.99 By 
marketing the aesthetic of rod and custom culture, American automakers commodified 
the craft and youthful creativity of hot rod culture. Consumers could buy a facsimile of a 
custom car by selecting from a palette of options to create, through transaction rather 
than the application of skill, the illusion of personalized originality.  
Through the development of optional equipment the material culture of hot 
rodding could be easily approximated by Detroit’s mass-produced sedans. Because of 
the flexibility of the culture’s form and convention, and because of the variety of 
innovations made by hot rodders, there was ample opportunity for automakers to mimic 
speed and custom elements of car design within the boundaries of profitable production. 
The flexibility of the hot rod form, and the creativity of hot rodders meant that no clear 
definition of a hot rod existed.100 Such ambiguity was due in part to the divergence of hot 
rod culture between those enthusiasts primarily interested in horsepower and the 
customizers, and in part to the rebellious nature of the movement. As with automotive 
styling itself, the dynamic between innovation, acceptance and obsolescence in the 
world of hot rodding functioned at rapid rate. Among horsepower hot rodders, the best 
means of achieving top speed was an issue open to varied interpretation. Some 
dragsters were built on a massive scale with multiple engines or one giant engine, while 
others were more lightweight and powered by only one engine. Among customizers the 
exact conventions of cool were likewise, constantly in flux.  
The shifting aesthetic of custom hot rodders was continually mimicked by 
corporate stylists. Michael Lamm describes how hot rodders and Detroit alternately 
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added and removed chrome from production cars in adherence to prevailing aesthetic.101 
A Lamm writes, “Evidence of the impact of kustoms [sic] can be seen in such items as 
the tunneled headlamps on the 1952 Mercury, the dechroming of the 1954 Pontiac 
Parisienne Motorama show car and the entire 1955 Thunderbird, which was essentially 
a lowered, sectioned, two-place version of a full-sized 1955 Ford convertible.”102 As soon 
as hot rodding began removing chrome from body styles, Detroit followed suit. When 
chrome elements then disappeared from production designs, it became “cool” for 
rodders to add chrome. Continued cycles of variation and emulation naturally kept the 
detailed definition of what constituted a hot rod very fluid. This flexibility allowed 
elements of the hot rod ethos and aesthetic to be appropriated when convenient by 
designers, engineers and advertising agencies. 
Though the emphasis on the aesthetic dimension of performance grew rapidly 
throughout the 1950s, other hot rodders remained true to the experimental car builder 
logic and craft. While attentive to the appearance of their machines, this strain of hot 
rodder remained focused on the exploration and application of the horsepower potential 
of their cars. These enthusiasts formed the basis for the development of organized drag 
racing and top speed runs.103 Other elements within the sub-culture of enthusiasts were 
more interested in sculpting an original, more comfortable, though also mechanically well 
“sorted out,” vehicle. The underlying similarity across all hot rodders was the assumption 
that mass-produced Detroit “iron” could be improved and that experimenting with 
machines was fun. Among the culture of hot rodding, speed zealots and customizers 
shared an aesthetic of mechanical ingenuity, carefully executed bodywork, and highly 
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developed craftsmanship. Crucially, a general lack of applied experience with cars 
meant that the subtleties of craftsmanship and original design, so valued among hot 
rodders, were lost on the general public. As such, the external look of custom cars, and 
crude indicators of performance like “horsepower,” became the modes of association 
preferred by most Americans.  
Most significantly for the purposes of this study, the technical and aesthetic 
products of hot rod culture were publicized widely and influenced new car production in 
Detroit. The subsequent impact on American car culture (and car marketing) was well 
understood by mid decade. In a 1954 article, one anthropologist familiar with hot rod 
culture suggested that,  
since the late 1920s, when building “hot rods” first became popular, there has 
been a steady expansion of this activity until, interest in and work on hot rods 
seems, in this area, a part of growing up for an increasingly large number of 
youths . . . experimentation in this field by thousands of young men has had a 
far-reaching effect on the entire automobile industry, not only resulting in the 
manufacture of countless special parts for the home car builders, but influencing 
basic automotive design. 104  
 
American automakers were able to hijack the fascination with speed and speedy 
styling built by hot rod enthusiasts by building and racing cars of their own that came to 
epitomize speed and style. Manufacturers pushed their styling innovations by producing 
experimental theme cars. Cars with exotic bodywork and elaborate mechanical systems 
like GM’s turbine engined “Firebird XP-21,” Ford’s “FX-Atmos,” and the Packard 
“Panther” were exhibited to demonstrate the creativity and ingenuity of different 
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manufacturers. 105 These design exercises and the car shows they filled found ready 
acceptance among American automotive culture through dealer publicity and detailed 
coverage in automotive magazines. Yet these “cars of the future,” as they were often 
described, were mainly design exercises. While some of the aesthetic detail these 
vehicles possessed might find their way onto production cars, they were not themselves 
capable of demonstrating performance. Put another way, “cars of the future” were 
analogous to customizers - more about theatrical performance and less about physical 
performance.  
The organization of NASCAR stock car racing and explosive growth of all forms 
of production-based racing in the 1950s introduced other opportunities to exhibit the 
speed potential of a production car to the buying public. Beginning in the mid 1950s 
automakers employed stock car racing to advertise actual speed. As one Chevrolet 
advertisement put it, “Engine and performance claims don’t count in this league. Here 
you’ve either got it or you haven’t.”106 
Though hot rodders defined how a fast, cool American car should look and 
perform long before stock car racing emerged into national prominence, stock car racing 
would ultimately carry American automakers message to the public. Races between 
ostensibly “stock” cars were a reliable and inexpensive way for manufacturers to build a 
speed reputation of their own.  Participating in a “strictly stock”107 series was the ideal 
means to prove the speed potential of their cars. For example, Hudson initiated 
manufacturer participation in stock car racing in 1951 by introducing special speed 
options for their “Hornet” engine and sponsoring two teams under the technical direction 
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of Marshall Teague and Smokey Yunick.108 In 1954, Oldsmobile followed suit and began 
offering optional final drive gear ratios intended for racing.109 Pontiac began introducing 
special performance parts, cataloged and sold as “Regular Production Option” (RPO) 
through dealerships.110 The involvement of major manufacturers would continue and in 
some cases expand through the 1960s.  
In several instances, major factory race teams were formed. By 1955, three large 
automakers were sponsoring factory stock car racing teams. Carl Kiekhaefer 
campaigned Chrysler 300s with heavy factory support to gain publicity for his “Mercury” 
outboard engine company.111 In 1955, Chevrolet created a racing team under the 
direction of Mauri Rose using experienced stock car mechanic Smokey Yunick. Also in 
1955, under the direction of Pete DePaolo, Ford set up a racing division in Long Beach, 
California. When Yunick left for Ford in 1957, Chevrolet opened its own stock car racing 
shop called the Southeastern Development Company (SEDCO) that operated out of a 
major dealership in Atlanta.112 
Despite a ban on racing activity mutually agreed upon by Automobile 
Manufacturers Association members in 1957, support of racing continued. Ford, 
Chevrolet, Chrysler and Pontiac all continued to offer race-grade equipment under the 
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RPO monikers of “Super Duty,” “Export” or “Police duty”. Among this factory produced 
racing equipment were performance chassis parts, high output engine components, and 
exotica such as stainless exhaust systems and multiple carburetor induction systems.113 
Continued unsanctioned factory support of stock car racing suggests the recognized 
value of motor sport advertising. Though automakers decreased development of 
technologies useful for production-based oval racing, the expertise and factory speed 
options pioneered there would continue to race in stock car circuits for the following 
three decades.114  
The rod and custom aesthetic influenced the emergence of stock car racing in 
two ways. First, the technical experience of the hot rodders would apply to the efforts of 
stock car builders from the beginning. Evidence of the diffusion of techniques can be 
seen in the methods used by stock car mechanics to skirt the published rules. They 
applied the same techniques common among rodders and customizers intended to 
create the illusion of streamlined speed, as explained in magazines like Hot Rod, Car 
Craft and Rod and Custom. Early stock car racecars were modified yet maintained the 
illusion of stock. Though stockers racing in both AAA and NASCAR were more 
constrained by rules than hot rodders, the “box” they worked within to build extra 
horsepower utilized the same production components as the basis for experimentation. 
Inside the engine bay, there is clear evidence that the West Coast hot rodders provided 
components and expertise for the emerging stock car series. Retired stock car 
mechanics from the 1950s almost to a man refer to the “speed parts houses” on the 
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west coast as a source of inspiration, technical guidance and parts for their racing 
exploits.115  
Technical knowledge borrowed from the hot rodders was not confined to 
the engine bay. When stock car rules mandated chassis reinforcement, or when 
racing experimentation moved into the realm of body alterations, stockers used 
techniques pioneered by the hot rod and custom movement to lower and 
strengthen their cars. A later example of body alteration, the Ford Torino 
Talladega, illustrates well the application of techniques such as sectioning and 
chopping applied to stock car racing. When building the prototypical Torino 
Talladega, Ralph Moody, who ran a body shop in Massachusetts before coming 
south to race stockers, sectioned a stock Torino to create a sloped front nose, a 
lower center of gravity, and a smaller frontal area. This car became the prototype 
for the limited production Ford Torino Talladega of 1968. 
Rod and custom techniques intended to convey neatness of craftsmanship and 
design were also utilized by stock car mechanics to hide alterations from inspectors. 
Artifacts recovered from Smokey Yunick’s racecar shop reveal how “filling” techniques 
were used to “move” holes back into stock positions.116 The original holes of a bumper 
mounting bracket, after being “moved” through an illegal alteration, were welded up, and 
a new hole in the stock location was drilled. For inspectors using the hole for reference it 
remained in the same place when in fact the overall dimensions of the bumper bracket 
(and therefore the position of the bumper) had been moved.117   
Some of the technical influence on stock car technique was more direct. Racers 
along the east coast competing in the modified ranks that fed talent into NASCAR Grand 
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National racing depended on the expertise of hot rodders for cars. As one 1947 
Saturday Evening Post article explained, “The package of chrome-plated dynamite you 
see there was never born on a Ford assembly line. It was dreamed up by Mr. Ed 
Schenck, the West Coast hot-rod wizard….”118 This dependence on supplies and skill 
from the West Coast did not end once NASCAR became established. As Bobby Allison 
describes, technology from the hot rodders remained necessary for top performance in 
the modified ranks into the early 1960s. Allsion describes his first opportunity to buy 
genuine California speed parts from a east coast supplier commenting that 
I had seen this advertisement and I knew that Honest Charlie Speed Shop had 
all these goodies that any racer would have to be interested in and I had all this 
[prize] money. So we went there and I went to Honest Charlie’s and I bought 
some new parts for my racecar.  Bought an aluminum flywheel, which at the time 
I even had a steel flywheel on the car.  Bought aluminum fly wheel and aluminum 
hubs and some things and took the car apart and did all this remodeling and 
headed back to Dixie Speedway for Friday night at Birmingham.119  
Though Allison would eventually graduate to the ranks of strictly stock where hot 
rod parts were illegal, he was indebted to the hot rod culture of the west coast.  
 Another, fundamentally more important consequence of hot rodding was 
that it helped change the way Americans thought about their cars. Either through 
phenomenal horsepower or custom-style bodywork, Detroit’s cars and their 
advertising copy written to address the 1950s auto market were meant to convey 
the potential of speed. The efforts of hot rodders and the subsequent focus of 
automobile advertisers suggested that American car owners could have speed 
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and luxury at the same time. This illusion sold cars. Consumers didn’t seem to 
mind that it was illegal everywhere to find out if your car could really reach the 
140 MPH printed on the speedometer, or that tailfins actually added tremendous 
instability at high speeds, or that even if you did push the limits of the overgrown 
engine in your fast- looking car, the brakes and suspension could scarcely 
handle it.  The era of hot rodding whetted the public appetite for speed, and 
romanticized the status, youthful appeal and speed potential of a powerful car.  
Beyond appealing to the youthful hubris associated with hot rodding, the hot 
rodding ethos, as embodied in automakers’ products, suggested that power and control 
were possible through technology, that power was morally good. This idea resonated 
with growing American dependence on technology for security during the cold war 
years.120 In an article entitled “Death on Wheels” defending increased emphasis on 
horsepower, performance is cast as a safety issue. “In recent months you may have 
read about the so-called “horsepower race” in the automobile industry. This race is a 
myth” read one magazine article: 
The purpose of the manufacturers has not been to have increase horsepower for 
the sake of speed . . . it is to improve performance, enhance operating economy, 
and to provide the car-owner with an additional safety factor . . . added 
horsepower under the hood gives the motorist a precious ‘reserve of power’ for 
those breath-taking driving situations in which a momentary flash of speed may 
save his life and that of his passengers.121  
 
This defense of increasing speed suggests that empowering the driver, offering 
the consumer greater horsepower and enhanced “performance” would provide more 
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rather than less safety. Despite contradicting earlier statements in this article that 
suggest driver error, rather than a lack of horsepower was the root cause of most 
accidents, the logic of “power equals safety” prevailed throughout automotive literature. 
Though the same article reports that “85 per cent of accidents were cause by 
“momentary distractions” of the driver” and that a “Pennsylvania Turnpike study 
attributed 37 per cent of crashes to recklessness or incompetence on the part of the 
driver,”122 the idea that more power might just get a careless driver into trouble that much 
faster is not broached. Some advertisements combined the contradictory claims of 
safety, direct association with racing performance, and high speed driving for recreation. 
To answer critics of skyrocketing horsepower figures, automakers construed extra power 
as a safety consideration rather than a bid to build high-performance prestige. 
 In an attempt to be all things to all consumers, Chevrolet offered to provide 
speed, superior handling, and safety, all with increased horsepower. “The records prove 
that in NASCAR Short Track events ’55 Chevrolets have rolled up almost twice as many 
points as their nearest competitior,” one advertisement read, “Because the ’55 Chevrolet 
is a lot more than just a plain passenger car!” The advertisement continued to suggest 
that for the consumer, enhanced performance can “mean more fun behind the wheel – 
and safer, surer control wherever you drive.”123 Despite possible contradictions between 
safety and speed, automakers continued suggesting that power equals safety 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Despite a recession in 1958, and concurrent 
introduction of compact cars like the Ford Falcon, Chevy II, Pontiac Tempest, and 
Chevrolet Corvair, consumers continued to respond to this suggestion and the example 
set by hot rodders and stock car racers by purchasing increasingly powerful cars. 
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In a cold war society preoccupied with the security offered by potential force, the 
American car was a symbol of personal power. Stock car racing simply offered a great 
place to show how powerful a production car could appear to be. Once the chic of speed 
and speedy appearance had been adopted by mass producers, the expectation for 
longer, lower, more powerful cars created machines suited (after mechanical 
reinforcement) for the spectacle of stock car racing. Big engines, big cars and the big 
egos of white Southern men combined on stock car tracks throughout the nation to 
display the capacities of Detroit’s wares.  
But why were newly established national stock car racing series chosen for 
advertising cultivation over the established events begun on the west coast? Ironically, 
the hot rodders helped build the American fascination with speedy cars, but stock car 
racers from a very different part of the country ultimately were used to advertise Detroit’s 
speed offerings. It seems evident that the manufacturers did not choose hot rodders to 
advertise their products because their creations seldom closely resembled production 
cars. Indeed, hot rod efforts were a reaction to the quality and form of the automaker’s 
status quo, a rolling critique rendered in steel, fiberglass, aluminum and iron. As 
University of Chicago graduate student Gene Balsey reported, “the hot rodder and his 
circle are highly articulate in their objections to the Detroit Product as an automobile, and 
the reason is that they have little respect for the Detroit solution of a problem in 
transportation, engineering and esthetics.”124 Yet though the logic of hot rodding and 
customizing was the antithesis to mass production, the goals of speed and luxury that 
hot rodders pursued were ideally suited to mass consumption. Though the enthusiasts 
who were engaged in the rod and custom movement built the enthusiasm sold by 
American automakers, they were not enlisted by those manufacturers to address the 
market they helped create.  
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Another reason that Detroit chose to support stock car racing was that these 
racers were willing to race while maintaining the illusion that the cars they used were 
truly mass production. NASCAR built adjustments and substitutions for production 
components into their rules to keep more cars competitive, all the while retaining the 
phrase that cars had to “maintain stock appearance.”125 Theirs was the advertising 
illusion magnified through race engineering under the cloak of stock car designation. 
Conveniently, the spectacle of stock car racing involved little of the worship of technical 
novelty, rather the focus was on competition. This suited manufacturers who advertised 
their racing sedans as “stock” without confessing that much of the running gear came 
from trucks.126  
It also seems likely that the requirements of stock car racing better suited the 
design and capabilities of production vehicles. Stress on driveline components and the 
pressure to minimize weight are much less during a long event on an oval track than 
during a drag race. Unlike drag racing where the straight-line sprint places massive initial 
stress on engine and driveline components, the more fluid, circular action of stock car 
racing placed more gradual demand on vehicle components. Also, 100 or 500 hundred 
miles of a stock car event might better advertise the capacities of a vehicle than a 
quarter mile burst of speed.  
Racing on an oval provided immediate association with the “golden age” of 
American motor sport and the successful championship series that fed into the famed 
Indy 500. The oval was an established method of staging races for entertainment. With 
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the oval format, stock car racing also offered prolonged visceral appeal to fans. Racing 
on an oval offers the contesting spirit of a melee, rather than the controlled atmosphere 
of one-on-one drag racing. Rather than the science experiment feel of staging lights and 
photoelectric cell timing equipment, highly modified classes and brief displays of 
performance that drag racing offered, stock car racing was a battle royal held between 
production cars.  
The application of mass production techniques to automobile manufacture 
altered the sporting landscape even as it helped spark massive demographic and 
cultural shifts in America. With the application of the American system and the moving 
assembly line, the automobile was accessible to the many. The same simplicity that lent 
itself to mass production made early stock vehicles suitable for the tinkering automotive 
enthusiast. The enthusiasts doing the tinkering helped build the hot rod and customized 
car phenomena into national prominence following the Second World War. Familiarity 
with hot rodding helped build the expectations of consumers for new models from 
Detroit. The perception that a powerful automobile meant comfort, safety, and prestige 
found ample patronage across the nation. During this phase, the notion that a vehicle 
could be simultaneously mass-produced and operated primarily as a utilitarian appliance 
yet also suitable for racing competition ultimately eclipsed reason. Despite how ideally 
suited this assertion was to record vehicle sales the idea was not wholly formed in the 
advertising departments of American automakers.  
Particularly in the economically emergent South, this linkage of mass production 
and enthusiasm for speed would create a fertile atmosphere for the expansion and 
acceptance of stock car racing. If the national enthusiasm for hot rodding did not 
translate into a nation-wide fan following during the first decade of NASCAR, the 
association between performance and advertising realized by automakers did influence 
the development of stock car racing. Ford, Chrysler, Chevrolet, Hudson, and Pontiac all 
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used reference to performance in their advertisements during the 1950s. Likewise, all of 
these automakers actively supported stock car competition during the same time period.  
It seems unlikely that stock car racing would have flourished without linkage to 
the marketing efforts of factories selling performance. It is clear that the story of factory 
involvement, both clandestine and overt, heavily shaped the practice and hardware of 
stock car racing during its first 30 years. By helping to develop Detroit’s new aesthetic 
that conjoined horsepower and production-custom styling, hot rod culture helped focus 




ESTABLISHMENT AND SOUTHERN RETRENCHMENT 
 
 
On December 14, 1947, a group of drivers, mechanics, and racing promoters 
gathered in the Ebony Lounge of the Streamline Hotel in Daytona Beach, Florida to 
discuss the future of production-based automobile racing in the United States. Through 
advertisements placed in various motor sport publications, they were invited by racing 
promoter Bill France to try and sort out a system of rules for a new production-based 
championship series.127 The meeting was an informal affair from the beginning. 
Invitations billed it as both business meeting and winter vacation spree. Because most of 
the attendees knew each other through racing competition or joint promotional ventures, 
it was as much a social event as a business meeting. Among the community of racers 
such roles often overlapped, so the idea of gathering to discuss racing in a resort town 
combined business and pleasure in the same way as racing.128 Throughout the four-day 
meeting, a free-flowing keg of beer kept everyone in friendly spirits and open to new 
ideas.129 The result of this meeting was the formation of a businesslike sanctioning 
agency for professional production-based racing in the United States. How this 
organization was organized and how it managed technological change, differentiated the 
business of sanctioning races from existing racing authorities, and facilitated the creation 
of symbolic production cars for competitive spectacle is the core of the NASCAR story. 
As a promoter operating mainly in the Southeastern United States, and mainly 
among the lower echelon of motor sport, France called the meeting to standardize and 
regulate a new championship series among racers competing with production-based 
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vehicles. For years, production-based motor sport was organized into smaller local 
championship series. With the close of the Second World War these pockets of activity 
boomed. Apparently France recognized that races between production-based cars were 
capable of satisfying crowds of eager fans. That there was great entertainment potential 
in staging races between production-based cars was lost on established sanctioning 
bodies like the AAA. Indeed, France had several promotional ventures in his portfolio 
that demonstrated the potential of stock car racing.130 Before the war he had organized 
two successful racing events on the sands of Daytona. Since hostilities ceased, he had 
successfully promoted events across the South in his own National Championship Stock 
Car Circuit (NCSCC).131 Like others associated with promoting stock car racing, France 
sought the legitimacy and potential profits offered through racing on a national scale. 
The meeting he called would culminate with the creation of NASCAR, the National 
Association for Stock Car Automobile Racing. 
At the time of the meeting and indeed since the dawn of motor sport in the United 
States, there was another, larger sanctioning body to contend with. In 1947, the Contest 
Board of the American Automobile Association (AAA) was, like most institutions, 
returning to normalcy after the recent World War. In the wake of hostilities, the racing 
business was booming. Though the AAA was aware of the tremendous demand for 
automobile racing, it was unwilling to sanction events using production-based 
equipment. Indeed, a bulletin issued by the AAA Contest Board on January 7, 1948 
acknowledged the dearth of racecars to meet the needs of competitors and thus the 
expectations of fans. Yet even though this communiqué relates that, “Based on 
information given the Board by those actively participating in automobile racing from all 
sections of the country, it was quite evident that there was a shortage of racing 
                                                 
130 France and Britt, p.15, “Stock Car Circuit,” Speed Age, October, 1947, p.34. 
131 Greg Fielden, Forty Years of Stock Car Racing, (Surfside Beach, SC: Galfield 
Press, 1992), Vol.1, p.5. 
 64
equipment during the past season,” there was no move to accept production-based 
chassis for speedway competition.132 Indeed the AAA seemed little interested in letting 
the so-called “jalopies” occupy even the margins of motor sport.  
The same bulletin also stated that “There is no change in the policy of the Board 
with respect to the sanction and supervision of stock car racing events.” The AAA 
emphasized that it would  
Only issue our sanction for stock car racing events which were limited to cars of 
strictly stock status. We will not issue sanctions for the ‘so-called’ stock car races 
which permit all types of modifications of the engine and chassis. It is our feeling 
that these races contribute in no way whatsoever to the benefit of the motoring 
public.133  
Though they would permit the use of modified production engines in competition, these 
engines had to be installed in what they considered “real racecars,” built on special 
chassis. By insisting on sanctioning only races using purpose-built cars, the AAA 
Contest Board rejected a vast group of dedicated and capable racers working the 
smaller tracks across the nation. For entrepreneur Bill France, their refusal to deal with 
any racing that smacked of mass-production was a stroke of tremendous good fortune. 
Organizing these racers into a national series was left to the men gathered in the 
Streamline Motel or others like them.   
With his opening remarks on the first day of the meeting in 1947, France outlined 
his perspective on how production-based automobile racing could become a respectable 
and profitable sport for drivers, mechanics, car owners, and racing promoters alike. He 
referred to a “golden age” of stock car racing when factories would sponsor racing teams 
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to travel around the nation promoting their brand.134 He spent a considerable amount of 
time describing the state of chaos that stock car racing had descended into before the 
Second World War.  During this time, the racing business was, at best, a gambit. 
According to France, who was a race promoter before 1941, drivers seldom knew if 
prizes would be paid, promoters seldom knew if drivers would show for a race, and there 
were no consistent procedural rules or technical specifications.135 On all but the highest 
levels it was a sport created and carried out largely on an ad-hoc basis.136  
After offering a brief biography on his qualifications as a racer and experience as 
a promoter, France turned to the heart of his opening comments: his plans for managing 
the creation of a national production-based racing series. He began by describing the 
advantages offered by creating a national championship series. He argued that racers 
would be free to travel around and compete at different venues if they could rely on a 
uniform set of rules to prevent disparity between race vehicles. The criteria governing 
vehicle specifications had evolved differently in different regions. Lack of uniformity 
between racecars from different regions kept racing local and small-time. What racers 
and promoters didn’t want was technological disparity to ruin competition, but numerous 
local sets of rules stifled competition. While these differences between rules might have 
been inconsequential, the perception of technological inequity was enough to keep 
racers from traveling to a race where they stood less chance of winning or needed to 
invest in extra equipment to meet different specifications. To illustrate this point, France 
asserted that a fast driver in an average car would always lose to an average driver in a 
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“hot” car.137 The idea was to produce a formula describing the race vehicles that 
permitted the maximum number of competitors to enter machines of near equal 
specification. 
France then went on to describe the economics of production-based racing in 
greater detail. It was common knowledge, he asserted, that certain specific production 
components were more desirable for racing activity.  These items typically were lighter, 
stronger or offered performance suited to the demands of the track. Because of the 
advantage some of these parts offered, they commanded higher prices than other 
production components. Indeed, some mass-produced parts that were desirable for 
competition cost more than aftermarket hot-rod parts.138 As France framed it, the 
problem was not so much about determining what was a production part or not, but 
rather consistency in permitting various technologies in competition. In short, it was a 
problem of maintaining standards that prevented technology from providing an obvious 
advantage and accounting entirely for victory. As Bill France described it, this was 
neither good for competitors nor promoters. He suggested that it would be better to have 
more cars racing than have every car meet some ideal of stock. As France saw it, the 
idea behind having production-based racecars was not so much to test the products of 
Detroit’s assembly lines, but rather to create the opportunity for as many people to race 
as possible. Cars should be allowed to use non-production components so long as they 
were inexpensive and readily available.  
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Based more on keeping racing machines economical than on the reality of what 
came off production lines, this stance had tremendous long-term ramifications. Once 
established, this fundamental principle would permit NASCAR, over the course of the 
next thirty years, to develop an inexpensive “stock” race vehicle appropriate to the task 
of resembling a true production car while racing at very high speeds. By borrowing 
components freely from the production line and the aftermarket while stemming 
investment in costly novelty, France was opening a crucial area for interpretation of the 
rules. Ultimately this practice removed ultimate control over the technology of 
competition from the automakers and secured management of the racing technology for 
NASCAR.  
Beyond controlling the NASCAR stock car championship, this stance also had 
ramifications for the public face of motor sport. France’s theory of regulation suggested 
that serving the public need as a race organizer was more about providing entertainment 
than providing a test or exhibition of genuine production cars. This attitude set NASCAR 
apart from the AAA, whose rulebook indicated that “the Contest Board … found 
opportunity to render a service greater than its founder envisioned. Under its supervision 
automobiles and their engineering were tried in races, tours, hill climbs and other tests, 
and this great laboratory process helped produce the great cars we have today.”139 
Though NASCAR would use the rhetoric of “the track as a laboratory,” its rules made 
clear that any testing function of competition was subordinate to providing entertaining 
racing.  
The scarcity and subsequent high cost of desirable production components was 
not the only justification for suggesting that NASCAR develop complete control over the 
technology of competition. As France explained, sometimes what was stock, and what 
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was not was an issue provoking fierce contention. He described how production vehicles 
were seldom so standardized that what passed as a “stock” racecar was known, even to 
factory representatives. In an example, France related an argument that followed the 
Daytona Beach race he promoted in 1936. In this instance, following the race one driver 
protested another’s valve springs because they had daubs of green paint. The 
disgruntled driver argued that they were a “cheater” part because the valve springs in his 
car carried splotches of orange paint.140 Though these paint marks were likely just 
assembly aids referencing spring height or designating production batches, they could 
be construed to indicate a non-production engine part. France points out that such 
conflicts, even where they did not affect the outcome of the race, often left competitors 
unhappy and cast doubt upon the abilities or allegiances of the officiating promoters. 
France pointed out that in the absence of a uniform set of rules to govern all production 
based racing, these sorts of conflicts and resulting resentment would continue to be a 
problem. By investing authority in a single, national sanctioning agency, such conflicts 
might be avoided, or at least responsibility for solving them shifted. In this instance it 
seemed better to leave rule enforcement up to an impartial sanctioning body, whose 
stake in the outcome seemed less immediate than that of the promoter. Deciding such 
disagreements could have long-term negative implications for a promoter that wanted to 
continue to attract the best driving talent to his races.  
Keeping technological advantage to a minimum had benefits beyond satisfying 
competitors. That institution or individual who controlled the technical specifications for 
competition vehicles would carry much responsibility and enjoy significant power over 
the production based racing community. France asked, “which one of you can tell, for 
certain, what a stock car is? I doubt anyone in this room can. I doubt anyone from Detroit 
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can.”141 He suggested that perceived or real technological advantage could be 
controlled, but only through deliberate and somewhat arbitrary distinctions between what 
sort of “production” cars and parts would be eligible and which would not. To effectively 
control the technology of competition, a sanctioning body should have the final say over 
what automotive makes or components were permissible regardless of who made them. 
It seems clear from his stated perspective that Bill France understood that close 
competition was more accessible and important to race fans that the accuracy of the 
technological composition of the racecars. What is absent from his remarks, but proved 
true in time, was that whoever maintained control over the details of technology 
controlled the destiny or production-based racing in the United  States. 
France conceived of production-based racing as a contest to get fierce racing 
competition before the paying public as much as a struggle between vehicle 
manufacturers. The AAA in sanctioning the strictly stock Elgin Cup races of 1934 and 
1935 had made the mistake of trusting the factories to supply actual production vehicles 
for competition.142 Trusting the authority of the automakers proved a grave error as both 
times factory built Ford racecars, posing as stock vehicles, trounced their respective 
fields of challengers. Though France was willing to follow factory parts literature when 
considering a part legal for competition in his NASCAR sanctioned races, he would 
never take factory publications as the last word. Furthermore, when one make of car 
was a little too successful, NASCAR would take steps, cautiously during the early years 
and later as bold as banning certain equipment, to see that the rest of the competition 
caught up. His willingness to disregard what part was actually stock for a particular 
vehicle, and assume responsibility for describing the specifications of vehicles that could 
race, was crucial to the ultimate success of NASCAR.  
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Assumption of this responsibility allowed racers from a variety of smaller series to 
become integrated into one “league” under the effective control of one agency. 
Determination of what was “stock” allowed NASCAR to regularize racing as 
entertainment. Control over the technological aspects of competition permitted the 
organized, regular presentation of races with a near-guarantee of close competition. 
Finally, being able to define “stock” permitted NASCAR racing to operate under the 
guise of genuine production origin even though the cars were heavily modified. The 
ability to maintain association with production-based cars, even if symbolic, brought an 
air of respectability to the sport.  
Later in his Sunday speech at the Streamline, France lobbied for a national 
championship. The creating of a unifying points system that crowned a champion at 
year’s end gave stock car racing respectability on par with other, more established forms 
of motor sport. A national championship was the crowning level of organization intended 
to bring respectability, secure regular participation from drivers and regular events from 
promoters, and integrate differing competition groups into a unified whole.  
Borrowing organizational and promotional philosophy from the AAA, France 
described the possible benefits of a two-tiered racing series. Each region of local, grass 
roots, production-based competition could play host to traveling “first tier” drivers from 
across the country. As a promotional hook, local talent could be pitted against traveling 
professional drivers. For traveling national competitors, a national championship points 
system, and a fat championship purse, would encourage consistent participation. 
Consistent local competition could be similarly encouraged through regional 
championship funds. Because both level of championship would be funded on a 
percentage basis from prize money offerings, and prize money was pulled from gate 
receipts, funding the championship would cost no money up front. Promoters would pay 
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fifty dollars per $1000 of prize money into the regional championship fund, and 100 
dollars for each thousand into the national championship fund.143  
Maintaining a multi-tier system was a clever and essential feature of NASCAR’s 
early years. By offering racing on many levels, NASCAR could lock up the best drivers 
and tracks across the nation and harvest substantial profits from local, grass-roots 
racing. As one journalist wrote, “The largest part of the racing dates are devoted not to 
stock cars as the name of the sanctioning body might imply, but to modified and 
sportsmen events. These are hard-top, souped-up jobs with plenty of speed and power 
but not much beauty.”144 As this statement suggests, NASCAR did reap tremendous 
benefit from sanctioning the lower echelons of motor sport. For every year of its 
operation, NASCAR sanctioned far more modified events than what later became known 
as Grand National (“major-league” strictly stock) events. In 1950, for example, races at 
the top level of production-based competition represented just over 28 percent of 
NASCAR’s sanctioning activity. By 1961, Grand National races at the top tier of stock 
car racing represented less that four percent of the events sanctioned by NASCAR.145 
Though NASCAR, the motor sport press, and the public always placed maximum 
emphasis on the exploits of stock car racers in the top echelon of competition, this level 
of racing rested on a vast network of competition using modified cars.  
Early recognition of the profit potential in organizing stock car racing on all levels 
also offered important symbolic leverage to NASCAR. As one 1951 editorial suggests, 
NASCAR became the proponent of racing for the masses. Speed Age magazine 
reported that  
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One of the reasons NASCAR was formed was to give a home to the gentlemen 
who race modified cars. The AAA won’t have them, considering such racing too 
commercial and too unimportant for national recognition. This makes it difficult for 
participants to get insurance covering themselves and spectators at events. It 
also leaves the unorganized drivers at the mercy of the occasional unscrupulous 
promoter one finds in the business. Under NASCAR’s protection, insurance is 
available at good rates and the drivers are guaranteed purse money in 
advance.146  
By offering stability and organization to eager racers and fans at lesser-known tracks 
across the nation, NASCAR positioned itself as champion of automobile racing for the 
common man.  
NASCAR gained other advantages besides widespread popularity by sanctioning 
“racing that is open to everyone.”147 The “Modified” and “Sportsman” ranks of production-
based racing helped train drivers, mechanics, and car owners to operate according to 
NASCAR’s rules. “Dirt tracks and smaller local tracks hold the keys,” suggested Bill 
France. “It is here that you see racing at its source,” France continued. “Drivers must be 
able to maneuver corners with one competitor laying against a fender and another 
pushing on his rear bumper. At these small, local tracks, young drivers feed on the 
experience of veteran drivers and learn their techniques. It is on the dirt tracks, too, that 
sportsmanship and rules-of-the-road are taught.”148 The social subtleties of successful 
competitive behavior, creation of rivalries and friendships and the acceptance of 
NASCAR’s administration of competition all accompanied experience in these “minor 
leagues” of production-based racing.  
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By maintaining a reserve of possible racers ready to move up into the next level 
of racing, France and NASCAR could exert influence over promoters as well. Because 
race promotion had been such a risky business before the meeting that formed 
NASCAR, the businessmen involved seemed willing to accept constraints in exchange 
for the territorial security and race dates with assured fields of competitors that NASCAR 
could offer. In addition, through selectively granting sanction to events and enforcing 
existing territorial divisions between promoters, NASCAR could also improve the 
profitability of production-based racing.  NASCAR avoided potentially costly scheduling 
conflicts by controlling the location and frequency of racing events from three “leagues” 
of competition.149 Such centralized control greatly expanded the opportunities to race for 
everyone involved. With complete vertical organization setting standards and controlling 
schedules on all levels of production-based racing, there were chances to profit as a 
promoter or driver on different levels of financial association.  
The only possible negative feature was that racers and promoters had to accept 
NASCAR’s complete control. The lock on most of the racing talent also meant that other 
production-based promoters could not gather enough resources to seriously challenge 
NASCAR’s authority. By agreeing to NASCAR’s authority, promoters were essentially 
buying into a trust that facilitated the relationship between drivers and track owners. 
Racers were kept happy with frequent, guaranteed prize purses, and promoters were 
kept happy with assured participation from racers and promotional help from NASCAR. 
For the folks gathered at the Streamline, organizing production-based racing before too 
many entrepreneurial promoters ruined the sport was critical.150 France’s plan offered 
stability to a sport often plagued with uncertainty. 
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Though France’s plan to divide up racing territory and dates effectively 
established a de-facto trust that would ostensibly allow everyone to “be a success at 
their own project,” it soon became clear that his project would take precedent.151 
Promoters could maintain and fortify the fiefdom of venues and events they already had, 
while as head of NASCAR, France built a nationally recognized first tier of competition. 
Though second and third tier events would clearly benefit from the success of the first, 
the potential for nation-wide expansion clearly made the first tier more lucrative. 
To finish off his comments before the men gathered at the Streamline, France 
brought up issues of respectability. Stock car events would need to concentrate on 
cultivating respectability to become a credible and profitable national motor sport. Before 
World War Two, stock car events were often staged as “run what you brung” free-for-alls 
on “gravel pit” local tracks, or novelty shows before “main-event” contests between 
purpose-built cars.152 For most devout racing fans before and after the Second World 
War, stock car racing was a novelty, a disorganized sport restricted to isolated dust bowl 
tracks of the rustic hinterlands. True racing, for the largest section of American race 
fans, meant AAA sanctioned events such as the popular “Sprint” and “Midget” racing 
series that cultivated talent for the national “Big Car” championship, the league that 
competed annually in the “Indy 500.” Stock car events were most often derided as 
ridiculous mimicry of the speed and technical sophistication of such genuine racing. As 
one fan put it, “… nothing is to be admired about a stock car.” Referring to the crash and 
bang style of so-called “jalopy racing” he continued, “The only way you can take a pretty 
or interesting picture of one is turn it upside down. That seems to appeal to certain types 
of people. I have been working with an auto wrecking company since my release from 
the Navy in 1946, so I am certainly not going to spend my Saturday nights or Sunday 
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afternoons looking at the same type of junk.”153 Though they might never achieve the 
same status as competition using purpose-built racecars, France suggested that other 
standards of respectability must be met if production based racing was to become a 
sport deemed appealing by “the average person.”154 He seemed to know that it would be 
easier to cultivate new fans than try and convert those of the racing establishment to his 
type of racing.  
Uniform rules and a national championship would go far toward creating 
respectability by equating production based race events with existing forms of motor 
sport. The structure under consideration at the Streamline meeting, a national 
championship with uniform rules, would accomplish this. More crucially, France wanted 
to cultivate public identification between racing and the cars on the street.  The 
association between the vehicle on the track and the vehicle a fan owned could be vital 
to enhancing respectability and ultimately vital to attracting sponsorship. The illusion that 
a car on the track was indeed “stock” remained vital to attracting the promotional 
attention of automakers. This assertion was also crucial for suggesting that stock car 
racing offered a social benefit by providing a regulated laboratory for testing 
automobiles. As a more immediate benefit, he suggested that the physical appearance 
of the cars was crucial for building respect among the larger racing community and 
acceptance from racing fans.155 To that end, France recommended that certain 
standards of appearance be set to prevent production-based racing from becoming 
identified as contests between “jalopies.”156 
France’s use of the pejorative term “jalopies” in reference to some production 
based racecars seems to have hit a raw nerve, as there was discussion about removing 
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his comments from the minutes. France then described how the viewing public, the fan, 
might be put off by the most sophisticated car if it had a rough appearance.157 Reference 
to the perceptions of fans suggests that France was more concerned with perceptions of 
the racecar than a vehicle’s actual composition. The dissent expressed by racers over 
this suggestion, the only issue raised during the entire meeting that registered 
controversy, suggests that bringing about respectable appearance for the race vehicles 
was a contentious matter. Adopting rules specifying late model “strictly stock” cars as 
standard for NASCAR’s premier series in 1949 would ultimately resolve the appearance 
issue.  
Ducking further conflict over the jalopy issue, France closed his discussion on the 
physical appearance of racecars by asserting that good looking cars would put on a 
more entertaining show. This matter is crucial to understanding Bill France’s take on 
public expectations. By maintaining a stock appearance, NASCAR racecars could claim 
to be racing in the public interest; that NASCAR stock car racing was a test bed for 
Detroit. This innocuous function probably helped deflect criticism from the sport from 
persons and institutions not enamored of speed sports. More importantly, the stock 
exterior also permitted, for enthusiasts, the opportunity to make the association between 
the car on the track and the car on the dealer’s showroom floor. In time, the clean, stock 
external appearance of the cars permitted NASCAR to maintain an aura of stock long 
after the cars had become mere conglomerations of stock components.  
Despite Bill France’s failure to bring about consensus on the external standards 
of the race vehicles, it is important to note that he considered a clean, non-jalopy 
appearance critical for respectability and building association with the “average 
person.”158 NASCAR, when created, would concern itself with the creation of a palatable 
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public image rather than simply sanctioning and governing an existing form of motor 
sport. It also seems likely that France understood that a recognizable, perhaps even new 
car on the race track was appealing to fans.159 
In his closing remarks, France tackled the issue of organizing the meeting 
members to undertake the business of writing rules for the newly formed organization. 
He suggested that the following morning, two committees be formed to hammer out the 
details of how to sanction a national championship series banking on the potential of 
production-based racing.  One committee, composed of drivers and mechanics, would 
hammer out the technical details of the emerging championship series. The other, 
composed of promoters and car owners, would work up regulations for racing procedure 
and discuss business matters. These committees would create the rule book 
blueprinting the first season of NASCAR stock car racing.160  
After his speech, there was general discussion on the problems that confronted 
the racing community in 1947, issues that interfered with the interests of promoters and 
the aspirations of racers alike. These same issues, France believes, had kept 
production-based racing balkanized affair. Different tracks and regions adhered to 
different rules, while promoters and participants were not bound to regular prize payoff 
or race attendance. Differing sets of rules differently advantaged some racers, and 
irregular business practices hindered the ability to attract and maintain a loyal fan base. 
It was agreed that if the promoters and racers present wanted to act in concert, they 
would have to form long-term plans for the sport. Such plans would include rules that let 
competitors travel across the nation and compete on an equal footing, and assurances 
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that prize money and insurance could structure stock car racing as a more regular 
profession.161  
After the first day of the meeting to form NASCAR, it was clear that the only 
factors preventing stock car racing from becoming a success were regularization, 
integration and respectability. The points outlined by Bill France all focused on creating a 
legitimate, professional sporting series out of production-based racing. Regularization 
would come with rules, schedules, and procedures to bring about the consistent 
production of close competition between equivalent racing cars. Accepting and 
organizing existing grass-roots racing enterprises would integrate the participants of 
production-based racing into an informal system that fed talent to the top tiers while 
reaping profits throughout the lower levels. In addition to bringing in capital, and 
cultivating new talent, this structure helped focus attention on NASCAR as the single 
entity responsible for organizing production-based racing in the United States. These 
first two issues dealt more with people already committed to racing production-based 
vehicles and as such success could be realized largely through organization. Cultivating 
respect for production-based racing dealt with shifting the attitudes of fans and the 
general public and was a more complex matter. 
Respectability, an issue that went to the core of production-based racing and 
more established forms of purpose-built racing, would take more time to build. The 
massive task of organizing and administrating races at the grass-roots level nationwide, 
would help gather respect. In addition, standardized rules and a regular schedule of 
events could enhance the credibility of NASCAR. Yet these instrumental issues would 
not negate the considerable power exercised by the AAA, the organization competing 
with the NASCAR for control over racing in the United States. For France one crucial key 
to respectability not shared by all meeting attendees was the exterior appearance of the 
                                                 
161 Eugene Jaderquist, “NASCAR Primer,” Motor Trend, May, 1952, p.46 
 79
cars. Though unforeseen, this issue would ultimately find resolution with the creation of 
the Grand National stock car championship as the top tier of production-based racing. 
Respectability among the fans meant having the sort of clean, well-maintained 
machinery the “average person” could identify with. Competition with such cars would fill 
the stands of race events with fans eager to see close competition between racing 
drivers in machines similar to those on the showroom floor. In choosing the strictly stock 
format, NASCAR chose the arena for struggle with AAA over legitimate racing in 
America. 
But before NASCAR and the AAA could butt heads over the definition of “real 
racing,” practical organizational matters had to be decided. On Monday, after the 
election of Connecticut race promoter Bill Tuthill as temporary chairman, the two 
committees were formed to begin creating a rule book. The competition committee, 
composed of promoters and car owners, divided the country into equal racing regions, 
figured out uniform procedure for the conduct of races, and decided how to divide the 
racing schedule among relevant tracks and promoters. Initially, the book of rules 
contained little about the conduct of race meets. Indeed, the 1948 rule book that resulted 
from the meeting at the Streamline Motel contained only five guidelines suggesting 
proper procedure for a race. While possibly a consequence of not having a clear picture 
of how best to run a race, it seems more likely that the original staff of the fledgling 
competition committee were unwilling to dictate too much of the action before their 
legitimacy was established. Rather than focus on uniform procedure, the traditional 
terrain of promoters, the first rule book focused on specifying the technology of 
competition. 
The technical committee, composed mostly of racecar owners, drivers, and 
mechanics, restricted their efforts to defining the technological parameters of eligible 
racecars. Their task was to prohibit the dominance of any single type of car. By 
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establishing standards for engine displacement, acceptable modifications, and possible 
application of speed equipment, they created a technical baseline for stock car racers 
that became a national specification.  
Nation-wide ubiquity on the scale described by France and in NASCAR’s rules 
had never been attempted in motor sport. During the second year of operation, 
NASCAR, on all three level of competition, sanctioned more races than the AAA Contest 
Board on all the levels it sanctioned.162 Creating this sort of scale of regulation over such 
a short period of time was only possible because smaller racing leagues existed to be 
unified, and because automobile mass production allowed material uniformity across the 
nation. 
 Apparently the bulk of meeting attendees agreed with Bill France’s assertion that 
mechanical ubiquity and technological parity translated into good competition on tracks 
full of economical racecars. The work of the technical committee amounted to thirty-five 
statements governing the construction of a stock car for NASCAR competition.163 Rules 
permitted the use of any cylinder head, as suggested by Bill France, and even the use of 
hot rod components such as superchargers and magneto ignition.164 Even though it 
would be a year until the “strictly stock” racing began, the pattern for regulating 
competition was set. NASCAR leveled the playing field by mandating similar equipment 
based on cost not origin. This attention to uniformity and economy helped fill the field 
with racecars without arousing resistance from race promoters.  
Though the mythology surrounding NASCAR’s creation often suggests that 
introducing “strictly stock” racing was a unified, long term plan conceived and executed 
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by Bill France, there was no mention of racing “strictly stock” cars during the 
organizational meeting. While it is possible that France planned to introduce the strictly 
stock format from the beginning, he did not share these plans with the racers gathered in 
Daytona.165 What seems more likely is that France introduced the strictly stock format in 
1949 as much as means of fielding a group of respectable looking newer cars and of 
distinguishing NASCAR from existing forms of “Modified” and “Sportsman” classes. The 
eventual shift to Strictly Stock, through starting with specifications created by 
manufacturers, would also prove an easy way of creating a baseline from which rules 
governing the parameters of racecars evolved.  
For those meeting at the Streamline, the parameters of car construction had 
more to do with existing conventions built by “Modified” and “Sportsmen” competition on 
tracks across the country. After agreeing on the details of competition, rules governing 
car construction, and guidelines for a competitive schedule on Monday and Tuesday, 
Wednesday was reserved for creation of a point scheme whereby the champions on 
each tier would be crowned. A championship based on total points awarded for finishing 
position over the course of a racing season was not novel. AAA racers in the 
Championship, Sprint and Midget series had been run in pursuit of a national 
championship for decades. However, the NASCAR points system proposed by driver 
Red Byron, and adopted late Wednesday afternoon awarded points and money more 
deeply into the field of finishers than other established series.166 The point system was 
linked directly to the system of payout for each race and rewarded consistency in 
competition almost as much as victory. Unlike the AAA, where points were offered to the 
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top 12 finishers in large events, NASCAR awarded points to the first 22 finishers.167 The 
relatively “flat” distribution of points leading to the NASCAR championship favored 
consistent participation and had the effect of encouraging drivers to compete in the 
maximum number of events. Because pay was to be distributed relative to points, 
NASCAR racers also enjoyed distribution of pay deep into the ranks of competitors. 
Spreading the proceeds among the racers, even if it meant giving less money to the top 
finishers, made racing a possible career for entrepreneurial driver / owners. In contrast 
to the patron/ professional operator format of AAA racing (an arrangement reminiscent of 
thoroughbred horse racing), NASCAR’s relatively flat distribution of points and money 
throughout the ranks helped keep more competitors of limited means financially viable. 
Alhough it would take a lot of success to get rich in NASCAR, racers could continue 
competing because they usually took home some prize money. A widespread 
distribution of rewards also helped build a cadre of professional racers willing and able to 
drive a full season.168  
With the creation of NASCAR, the relationship between motor sport and business 
was recast. In contrast to the AAA, NASCAR racing was more about providing 
entertainment than facilitating racing in the public interest. For NASCAR it was important 
to have close racing and stands full of fans each week. The AAA Contest Board, 
apparently influenced by the public service and automotive advocacy role played by the 
AAA, was more interested in simply facilitating the sport of automobile racing. Even the 
AAA rule book justified racing as an experiment conducted on the behalf of public 
interest suggesting that 
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the need for testing will remain as long as there are cars and a public which buys 
them. The element of sport which has surrounded the automobile from its earliest 
days will live. People will always like to witness tests of speed and there will 
always be adventurous men who enjoy the thrill of participation in them. 
Adventure, engineering, sportsmanship, fame, fortune careers and scientific 
testing are combined in automotive competitions as in no other activity in the 
world.169   
In contrast, NASCAR promoted races with unapologetic concern for the entertaining 
aspects of the sport. Though NASCAR did describe its racing as a laboratory for the 
automakers in Detroit, this was typically proposed as a benefit secondary to entertaining 
the masses. Entertainment using production-based vehicles that looked like cars straight 
from the stock of automakers was their primary mission.  
When the Ebony Lounge at the Streamline Motel emptied on Wednesday 
evening, the foundation for a stock car racing empire was in place. The Rule Book 
resulting from four days of meetings united technological specifications and event 
scheduling under the auspices of a national championship. Bill France had effectively 
brought competing promoters into the fold by promising consistent racing action between 
closely matched cars. By designing an approach that promised to make stock car racing 
a regularized, integrated, and respectable enterprise, NASCAR was in a position to 
capitalize on America’s growing fascination with fast cars.  
The names of the notable drivers, car owners, and promoters that met to form 
NASCAR were printed on the cover of the 1948 Rule Book.170 Despite this show of 
solidarity between racers from differing regions with different occupations, in time control 
over NASCAR and its mandates would become concentrated in Daytona in the hands of 
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NASCAR president Bill France. Just how voluntarily the charter members allowed power 
to become so concentrated is unknown. It does, however, seem likely that much of the 
drudgery of starting up a racing series, endless travel, settlement of countless disputes, 
and operating on a shoestring budget was willingly transferred to France.171 That is to 
say that he gathered power because he was always on hand to assume responsibility. 
In addition to putting in long hours organizing, officiating, schmoozing, and 
traveling, concentrating this power was due in no small part to continued, subtle revision 
of the rule book presided over by Bill France. Over time, the responsibility for decisions 
about racing procedure and racing equipment was ceded to France and NASCAR. With 
each subsequent rule book, the list of rules governing procedure and technology 
lengthened; the list of people responsible for the rules grew shorter.  
Most importantly, NASCAR’s Rule Book, though conceived as a yearly set of 
regulations, became a flexible tool for the exercise of discretionary power. The areas of 
jurisdiction wherein NASCAR officials (Bill France was the top NASCAR official) could 
exercise discretionary judgment and change rules at a moment’s notice became useful 
gray areas that permitted on-the-spot manipulation of events in “the spirit of 
competition.”172 In time, the discretion with which decisions could be made broadened 
until Bill France could alter whole sections of the rule book anytime he felt it necessary. 
While such potential for caprice infuriated many competitors even as it reinforced 
France’s paternalistic management style, it also gave NASCAR the sort of flexibility it 
would need to rein in headstrong competitors and consistently produce close 
competition. Exercising control over the rules also allowed, in time, NASCAR to 
challenge the will of American automakers, large corporations with a vested interest in 
motor sport.  
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Because manipulation of the rules meant so much to controlling competition, it is 
useful to track how and when some of the changes occurred that left Bill France in 
complete control. The consolidation of control occurred through a gradual shift that 
began soon after the formation of NASCAR. Though NASCAR was the product of an 
agreement between eighteen men, it was incorporated and owned by just three. Early in 
1948, promoters Bill France and Bill Tuthill and Daytona lawyer Louis Ossinsky 
incorporated NASCAR.173 The fledgling institution operated with Bill France as President 
and Bill Tuthill as National Secretary until Tuthill sold his share to France in 1953.174 With 
majority control of the corporation and no apparent interference from Ossinsky, France 
ran NASCAR as his own. Ossinsky was ultimately bought out in 1971.175 This 
consolidation of control contradicted the cooperative flavor fostered at the 1947 Daytona 
meeting. Though probably less egalitarian, the dictatorial control enjoyed by France after 
1953 did allow tremendous organizational flexibility and contributed to NASCAR’s 
success.  
In the beginning, however, ownership of NASCAR did not imply control of the 
stock car racing it sanctioned. Gradually, by extending control over the rule making and 
enforcement process, France worked to win the allegiance or acquiescence of racers 
operating in NASCAR competitions. Consolidation of control over the sport began as 
soon as the second rule book was issued in 1949. In this set of rules, the responsibility 
for creating, enforcing and adjusting the rules shifted away from the group that met at 
the Streamline to a National Stock Car Commission acting with an advisory board 
composed of drivers, mechanics, and car owners. In an apparent move to bring prestige 
to the young organization, famed motorcycle endurance racer “Cannonball” Baker was 
named National Commissioner. He exercised little input over the sport, and his expertise 
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would not be tapped until a dispute in 1954.176 Given the infrequency of input from 
Cannonball, it seems likely his role was largely ornamental.177 In addition to “Cannonball” 
Baker, the “National Stock Car Racing Commission” consisted of Bill France and fellow 
promoter Bill Tuthill.178 The Commission acted in communication with an “Advisory 
Board” consisting of two car owners, a medical doctor, and the insurance salesman 
responsible for insuring NASCAR events.179 As there remains no record of any 
communication between the NASCAR Racing Commission and the Advisory Board, it is 
unclear how much input they had in determining the technology or procedure of 
competition. Given that Bill France was on the racing Commission, president of 
NASCAR, and attended all the races, it seems reasonable to assume that, as early as 
1949, he ultimately controlled all facets of NASCAR’s rule creation, adjustment, and 
enforcement. 
By 1949, it is also clear that, despite being represented at the founding meeting, 
the power to control events had shifted away from the mechanics and drivers. Not only 
were there less direct means to offer input on matters of rules, membership as a racer in 
NASCAR began to entail more than simple casual association. Beginning in 1949 
NASCAR required each car to be attended by a licensed driver and a licensed 
mechanic.180 Though this could be the same person, the licenses were different and a 
fee had to be paid for each one. Increasing the number of racers licensed for each car 
both raised more money for NASCAR and helped encourage consistent participation in 
NASCAR events. Once the investment in membership had been made, it made more 
economic sense for racers to participate in the maximum number of events.  
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In addition to concentrating power into the hands of Bill France, NASCAR also 
instituted several rules to address issues that helped gain respectability. Payment into a 
benevolent fund, intended to compensate injured drivers, became necessary to gain 
access to the track.181 This provision helped keep the pits clear of unnecessary persons 
and prevented potential dependence on the largess of the town hospital nearest the race 
track. That the amount of insurance coverage offered per event was offered in NASCAR 
advertisements suggests that this matter was important both to racers and the credibility 
of the series.182 Though these measures often cost racers money or imposed new 
patterns of behavior, they ultimately provided polish to levels of motor sport that were 
once considered barbaric by demonstrating that racers would take care of their own. 
Another new rule demonstrated just how flexible Bill France’s NASCAR could 
become in the interest of promoting racing. Despite advertising that claimed NASCAR 
racing was “racing that is open to everyone,” the 1949 rules prohibited Women and 
children from entering the pits unless they owned a racecar.183 This rule remained in the 
NASCAR rule books until 1971, but was not enforced when it appeared that the novelty 
of including women might boost ticket sales. While the AAA enforced its prohibition of 
women racers, NASCAR allowed Louise Smith, Ethel Flock Mobley and Sara Christian 
to compete between 1950 and 1954.184  
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Figure 1: Bill France on Daytona Beach with Miss NASCAR circa 1953 -- Though 
women were allowed to participate in some early NASCAR events, they were 
encouraged to serve as symbolic rewards.  
 
Image courtesy:  International Motorsports Hall Of Fame archives, Talladega, AL. 
 
 
Though the bulk of 1949 changes modified or augmented the text of the rules 
written at the Streamline in December of 1947, the most significant feature of the 1949 
Rule Book was not brought up during the initial meeting. This change marks the 
transition in stock car sanctioning from a discussion between interested parties to a 
centralized control over racers as independent contractors. A message, printed inside 
the back cover apart from the bulk of the 1949 rules states that, “All NASCAR members, 
when signing for NASCAR membership, agree to abide by the decisions of the Racing 
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Commission.”185 This statement, located separately from the bulk of the rules, effectively 
brought racers who joined NASCAR under the control of NASCAR. By 1953 the object of 
allegiance mentioned in this legally binding caveat would shift from the “Racing 
Commission” to simply “NASCAR.”186 Also after 1953, with France owning a strong 
majority of NASCAR and taking an active role in managing the sport, allegiance to 
NASCAR equated to acceptance of Bill France’s complete control.  
Whereas before 1950, race promoters had the right to prevent anyone or any 
cars from competing that might be “detrimental to the show,” beginning in 1950, 
NASCAR officials also had that power. 187 Similarly, where the method of time trials to 
qualify for the main event had once been up to the promoter’s discretion, NASCAR now 
stated that it had to approve the method to be used for qualification.188 As the shift 
toward procedural uniformity continued it accompanied a gradual transfer of the control 
exercised by promoters to NASCAR officials. To create procedural uniformity between 
events, and probably also to expand control over the conduct of competition, NASCAR 
began to administer more of the details of competitive events. Procedurally, the races 
were started, scored and paced by NASCAR officials.189 Assumption of these functions 
helped further systematize what were initially local events while further establishing 
NASCAR’s control over production-based racing. While it is possible that promoters 
were willing to transfer the operational details of race day administration, it seems 
equally likely that NASCAR saw uniform control of race events as another means of 
providing consistent racing action to their growing fan base. 
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By 1950, the Advisory Board had been completely dropped from the listing of the 
NASCAR administration. With the dissolution of the Advisory Board, there was no longer 
any direct mechanism for offering feedback about NASCAR rules. In a move apparently 
intended to replace the committee, there was an indirect feedback function given to the 
NASCAR Newsletter, the bi-monthly newsletter sent to all NASCAR members.190 A brief 
statement published each year solicited comments and recommendations regarding the 
rules from NASCAR members. It remains unclear if any recommendations offered 
through this indirect method were acted upon. What is clear, however, is that Bill France 
had begun whittling away portions of the NASCAR organization that infringed on the 
unfettered exercise of his control. 
In 1951 the gradual shift of rules toward centralized control continued. In a 
change apparently intended to bring promoters further under its power, NASCAR 
reserved the right to withhold sanction from any promoter that had not met their financial 
obligations to NASCAR.191 Apparently the traditionally lax accounting and payment 
methods utilized by promoters did not suit NASCAR’s ambition to regularize production-
based racing on a national basis. This ruling was probably put in place to prevent 
speculation by financially marginal promoters unable to front money for a sanction or to 
keep greedy promoters from retaining too much of event profits. Accounts of racing 
during the late 1940s and early 1950s frequently mention such unscrupulous promoters. 
NASCAR racer Ned Jarrett recalls how occasionally, “promoters would advertise a 
certain purse and then maybe a good crowd wouldn’t show up and they’d just hang the 
green flag out and they took off with the money and the drivers would run until they 
finally figured out that they weren’t going to get paid and so they just quit.”192 Whatever 
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the intention, this rule change made certain that before any cash flow from events 
occurred, NASCAR had already gathered its share. NASCAR also claimed the right to 
pay the prize money to winners, effectively taking promoters money in escrow until the 
close of the race and then distributing it among the winner.193 This transfer of prize 
allocation gave NASCAR a powerful symbolic role in rewarding its drivers and car 
owners while providing financial leverage over these same individuals. If any of the 
racers owed money to NASCAR, it seems likely that it could simply be deducted from 
their winnings. Though seemingly administrative details, these changes in race event 
accounting suggest that “strictly stock” racing was making money and that NASCAR 
wanted more control over its share. 
Nascar introduced measures to bring regular order to events and to exert uniform 
control over promoters in 1950-51. New guidelines limiting the number of pace laps and 
the amount of time racers were allowed to report for a start, established NASCAR as a 
reliable arbiter of consistent racing. These two rules, listed as the “five minute rule” and 
the “three lap rule,” state that a driver has five minutes to get to the starting grid after the 
pole position car reports for the start and that a race will be delayed with caution flags no 
more than three laps.194 While other forms of motor sport struggled to maintain 
schedules, NASCAR operated according to strict and predictable guidelines.195 Regular 
schedules and procedure designed to keep the maximum amount of racing action in the 
public eye for the longest possible time helped NASCAR establish itself as an 
entertainment industry. 
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With NASCAR exercising increasing control over racer’s talents and time, it was 
not long before the interests of an emerging class of professional racers began to 
conflict with those of the sanctioning body. Despite the good chances of winning money 
in a NASCAR race, some racers were tempted to augment their earnings by competing 
in races not sanctioned by NASCAR. As this practice undermined the creation of a 
unified series and offered talent and resources to business competitors, NASCAR 
treated it as the gravest offense.  Territorial limits were imposed in 1950 to encourage 
NASCAR members to compete at NASCAR sanctioned races.196 These included not 
competing in a non-NASCAR race within 200 miles of a NASCAR sanctioned event. In 
1951, the parameters for competing in a non-sanctioned event were changed to include 
an “area as prescribed by NASCAR officials.”197 If a driver wanted to race in an event 
sanctioned by someone else, rather than using a map to confirm legality, racers would 
have to contact officials ahead of time for permission. Typically such permission required 
a bond payable to NASCAR.198 The control such discretion offered should not be 
underestimated. When a racer was trying to make a living by competing in races, 
controlling the number and type of races that he or she could enter was a powerful tool. 
Bill France and NASCAR fought to keep their drivers away from events sanctioned by 
competing associations, or at least keeping a close eye on where they were competing. 
Yet, extending control over the racers working under NASCAR sanction was not 
sufficient to guarantee control over stock car racing in the United States. Beyond 
concerns about meeting the demands of potential fans, Bill France had to be concerned 
about the larger context of the motor racing world into which NASCAR was born. Even 
though NASCAR was the first organization to capitalize on the production-based format 
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on anything like a national scale, it was still the newcomer. The AAA Contest Board 
claimed the sole right under authority of the Federation Internationale de l’Automobile 
(F.I.A.) “to authorize and supervise automotive competitions and tests of any kind,”199 
and was not amused by the upstart racing group in their “stock” cars. Just seven months 
after the first NASCAR strictly stock race in June of 1949, the AAA declared war on 
NASCAR. A press release describing the February meeting of the Contest Board states 
that, “Effective immediately the contest board will sanction and supervise legitimate 
stock car racing events on tracks one mile or more in length where a creditable race can 
be held under approved racing conditions and only by accredited AAA promoters.”200 
This decree, using language suggesting that NASCAR racing was not legitimate or 
creditable, drew the AAA into direct competition with NASCAR.  
Though the AAA had long maintained specifications for “strictly stock” cars, these 
standards were largely reserved for vehicles competing in performance trials. In keeping 
with the AAA perspective of public service, these trials and speed runs were conducted 
with laboratory precision, not the competitive gusto of a stock car racing event.201 The 
AAA had demonstrated an unwillingness to consider sanctioning sportsmen and 
modified “jalopy” racing (according to one account even Bill France had approached the 
AAA about organizing a national championship for production-based racing just before 
he organized NASCAR202) infringing on AAA’s talent was a different matter. The Contest 
Board wanted to be sanctioning the top level of competition for any type of auto racing in 
the United States. With the strictly stock formula introduced in summer of 1949, 
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NASCAR established a new top tier of production-based racing and the AAA wanted 
control. 
Further comments in the same bulletin suggest that NASCAR may have attracted 
(or possibly poached) some talented drivers from the ranks of AAA competitors. The 
memo continues, “In the future, AAA registered drivers will not be allowed to participate 
in any unsanctioned races except where local concessions have been officially granted 
for small car events.”203 Clearly there was to be no quarter given to this upstart 
sanctioning agency. The AAA wanted to control where its drivers raced and was willing 
to punish drivers willing to compete in production-based events. Apparently in the eyes 
of the Contest Board it was fine for the upstart sanctioning body to preside over a 
national championship provided it did not impinge on AAA prestige. However, when 
NASCAR’s purview began to threaten AAA Contest Board jurisdiction, they struck back. 
Despite the scathing tone of the Contest Board announcement regarding the 
1950 season, the struggle between NASCAR and the AAA began with more of a 
whimper than a bang. The first year of the AAA “strictly stock” racing series amounted to 
only five races. Worst still, the second season was limited to only three contests. The 
struggle began to heat up when NASCAR responded in 1951 by accepting into its ranks 
1949 Indy 500 champion Bill Holland, who was on AAA suspension for competing in a 
charity event outside of Contest Board sanction.204 Losing an ex-champion from the 
premier motor sport event in the nation (and probably the world) to the upstart rabble in 
their jalopies was a tremendous blow to AAA prestige.  
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To offset the loss of an Indianapolis champion into the ranks of stock car drivers, 
the AAA lured top NASCAR performer Marshall Teague to AAA stock competition in 
1952.205 Teague was one of the top drivers for the Hudson racing effort, a high-profile 
effort during the early years of NASCAR, winning five out of fifteen starts in 1951. His 
departure for the AAA ranks, with a Hudson sponsorship, was a blow to NASCAR. There 
was, however, a glimmer of redemption. In contrast to the lukewarm performance 
registered by Holland after his defection to NASCAR, Teague’s dominance of the AAA 
racing seemed to suggest that NASCAR racers were, on the whole, a speedier lot. 
Despite such mitigating circumstances, NASCAR launched another attack in the 
struggle with the AAA in February of 1952, when it announced the creation of a 
speedway car series of its own.206 Like the open-wheeled roadsters of the AAA Sprint 
and “Big Car” championship series, these cars were purpose-built single-seaters. As 
very fast purpose-built cars campaigned on speedways, they were clearly intended to 
compete with the two premier levels of competition sanctioned by the AAA. Unlike many 
of the “Sprint cars,” and virtually all of the “Big Cars,” however, these cigar shaped 
speedsters used production-based engines. Though the NASCAR’s “speedway” division 
was not a roaring success, and lasted but one year, it did demonstrate that Bill France 
and company could put together a decent open-wheeled series if the need arose. 
Perhaps more importantly, the “Speedway Division” offered evidence that NASCAR 
would fight aggressively to maintain its stake in the racing business. 
Elsewhere, France attempted to influence what was happening on the stock car 
tracks by distinguishing between NASCAR and AAA definitions of “strictly stock.” In early 
1952 NASCAR appeared to be taking a step back from the truly “strictly stock” definition 
used by AAA. In an interview conducted during NASCAR’s “Speed Week” in February, 
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France commented that, ”These aren’t strictly stock cars we run. Better call them ‘Grand 
National Circuit’ cars, because we have our own specifications.” Suggesting that AAA 
racing was slow, France continues stating, ”Strictly stock is a nice idea but it won’t work 
in our races. One Chrysler yesterday lost two wheels cornering at speed. The owner 
didn’t reinforce his hubs but he should have.”207 Indeed, despite condemning reactions 
from AAA, and some fans, the cars raced in NASCAR never matched the AAA definition 
of “strictly stock.”  
From the beginning, alterations in the interest of safety and speed were 
permitted. NASCAR allowed changes in carburetor jetting, water pump impellers could 
be altered, and “wheels, hubs, steering parts, radius rods and sway bars [could be] 
reinforced and strengthened in any manner.” 208 To build a successful series, it was the 
appearance rather than the substance of strictly stock that mattered. With each passing 
year, chassis and engine specifications changed to facilitate economical, competitive 
racing. Innovations were suppressed, weak systems reinforced, and unfair advantages 
negated.209 For Bill France (and therefore for NASCAR) the technical details of the car 
were subordinated to the business of providing entertaining racing. If calling a car strictly 
stock was a quick and easy way to build a racing series full of respectable looking cars, 
then so be it. 
It turns out that AAA fears about NASCAR encroaching on its territory were not 
unfounded. The multi-tiered approach to sanctioning races initiated during the founding 
meeting of 1947 proved a substantial success. By imposing order on existing forms of 
production-based racing, NASCAR became the largest sanctioning body in the United 
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States almost over night.210 As one report indicates, in “1951 NASCAR sanctioned 585 
races on 91 tracks and awarded  $779,589 in purses plus $40,000 in point money”211 
with much of this going to racers in the Sportsmen and Modified ranks. Apparently, 
administering several tiers of racing helped fuel phenomenal growth. The same article 
suggested that NASCAR was, “Racing’s Cinderella organization” and that stock car 
racing under NASCAR “has grown mote than 400 per cent in three years of racing.”212  
As NASCAR grew but still struggled with the AAA, it developed an expanding schedule 
of races each year. This approach satisfied two objectives. NASCAR was paid by the 
race for its sanction. If Bill France wanted NASCAR to become a big player in the world 
of motor sport, he needed to take advantage of the growing demand for racing and 
expand, even if it mean conflict with the AAA.  
Despite AAA criticism and competition, between 1949 and 1955 NASCAR 
realized dramatic growth. After staging only 8 races in 1949, between the 1950 and 1955 
the number of high profile NASCAR Grand National events increased from 19 to 45.213 In 
contrast, the AAA averaged little more than eleven races per year between 1950 and 
1955.214  
By 1955, there were 45 races in the Grand National championship series with 
over 225,000 dollars in prize money awarded. The AAA could not boast such impressive 
figures as it sanctioned but 13 stock car races in 1955, and awarded just over 107,700 
dollars in prize money. Though at $85.84 the AAA “purse per mile”215 average for 1955 
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was more than twice the average for NASCAR races, NASCAR offered more 
opportunities to win money.216 NASCAR also offered an array of opportunities for 
gathering money in production-based racing among its lesser tiers of competition. On 
the AAA stocker circuit, animosity against production based racers, and a lack of 
experience in open-wheeled cars probably kept drivers from working when a stock event 
was not on the schedule. 
Over the course of five years NASCAR’s overall sanctioning activities had grown 
to dwarf those of the AAA. In 1949, before entering direct competition with NASCAR by 
sanctioning stock car races, the AAA oversaw 446 events. In 1955, the AAA sanctioned 
a total of 123 events. In contrast, NASCAR had grown from sanctioning 67 races in the 
Modified, Sportsmen, and Grand National classes in 1949217, to sanctioning 1142 races 
in all tiers of production-based racing in 1955. In assuming complete control over the 
majority of racing action across the nation by 1955, NASCAR had demonstrated the 
popularity and the profitability of production-based racing.  
Despite the inertia accompanying NASCAR’s growth, events outside of American 
racing would ultimately bring the conflict between NASCAR and the AAA to a close. 
Following the death of six drivers in AAA sanctioned events, and the disastrous death of 
over 100 spectators at the 24 hour race at LeMans, France; much public criticism was 
leveled against automobile racing.218 On the floor of the U.S. Senate, Senator Richard 
Neuberger of Oregon stated that “I doubt is there is as much blood shed in Spanish bull 
rings as is occurring on automobile race tracks in this country.”219 In response to the 
                                                 
216 NASCAR did not use the ‘purse per mile’ measure that the AAA did, but 
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219 Speech on the Senate floor from July 12, 1955 reprinted in, Russ Catlin, “How To 
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 99
growing amount of bad publicity associated with motor sport, in early August of 1955 the 
president of the American Automobile Association, Andrew J. Sordini, announced that, 
“Upon the completion of the schedule of events already undertaken for the year 1955, 
the AAA will disassociate itself from all types of automobile racing in the United 
States.”220 With one quick statement the conflict between NASCAR and the AAA was 
ended. Though the AAA Contest Board’s activities were reorganized under the auspices 
of the new United States Auto Club, NASCAR’s role as premier sanctioning agency for 
production-based motor sports in the United States was never again challenged. USAC 
stock car racing continued the championship series begun by the AAA, but it never 
developed enough momentum to seriously challenge NASCAR. 
At the close of 1955, NASCAR stood alone among sanctioning agencies. In just 
over eight years Bill France had established a national championship for stock car racing 
that operated without significant competition across the United States.221 In seven 
seasons, the NASCAR Grand National series had grown to such prominence that factory 
sponsored racing teams were commonplace.222 The year after the withdrawal of the AAA 
from racing, Grand National competition enjoyed a banner year. NASCAR sanctioned 
fifty-six Grand National races in 1956, and paid out substantially more prize money than 
in 1955.223 As a result of dictatorial management and general public enthusiasm for fast 
production-based cars, NASCAR had become well-established in a very short time 
despite isolated outcries regarding safety issues. 
                                                 
220 Fielden, Volume 1, p.173. “American Automobile Association Contest Board 
Official Bulletin, August 4, 1955,” AAA Correspondence, Smithsonian Institution 
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221 NASCAR even sanctioned “Modified” races in Hawaii, NACAR Newsletter, 
November, 1, 1953, p.3. 
222 Yunick, p. 27, 37, 57, 143. In 1951, 52, and 53 Hudson sponsored NASCAR 
teams and by 1955 Ford and Chevrolet were developing teams of their own.  
223 Though NASCAR completed fewer races overall (modified, sportsman and  Grand 
National) in 1956, it awarded $1,626,993.54. An increase of $331,000 over 1955. 
NASCAR Newsletter, vol. 7, no 1, January 12, 1957, p.1. 
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Perhaps because of the close identification with the equipment possible in the 
case of stock car racing, the public discussion of violence in racing often included 
references to the barbaric carnage supposedly staged weekly for degenerate Southern 
fans. As the largest sanctioning body in the country, NASCAR was certainly a target for 
criticism. “I believe the time has come for the United States to be a civilized nation and to 
stop the carnage on racetracks,” Senator Neuberger commented. “The deaths on our 
highways are sad and tragic, but at least they are not purposely staged for profit and for 
the delight of thousands of screeching spectators.”224 Where action was initiated to 
diminish violence on the track, even if intended to apply to all forms of sport, it impacted 
NASCAR the most.  
In June of 1957, the Automobile Manufacturers Association (AMA) enacted a ban 
on factory support for any automobile racing.225 Carnage in the annual sports car 
endurance race at LeMans, France in June of 1955 and numerous deaths on the AAA 
Championship circuit during the mid-1950s prompted the AMA ban.226 As a result, the 
important support that had helped cultivate a national reputation for stock car racing 
during the 1950s was withdrawn. Yet there was little impact on AAA-style racing using 
purpose-built equipment or on sports car racing. Neither of these forms relied heavily on 
products or prestige from American automakers. Unfortunately for NASCAR, the 
evacuation of support for a series dependent on production-based cars was significant. 
For five years attendance declined as racing teams lost major factory participation while 
other forms of racing suffered little change in momentum.227 (See Table 1) 
                                                 
224 Senator Richard Neuberger from a speech delivered on the Senate floor, July 12, 
1955 as quoted in Speed Age, November 1955, p.13. 
225 “Detroit Censors Speed,” Speed Age, October 1957, p.15. 
226 AAA Contest Board, “1955 Summary of Activities,” AAA Correspondence, 
Smithsonian Transportation Collection, Washington, DC 
227 In this instance, the SCCA and road racing events it sanctioned were unaffected 
while the AAA contest board was quickly reorganized as USAC and continued with 
business as usual.  
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Data Extracted From: Greg Fielden, Forty Years of Stock Car Racing , (Surfside, SC: Galfield Press, 1992), Vol. 1-4.
 
 
At various times during the decade, financial and technical support for racers 
from automakers such as Hudson, Oldsmobile, Pontiac, Studebaker, Ford, Chrysler and 
Chevrolet had helped NASCAR achieve success and respectability. With the withdrawal 
of factory support in 1957, NASCAR focused less on expanding nationally and more on 
consolidating growth in regions most amenable to stock car racing. For NASCAR the 
decade between 1955 and 1969 was a period of Southern retrenchment that allowed 
stock car racing to recover from the loss of factory sponsorship and consolidate a loyal 
fan base within the southeastern United States.  This period heavily influenced the 
composition of NASCAR patrons and shaped eventual perceptions of stock car racing 
when it again appeared on the national scene. 
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Popular histories often cite the moonshining roots of some competitors as 
evidence that NASCAR was Southern from the beginning. 228 Yet any such regional 
association was not initially embraced by NASCAR. During the first decade there was 
much official emphasis devoted to shaking any regional association with the South. 
Indeed, NASCAR spent much of its first five years trying to make stock car racing a 
genuinely international sport. Between 1949 and 1954, NASCAR staged races in 23 
different states and Canada. (See Table 2) During this period, there were more races in 
the state of New York, than in Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Texas 
combined.229 Not until the five seasons between 1955 and 1959 did NASCAR 
competition begin to concentrate its competitions in the South. (See Table 3)  
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Winston Cup Series, (Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University Popular 
Press) 1997, p. 11-12. 
229 Data from, Fielden, Vol. 1. 
 103











































































NASCAR event scheduling policy clearly intended to develop a racing series 
unifying production-based racing across North America. Even its letterhead hinted at this 
ambition, presenting the ambitious (if somewhat confusing) title of NASCAR International 
(NASCAR is short for the National Association of Stock Car Automobile Racing).230  
Despite such ambitious nomenclature, by the time NASCAR racing resumed earnest 
national growth in the 1970s, stock car racing had become known as a particularly 
Southern endeavor.  
Much of this persistent association with region was the region resulted from of 
historical happenstance and the demographics of mass entertainment. When NASCAR 
was formed, potential fans in other regions were already concentrated in urban areas 
and following professional “stick and ball” sports. During the 1920s, while southern 
workers struggled within an agricultural and emerging textile production economy, 
                                                 
230 NASCAR, 1950 Stock Car Competition Rule Book, (Daytona Beach: NASCAR, 
1950), p.3. 
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working class fans elsewhere became affluent enough to begin following sports as 
entertainment. Working class fans of the East coast and industrial Mid-west embraced 
sports like professional baseball, football and basketball. Teams from the National 
Football League (1903-1932), American Basketball League (1925-1955), and the 
International Roller Derby League, among others, were building fan bases in larger 
urban centers across the northern United States.231 Where auto racing other than the 
major AAA Championship series did occur, it was small-time and subject to the whims of 
racers, promoters, and weather. Though numerous local dirt tracks hosted a full 
schedule of midget and jalopy racing events, they were far too disorganized, and 
frequently too far removed from urban centers, to enter direct competition with 
established professional sports.232  
The timing of NASCAR’s growth suggests that it was the expectations of 
Southern fans that made it grow into a regionally defined sport. As the Southern 
industrial working class emerged economically during the decades following the Second 
World War, NASCAR stock car racing offered entertainment. This “demand pull” also 
influenced NASCAR because stock car racing served a region longing for emblems of 
identity in a time of social upheaval.  If Boston, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and Chicago had 
pro baseball teams, and working class fans in Philadelphia and Cleveland could cheer 
for pro football teams, Southern fans could rally around the amazing feats of drivers in 
“production” cars.  
Meeting the demand for sports entertainment meant that money existed to create 
such demand. As the Southern states realized explosive economic growth following the 
Second World War, the means to take advantage of mass entertainment were available 
                                                 
231 “Dimitry’s Extinct Sports Leagues, 
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232 Staff Report, “Farwell to Midgets,” Speed Age, February 1951, p.28 
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to the masses for the first time.233 Across the nation automobile ownership was 
becoming virtually universal, roads were being built at a rapid pace, and the car was in 
vogue as a symbol of status and taste.234 In the South, the emergence of the automobile 
as a consumer durable of profound symbolic and immense practical value is reflected in 
the high ratio of car ownership. During the years 1950 through 1975, Southern states 
consistently reported more cars per driver than the national average.235 The economic 
emergence of the South only sharpened the separate impact of these trends. Also 
between 1950 and 1975, automobile ownership per 1000 citizens realized an average 
national increase of just under 20 percent, while during that same period automobile 
ownership in the South increased by more than 26 percent.236 
The case of North Carolina is illustrative of regional affinity for automobile use. If, 
during the post war decades, California was the cradle of creative automotive speed 
culture, North Carolina was the land of road making. In the state-funded creation of this 
vital component of automobility North Carolina exceeded all other states. With over 
75,000 miles of state roads by 1975, North Carolina had nearly 55,000 more miles of 
state-maintained roadway than California.237 Additionally, most of the state funded road 
building in North Carolina was completed before the massive nationwide expansion 
stimulated by the beginning of the Interstate highway system in 1956. Between 1950 and 
1953, the state of North Carolina built over 37,000 miles of roads, more than any other 
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state in the nation.238 Though it is possible that state-funded road construction was 
prompted by the pork-barrel politics of long standing congressmen, and probable that 
the presence of military bases throughout the state influenced road construction, the 
scale of the road boom suggests widespread quiescence by the state citizenry. Such 
was enthusiasm for road building that, by 1965, twenty percent of state funded road 
construction in the lower 48 states was completed in North Carolina.239  
North Carolinians were making up for time lost expanding their road system. 
Road building during the 1910s was on a scale still suited to the needs of horse drawn 
farm wagons. The 1920s saw increased construction, but on a limited scale. Textile 
manufacturing was just coming into its own, so much of the existing infrastructure suited 
state needs. A slump in textile manufacturing and farming during the depression ruled 
out major efforts during the 1930s, but it also seems likely that North Carolinians wanted 
automotive mobility to become part of the economic, political and social life of the state. 
With a surge in the growth of southern manufacturing after the war, the Southern textile 
processing region, dominated by North Carolina, produced a huge number of new 
motorists willing to support roadway creation. Whatever the reason, the state’s 
leadership in this area of infrastructure growth suggests that North Carolinians wanted 
roads and were every bit as excited about the car as their counterparts on the West 
Coast. If California was the inspirational center of automotive design creativity then 
North Carolina became a model of automobile use.  
Though the exact reasons for this road-building boom remain unclear, the 
possibilities it created for production-based racing are unquestionable. One way that 
North Carolinians celebrated the American automobile was staging, attending and 
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competing in stock car races. Between 1955 and 1964, more than one third of all Grand 
National races were staged in North Carolina.240 Even as late as 1979, the state still 
accounted for well over a quarter of all NASCAR Grand National races yet run.241 (See 
Table 4) The connection between the growing road system and racing stock cars is 
telling. The growing infrastructure helped bring fans to tracks and the growing economy 
provided dollars for fans, racers, and promoters to spend on racing events. New roads 
and a higher percentage of drivers helped build the association between action on the 
track and common experience of the fans. More cars and roads across the South, 
helped foster a dimension of vicarious association possible with stock car racing. 
Beyond these practical matters, stock car racing, as a powerfully symbolic manner of 
celebrating the use-value of the automobile, found devoted fans in North Carolina. This 
atmosphere celebrating automobility, as centered in North Carolina, found patrons 
expressing enthusiasm for use of the automobile by driving to a racetrack and watching 
production based cars similar to their own compete. 
                                                 
240 During the ten year span from 1955 to 1964, NASCAR staged 515 Grand 
National races, of which 179 or 34.84 percent were staged in North Carolina. Data 
from Fielden, Vol. 1-2. 
241Data from Fielden, Vol. 1-4 
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This chart shows the heavy distribution of events in North Carolina and across the states of the southern Piedmont 
including South Carolina, Virgina, Georgia, and Alabama between 1949 and 1979.
Data Extracted From: Greg Fielden, Forty Years of Stock Car Racing , (Surfside, SC: Galfield Press, 1992), Vol.1-4
 
 
For the cultivation of devoted fans, the timing of the creation of a large stock car 
series could scarcely have been more fortuitous. As radio and television acquainted the 
South with the rest of the nation, working class whites in Dixie sought new symbols to 
help maintain distinct regional flavor. The birth of NASCAR in 1948 coincided with the 
beginning of a national push for civil rights with other, more fundamental threats to the 
established culture of the region. As lunch counter sit-ins, ranting segregationists, and 
televised confrontations between peaceful protesters and police in riot gear brought 
scorn upon the South, stock car racing found a solid fan base among the working class 
whites of the southern Piedmont.242 As Dewey Grantham comments on the civil rights 
movement, “The Second Reconstruction was clearly the result of outside forces 
                                                 
242 Dewey Grantham, The South in Modern America: A Region at Odds, (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1994), p.233. 
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impinging on the South.”243 For white southern workers, a group often manipulated with 
segregationist rhetoric, and historically most threatened by desegregation,244 the thrill of 
racing created new symbols of white southern character and distinction. By the early 
1960s, the equipment and superspeedways of NASCAR stock car racing were 
sufficiently evolved to help sustain the mythology of southern white supremacy. The 
sight of a mundane production “stock” racecar traveling at phenomenal speeds on the 
banks of a superspeedway suggested that stock car drivers could accomplish fantastic 
feats with ordinary equipment. Even if the competitors were not vehemently racist, or 
perhaps not even white, their exploits were carried out primarily for working class 
audiences in an increasingly Southern sport. For some, dramatic wrecks and hard fought 
finishes likely offered redemption for southern masculinity damaged by the lost cause, 
reconstruction and the unswerving march of the civil rights movement.  
Other features of stock car racing were appealing to southern working class fans. A 
market study conducted for Ford at Darlington and Charlotte in 1963, found traditionally 
southern themes present among NASCAR stock car racing fans. In addition to exploring 
the role of violence, the study suggested that patrons were frequently disaffected 
working class men. A synopsis of this research reported that 
The findings indicate that stock car racing represents the American version of bull 
fighting whereby the fan achieves significant pleasure viewing the combined act of 
violence and competition. Violence if equated with accidents, bloodshed, and death, 
while competition is equated with drivers and or makes. Not surprisingly the 
dominant characteristics of the fans are youth, employment in subordinate jobs, and 
an extreme love and knowledge of automobiles, engines, etc.  The great attraction 
of stock car racing to this group is the opportunity to release feelings which have 
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little chance to be expressed fully in the course of daily, and frequently dull, 
routines.245 
This appraisal confirms Dewey Grantham’s later assessment that, “Televised scenes of 
demonstrators being attacked with fire hoses and police dogs, reports of the bombing of 
black churches, and the beating and murder of civil rights volunteers shocked millions of 
people in the United States and reinforced the outside perception of the South as the 
nation’s most violent and savage section.”246  
 Though not exclusive to stock car racing or even racing in the South, violence 
during competition was embraced by Southern working class fans who accepted danger 
and violent behavior between contestants as normal, perhaps even praiseworthy. As 
John Shelton Reed suggests in The Enduring South, “the historical record and actual 
crime statistics suggest that Southerners do have a ‘tendency to appeal to force’ to settle 
differences and it may be supposed that they view such resort as more often legitimate 
than do non-Southerners.”247 Southern working class fans were perhaps more willing to 
condone, even celebrate, the violent nature of stock car racing. One survey published by 
Reed indicates that among all Southerners, urban uneducated skilled labor, the same 
sort of folks working on the weaving floors of Piedmont textile mills and in the bleachers 
at stock car tracks, were more likely to condone violence than their counterparts outside 
the South.248 
                                                 
245 “Exploratory Research On Motivations and Characteristics Of Stock Car Racing 
Fans” (65/F-32-S), Ford Motor Company Archives, Motorsports Collection, Dearborn 
Michigan. 
246 Grantham, p. 321. 
247 John Shelton Reed, The Enduring South: Subcultural Persistence in Mass 
Society, (University of North Carolina Press, 1974), p.46. 
248 In this survey Reed shows that 69 percent of southern, urban, uneducated skilled 
labor favored corporal punishment in schools whereas 37 percent of Non-South 
urban, uneducated skilled labor favored corporal punishment. While there is some 
difference between wrecking an automobile while racing and spanking a child, the 
important similarity is an underlying acceptance of violent methods to achieve a 
desired end. See Reed, p.54. 
 111
As the Ford-sponsored study suggested, while outsiders condemned such 
violence, Southerners reveled in it. Harsh appraisals of southern violence, especially 
when broadcast nationally, could not have been lost on race fans.249 Even as the 
superspeedways hosted their first events, in the political arena segregationist practices 
associated with the south were being beaten back by external forces. What better way to 
show indifference or defiance to opinions and initiatives from without, than attend a 
violent stock car race? 
Celebration of such a contrast extended notions of transgression and rebellion in 
evidence at racetracks into the national arena. Though NASCAR stock car racing sprang 
from activities contrary to the sensibilities of Southern authority, it grew to symbolize 
Southern resistance to authority from without. As Pete Daniel writes, “… racing culture 
was characterized by a disrespect for authority that had been the underpinning of 
bootleg culture and the worldview of the working class.”250 Perhaps fans loved stock car 
racing because it was dangerous and violent in ways other sports were not, because, 
replete with racist imagery, it was dominated by white southern talent. 
Another, more historical, coincidence used by race event promoters helped 
popularize regional distinction among NASCAR fans. Even as NASCAR stock car racing 
began to consolidate in the South during the mid-1950s, a fresh wave of nostalgia 
celebrating the centennial of the Confederate States of America brought symbols and 
discussion of the confederacy into the public sphere. Racetrack promoters brought this 
symbolism to NASCAR racing to sell tickets. Beginning in 1958, events began to carry 
names evoking the romanticism and racial legacy of the “lost cause.” Thus, events 
known as the Rebel 300, Dixie 400, Mason-Dixon 200, Volunteer 300, and Southeastern 
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250 came into being during the era of greatest racial tension across the southeast.251 In 
keeping with this trend, during the late 1950s and early 1960, photographs of stock car 
races began to show more confederate battle flags flying among infield fans, Victory lane 
ceremonies now sometimes featured “Confederate honor guards” in gray uniforms 
sporting the confederate battle flag and race queens dressed as Southern Belles.252 
Though perhaps simply a nostalgic ploy staged by promoters to sell more tickets, the 
presence of these symbols in conjunction with political pressure from outside the region, 
and an increasingly regional schedule, helped cement the adoption of NASCAR stock 
car racing by Southern working class fans. 
During the 1960s, the scale and speed of entertainment and spectacle afforded 
by the superspeedways helped finalize stock car racing as the chosen sport of the 
southern working class. Racing on the big ovals offered legitimacy to a sport struggling 
for recognition amid growing competition from more established stick and ball sports. 
The big ovals also helped NASCAR stock car racing achieve legitimate speeds and 
notoriety as compared to other forms of automotive competition. Huge crowds of loyal 
fans enticed and accommodated by the big tracks brought notoriety and revenue to the 
sport. The publicity generated interest and investment from automakers, even as the 
tracks required radical departure from strictly stock specifications for the racecars. 
Record numbers of paying fans guaranteed NASCAR’s financial future, even as themes 
from the Old South also proved irresistible as a rallying point for egos bruised by 
externally orchestrated adjustments to the established social order.  
With the withdrawal of overt factory support for racing teams after the AMA ban 
in 1957, NASCAR temporarily abandoned hopes for a national racing series with races 
throughout the nation. The southern states, which offered little in the way of competing 
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professional sports, or even amateur motor sport, were a logical place to regain 
momentum. Instead of building a championship with events in every state or even every 
region, a goal first defined at the formation of NASCAR, the National Stock Car 
Championship became a series contested mainly on southern soil. Though stock car 
races were sanctioned in 17 non-southern states during the first five years of NASCAR’s 
existence, between 1955 and 1959 races were held in just nine states outside the 
South.253 (See Table 2) During the next five-year period, from 1960 through 1964, 
cultivation of an eager fan base within the South continued, with a total of only 22 of 266 
race events occurring outside the South. Concentrating NASCAR Grand National events 
in the South marked a logical return to a region with a tradition of support for production-
based racing.  
Review of the locations of races within the South suggests that the popularity of 
stock car racing below the Mason-Dixon line had less to do with broadly accepted 
moonshine and magnolia mythology than with the high concentration of willing fans in 
particular locales. It seems that NASCAR depended on the expanding disposable 
income of the emerging working class, a working class rooted in Piedmont textile mills 
rather than the rural South as has been occasionally suggested.254 During its first thirty 
years, NASCAR staged no races in Mississippi, and but one race in Louisiana, both 
agricultural states without significant concentrations of industry. Instead, the heaviest 
concentration of races occurred in the mill country of the Piedmont. Between 1955 and 
1964, over one-third of all NASCAR Grand National racing events were staged in the mill 
towns of North Carolina.255 More than half of all NASCAR Grand National races 
conducted during the first thirty years occurred in the four states of Virginia, North 
                                                 
253 Fielden Vol. 2, 3.  
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Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia.256 Significantly, these same four states contained 
the highest concentrations of textile weaving and spinning mills in the nation.257  These 
mills offered a concentration of potential fans that became the core fan base for 
NASCAR. 
Arranged parallel to the Appalachian Mountains and diagonally across Virginia, 
North Carolina, western South Carolina, and north Georgia into Alabama, the textile 
industry of the southern piedmont created the largest, most established industrial 
working class in Dixie.258 In 1950, Davidson’s Textile Blue Book listed 412 “cotton 
manufacturing” businesses in North Carolina.259 In the same year, Massachusetts, the 
cradle of mechanized American textile production, had but 234 cotton mills.260 By 1967, 
North Carolina had 994 textile mills of all types, while Massachusetts had but 381. Yet 
as textile manufacturing jobs moved South during the first half of the 20th century, the 
diversions possible for the workers in the North did not move with them. Without 
competition from professional football, basketball or major league baseball, southern 
laborers, some southern workers enjoying disposable income for the first time, found 
diversion at stock car races.261 
Through the crucial years after NASCAR’s initial foray into nationwide 
acceptance and before the onset of tobacco sponsorship in 1971, areas with the most 
cotton mills had the highest frequency of density of NASCAR stock car races. A map of 
“Textile Mill Towns” from 1955 shows strong correlation between NASCAR event venues 
and the textile industry. Towns like Rockingham, Martinsville, Charlotte, Darlington, 
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Weaverville, and Hillsboro, among others, all hosted multiple NASCAR events between 
1955 and 1971, and all contained large textile mills. The distribution of races by county 
throughout Virgina, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Alabama suggests that 
the highest concentration of fans with an unlimited demand for stock car racing was the 
mill region of the Southern piedmont. Here, race promoters and NASCAR found a willing 
audience among working class white men seeking entertainment, redemption of identity, 




Figure 2: Map Showing the Concentration of NASCAR events across the Southern 
Piedmont, 1955 through 1969. 
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Map From: Davidson’s Textile Blue Book, (Ridgewood, NJ: Davidson Publishing 
Company) 1958 edition 
 
Data on event locations from: Greg Fielden, Forty Years of Stock Car Racing, (Surfside 
Beach, SC: Galfield Press), Vol.1-4. 
 
The presence of such strong demand for stock car action helped keep the series 
credible after the manufacturers officially bowed out of competition in 1957. It also 
suggests that after trying to sell stock car racing to fans across the nation during the first 
few years of existence, NASCAR settled on the high concentration of loyal fans in the 
South. Whereas the primary focus of AAA and later USAC was the uniform sanction of 
races, NASCAR assumed the role of managing the forces and circumstances that 
determined the overall success of the entertainment format they regulated.262 Such 
careful attention to the business side of sanctioning, the demographics of their fan base, 
and the needs of the competitors meant that NASCAR races consistently attracted larger 
crowds than competing stock car circuits. Part of this was an ability to keep paying fans 
returning to the track each week. The violent nature of stock car races, exclusively 
Southern flavor of events, and absence of significant competition from other sports made 
the South NASCAR’s “breadbasket.” The relative affluence afforded by these factors 
only increased the appeal of racing stars and the cultural gravity of events in which they 
competed. When Chrysler, Richard Petty’s sponsor, boycotted NASCAR racing in 1965, 
he rejected the opportunity to compete elsewhere stating, “I definitely won’t switch to 
USAC. I couldn’t make a living running stocks in that group because they don’t run for 
enough money.”263 Rather than sanction where promoters were willing or according to 
what might establish a uniform national reputation, NASCAR selected the location of 
events to assure full stands, and therefore big purses and top racing talent.  
                                                 
262 “1955 AAA Contest Board Activity,” AAA Correspondence, Smithsonian Institution 
Transportation Collection, NMAH, Washington, DC. 
263 Fielden, vol. 3, p.9. 
 117
Management of racing dates, as evident by the consolidation of races throughout 
the Piedmont, reflects the intent by NASCAR to embrace a base of loyal fans. Carefully 
choosing locations for races, and organizing the calendar of sanctioned events to 
promote sellout crowds rather than geographical dispersion, were crucial to the success 
and eventual regional association of stock car racing.264 Though NASCAR events in 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and even Long Island were well attended, in North Carolina the lack 
of entertainment competition meant that events could sell out consistently. 
 Development of a strongly loyal fan base was essential for the long-term success 
of NASCAR. Patrons across the Southern Piedmont who financially sustained the sport 
after the loss of industry sponsorship in 1957, now claimed it as a regional development. 
Part of this association with the South, the violent action accepted as a part of the sport, 
remained a controversial yet fundamental attraction. When NASCAR again began 
cultivating a national audience during the 1970s, it would be as a sport cast as a regional 
phenomenon.  
                                                 




THE SPIRIT OF COMPETITION MEETS RACING INNOVATION 
 
 
Much of the financial and organizational success of NASCAR can be attributed to 
artful regulation of the racing technology employed in stock car events.  Through years 
of skilled regulation of the applied native genius of competitors, NASCAR crafted a 
recipe for an inexpensive racing chassis and driveline well suited to the demands of 
stock car racing. Whereas in most sports, the sanctioning organization exists primarily to 
organize and satisfy the needs of the participating teams, from its creation NASCAR was 
clearly attuned to reaping benefit from the more theatrical and commercial aspects of the 
sport. From his days as a promoter, Bill France knew that funding for American racing 
depended upon attracting crowds of paying fans. This experience, and the American 
automotive environment of the 1950s and 1960s helped France influence technological 
development toward the pragmatic goal of maximum entertainment potential for the 
minimum cost. Indirectly, serving the interest of fans also furthered the interest of 
NASCAR’s immediate constituents, the racers. Filling grandstands with paying fans 
assured profits for promoters and track owners, and pay for drivers, mechanics, and car 
owners.  
Entertaining competition in motor sport involves a contest between a large field of 
cars with frequent passing on the track. As discussed earlier, this is difficult to 
accomplish when the cars in competition are dissimilar. Unfortunately for NASCAR, 
because of the inherent differences between the cars offered by auto makers, it was 
likely that one production model would prove itself best suited to winning races. 
Increased traction offered by the conversion of the sport to bigger asphalt speedways 
during the late fifties and early sixties only compounded the importance of dissimilarities 
in weight, horsepower, and handling between different models and makes. 
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Maintaining the interest and involvement of racers, sponsors, promoters, and 
fans required artful enforcement of rules constructed to give NASCAR the authority and 
flexibility to make stock racing a viable motor sport, and provide consistently close action 
for race fans. To accomplish this NASCAR developed a replacement for the chassis and 
engines built in Detroit, maintaining only the stock bodywork for outward recognition of 
the production origins of the car. Developing and implementing this “formula stock” 
design as a replacement for cars based primarily on production technology occupied 
much of the first 25 years of NASCAR’s existence. By developing a racecar that looked 
like a production-based car but that was actually purpose-built, the regulating body 
gradually transformed stock car racing into a sporting contest, a promotional tool, and a 
form of entertainment.  The “stock car” that was developed to suit these disparate needs, 
represents the crystallization of racing knowledge developed by competitors, racing 
technology borrowed from production vehicles between 1950 and 1975, and the 
promotional agenda of NASCAR. 
Ostensibly a sanctioning body has complete discretion in shaping the sport it 
oversees, but there are constraints imposed by accepted practice. Beginning with early 
motorcycle races in velodromes at the turn of the century, Americans had been racing 
motor vehicles set distances on oval courses long before NASCAR was founded.265 
Instead of racing between two points, oval racing kept the action in front of paying fans, 
for a set number of revolutions around a circular closed course. This format permitted 
the development of racing as a spectator sport, but did little to ensure close competition.  
Maintaining close competition was a task assumed by NASCAR. Racing 
automobiles in circles for set distances offered little latitude for adjusting race procedure 
to ensure entertaining action. As a result, the technical specifications of competition 
                                                 
265 Roger Huntington, “Bombs on the Boards,” Speed Age, September, 1952, p.36, 
Harry V. Sucher, Iron Redskin, Haynes, 1984. p.21. 
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vehicles set forth in the rules were intended to ensure closely matched capabilities 
regardless of brand name. 
Establishing rules to maintain competition is not unusual. Rules define what 
actions constitute scoring, what actions draw penalties, and the physical and temporal 
parameters of competition. Rules also describe what equipment may be used in 
competition. Enforced equity among competitor’s equipment is what distinguishes 
sporting contests from exhibitions. Uniform procedure and equivalent equipment 
facilitate outcomes determined by the successful application of skill, stamina, and 
strength. Such uniformity also helps foster participation and fanship by establishing 
regular, understandable sporting events. For sporting enthusiasts and beginners alike, 
uniformity of rules also encourages comparison between  contests and contestants in 
different places and times.266  
Though material uniformity is theoretically possible in auto racing, regulation is 
problematic because of the complexity of the technological systems that comprise the 
sporting equipment. In contrast with a tennis racket or basketball, there is vast 
opportunity to gain “sporting” advantage by manipulating the complex systems of the 
racecar and its attending equipment. Racing series using purpose built cars often 
followed a “formula”267 that typically specified parameters such as minimum weight, 
maximum engine displacement, and maximum wheelbase.  
                                                 
266 For example, a runner with long legs might have an advantage over a runner with 
short legs, but they both run the same distance, and are timed with equivalent 
watches. Even if the long-legged runner is consistently faster, he/she is not forced to 
carry extra weight, or run farther, or be timed with 65 second minutes during the 
race. Thus, though the runner’s performance might be very different; though one 
runner might be much faster for much greater distance, the parameters experienced 
by each runner in competition would be the same. 
267 The term “Formula” as used in racing is a set of specifications that define the cars 
in a specific series. They typically define engine size, wheelbase and weight. As 
knowledge of other factors such as tires and aerodynamics grew during the 20th 
century, the number of standards composing most formulae also increased.  
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Racing that uses production-based equipment offers greater challenges for 
regulation. The paradox of keeping the equipment roughly equal while allowing cars to 
come from different manufacturers cannot be resolved without heavy manipulation of the 
technical criteria of the cars. In the early decades of stock car racing, where vehicles 
were built to intentionally differentiated designs, such a formula was not practical. Unless 
the formula varied for equipment from different automakers, most of the racers would 
likely choose the one make of car closest to the design parameters. Effectively 
mandating a single model for competition would negate an important advertising 
dimension of stock car racing. Though true uniformity in equipment might better 
demonstrate the skills of a driver, it would deprive a stock car racing series of much of 
the promotional lure that kept manufacturers involved financially. NASCAR’s gradual 
transition to a “formula stock,” purpose-built car that maintained the silhouette of the 
production vehicle encouraged both close competition and the promotional aspects of 
the sport. 
In most sporting contests a degree of enforced parity does not rule out vastly 
different performances. But for the most part, because of the simple nature of the 
equipment employed, vastly different performances are the exception. In addition, 
significant thresholds determined by ability and experience limit the possibility of 
beginners competing against well trained, well conditioned, experienced athletes. 
Typically, a competitor must become an experienced amateur, before becoming 
professional. Furthermore, seldom do amateurs enter the professional ranks with top 
ranking. But because of the significant role that equipment in competition, these 
thresholds are less in motor sport.  
Consistent disparity in professional sports, especially professional sports that 
depend heavily on significant capital investment and revenue from spectators, can be 
devastating for competitors, owners and sanctioning bodies alike. Consistent disparity 
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between competitors can drive fans away, or at least create less dramatic action.  
NASCAR, in order to build itself as a form of entertainment, took steps to guarantee, 
insofar as possible, close competition. This was accomplished by gradually extending 
control over the technical specifications of the sporting equipment used in competition. 
For NASCAR, the complicating factor was the obvious and necessary dissimilarity 
between the equipment used in competition. Though promotional considerations made it 
vital to maintain a variety of vehicles on the track, keeping competition close was a 
fundamental objective for NASCAR from the beginning. For automakers the marketing 
leverage offered by claiming that their stock model outperformed similar models from a 
competitor was considered very valuable.268 Similarly, NASCAR could also not resist 
advertising that its races served the public interest by offering a “laboratory for Detroit” to 
test its new cars.269 For this great laboratory to be valuable as an advertising asset, and 
more dramatic for fans, it was essential to have a variety of automakers represented. 
NASCAR president Bill France understood that if the resources of a single 
automaker were applied to the problems of winning races, competition between different 
cars (and therefore ticket sales) would suffer. He was interested in moving his 
sanctioning organization beyond the role played by those groups that preceded 
NASCAR.270 With control over the equipment, parity between competitors could be 
assured, but the symbolic reference to genuine production had to be maintained. In the 
end, this meant that NASCAR stock car racing was spectacle intended to relate the 
virtues of automobiles that were utterly unlike those on the track. However, before 
NASCAR had enough momentum to generate a car that was wholly original to stock car 
racing, support from automakers was essential. 
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France displayed artful use of diplomacy, bluff and strategy as he struggled to 
maintain enough interest from automakers to help subsidize the sport, without fostering 
so much interest that NASCAR might lose control over stock car racing.271 As Motor 
Trend writer Eugene Jaderquist related in 1952, “Detroit’s attitude is of primary 
importance to you and NASCAR. Bill France does not want direct factory participation 
because the huge bankrolls and skilled engineering staffs would put the small owner out 
of business.”272  France recognized that factories were too hard to control, and that if one 
factory was dominating events too completely, the others would likely leave. After all, in 
order for winning races to have positive effect in the market place, the cars had to be 
competing against other makes. 
What NASCAR did want was modifications useful to racing to appear in mass 
production form.  In that way, they would be available to all racers, not just those on 
factory race teams. Paraphrasing NASCAR’s president, Jaderquist writes,  
Bill cites the 22-gallon gasoline tank available on the Henry J as an example of 
Detroit’s proper attitude toward his races. Few Henry J owners need that much 
reserve, but it means one less pit stop for a Henry J driver. Ford now lists an 
optional valve timing, something that you and I may never use but which is very 
helpful to the Ford competition driver. 273  
 
If options were available through mass production, if they could be ordered 
through the dealer and were thus available to considerable numbers of competitors, then 
NASCAR was happy to accept them. It is unlikely that the 22 gallon gas tank used by 
Kaiser or the alternate valve timing available from Ford were intended to meet the needs 
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of NASCAR competitors.274 Claims that stock car racing was related to any sort of 
factory research and development races only enhanced the status of NASCAR.  
Though ultimately France’s position would have the effect of democratizing high 
performance technology, his original intent was to discourage direct factory participation 
in racing. Jaderquist continued, “What [Bill France] does want is: (1) more factory 
recognition of the value of stock car racing, both as a promotional device and as a 
testing ground for engineering ideas, and (2) better relations between factories and 
drivers.” 275 Jaderquist suggested that factories interested in promoting their wares by 
supporting existing drivers would find welcome reception in NASCAR. While NASCAR 
was a fine place to promote vehicles and drivers, it was not practical for automakers to 
test new models on racetracks. The outcome of such tests was far too public, and the 
modifications were far too extensive to return any real design data. Furthermore, using 
NASCAR Grand National stock car racing as a “testing ground for engineering ideas” 
was, at best, inefficient. Since the NASCAR rules dictated that an item be in production 
before it was legal for use in competition, engineering testing could only occur on a 
relatively limited number of components that would have already been engineered. 
There was no economic incentive to put untested ideas into production in order to test 
them on a track.  As the 1952 NASCAR rule book states, “In all specifications the word 
“stock” shall be defined as meaning any part which is listed in the manufacturer’s catalog 
for the year model and type of car entered.”276 Though this rule would ultimately be 
circumvented by manufacturers through supplemental additions to parts catalogs, in this 
context NASCAR meant that legal parts had to be mass-produced. It was unlikely that a 
mass producer would invest capital in tooling to produce any new technology for testing 
at a stock car race.  
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276 NASCAR, 1952 Stock Car Racing Rule Book, (Daytona: NASCAR, 1952), p.7. 
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Optimally for NASCAR, factories would provide capital and let the racers do the 
racing. In addition to providing one more link in any feedback mechanism that connected 
the supposed test bed of the race track with auto factories, the use of experienced 
racers would have telling impact on the pace and direction of technological innovation. 
Racers did not have the resources to effect radical shifts in the technological trajectory of 
NASCAR’s version of a production-based racecar. Racers could also be more easily 
controlled. If innovations were found to be unacceptable, racers had little recourse other 
than returning their cars to legal configuration. Racers were less likely to stray too far 
technologically as few could afford to rebuild a car found illegal because of radical 
innovation. What resulted was incremental technological development forever 
constrained by the demands of presenting the sport of stock car racing as entertainment. 
It was an unusual dialectic based on the materials, skills and knowledge available to 
racers and the necessity of producing entertaining racing. 
There were also financial considerations influencing the creation and 
enforcement of the stock car rules. The racers themselves were interested in durable, 
inexpensive equipment that could win races. If the rules kept the cost of competing low, 
more racers had a shot of making a solid career on the track and NASCAR had a good 
chance of filling the track with lots of competition. 
Bearing these processes and issues in mind, it is useful to reconsider the 
fundamental paradox shaping the perspective of NASCAR. In order to maintain fan 
interest, NASCAR-sanctioned stock car races had to provide exciting competition. 
Exciting competition typically involved close racing between numerous, fast cars. In 
order to claim that it was a stock car series that might enjoy the benefits of vicarious 
association by fans and possibly attract the financial support of automakers, NASCAR 
had to allow a diverse field of cars to compete. To create this illusion, as time wore on it 
became necessary to build a special formula for the NASCAR stock car that could, 
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chameleon like, have its exterior tailored to accommodate different body work, but 
whose vital mechanical components were equal across all competitors. Fortunately for 
NASCAR, during the formative years of their sport, oligopolistic practices of the 
American auto industry rendered cars that were different, but not dramatically dissimilar. 
For the most part they were heavy, front engine, rear wheel drive with wishbone and coil 
spring front suspension, and straight axle leaf spring rear suspension. Though suited to 
the demands of mass-production, and the needs of most car owners, this design was not 
optimal for stock car racing. It was not durable enough, did not permit fine tuning at the 
track, and was not sufficiently rigid for use on asphalt tracks. Between 1949 and 1979, 
NASCAR borrowed innovations made by competitors to standardize the mechanical 
components of the American stock car. 
As racers found solutions to problems through experience and experimentation, 
they were subjected to the scrutiny of NASCAR inspectors and their peers. Where 
adaptation, construction or innovation was found to be in keeping with the spirit of the 
rules, it was accepted as conventional practice by racers and officials. Frequent 
personnel shifts among the stock car racing community and the close physical proximity 
of competing cars at the race track meant that innovations, once past technical 
inspection, were quickly disseminated.277 When substantial new conventions were 
established, NASCAR would loosely describe the innovation in the rule book issues the 
following year. In the NASCAR rule book, however, the greatest attention and specificity 
about recent innovation was given to new conventions intended to enhance safety. 
                                                 
277 Currently known as the “Silly season” the winter lull in stock car racing has 
customarily been a time when mechanics, fabricators, crew chiefs and drivers move 
between teams in hopes of finding a better situation. Such fluidity among NASCAR 
teams is not a recent development. Pioneer stock car mechanic Smokey Yunick 
worked for Hudson, Chevrolet, Ford, and Pontiac between 1951 and 1971. Some 
mechanics like “Suitcase Jake” Elder enjoyed epithets coined during frequent shifts 
between team. 
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As this process continued over the years a near perfectly appropriate system of 
technologies evolved.  During 1951, for instance, Ford truck pattern wheel hubs became 
the equipment of convention on stock cars. In 1957, NASCAR mandated carburetor 
induction and the Ford Galaxie front suspension arms, which later became the standard, 
emerged. By 1979, the only production parts of a NASCAR stock car were the hood, roof 
and trunk.278 
Initially the NASCAR rules mimicked the standards for strictly stock established 
by the AAA. In the 1948 AAA rule book, stock designation was possible only if, “A car of 
a type usually sold to the general public by a manufacturer and conforming to the 
Contest Board stock car specifications.” 279 Borrowing the notion that truly stock items 
would be recognizable through their presence in manufacturers catalogs, the first 
NASCAR designation of a stock component stated that, “In all the above specifications 
the word “Stock” shall be defined as meaning any part which is listed in the 
manufacturer’s catalog for the year, model and type car entered.”280 Over time, piece by 
piece, conventions were built as parts of the NASCAR stock car were replaced with 
stronger components borrowed from larger sedans and trucks or created by aftermarket 
specialty manufacturers to meet the demands of stock car racers. 
These changes generally helped create closer competition by either shoring up 
flaws revealed through racing action or universally implementing production technologies 
from a single make of vehicle proven to be better suited to racing. When competition 
required innovation outside the purview of normal production, France relied on several 
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important tenets to allow both complete regulation and public acceptance of innovation 
by racers.  
Most importantly, the cars had to maintain “stock appearance.” In addition to 
being clean, painted and having reasonably straight bodywork, from the beginning cars 
had to at least appear to be stock. If the association between stock car racing and the 
cars rolling off assembly lines was to be maintained, if the vicarious association between 
cars and drivers on the tracks and the cars and driving of fans promoted, and if the 
widely repeated notion that stock car racing improves the products of American 
automakers; the exterior resemblance had to be maintained. If a car looked like a 
production vehicle from the grandstands, then potential consumers could easily believe 
that it was truly a product of mass production. In this way the specialized racecar could 
fulfill the suggested performance of real production cars in front of crowds of potential 
consumers. 
Initially the rules designated that the car maintain original exterior parts and trim. 
The Grand National section of the 1950 NASCAR rule book stated that the vehicle must 
retain all fenders, bumpers, chrome and glass.281 Later, in 1956, the rules changed, 
simply demanding that all vehicles “Maintain Stock Appearance.”282  This mandate would 
persist as a feature of NASCAR Rule Books until 1974. The suggestion of truly stock 
was important enough that, after a notorious clash over the profile of one Chevrolet built 
by Smokey Yunick in 1967, the profile of NASCAR stock cars was checked against a 
template made from a legitimate production car. Implemented to maintain aerodynamic 
parity, this rule also restricted just how far from stock profile the bodywork of a NASCAR 
stock car could be. For NASCAR, the proportion and exact configuration was essential. 
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Even though the chassis was a bastard conglomeration of production components, the 
body panels had to be genuine and they also had to be proportioned and aligned to 
present the illusion of a legitimate factory-stock car. 
Beyond the primary importance of cultivating the association between the cars on 
the track and cars on the street, there were important reasons for maintaining stock 
appearance. Mandating stock appearance was initially intended to clearly differentiate 
Grand National Stock car racing from other, extant forms of stock car racing. Because of 
the shady reputation of stock car racing at the time of NASCAR’s founding, NASCAR 
was eager to distance itself.283 The most dramatic way to demonstrate the distinction 
between NASCAR stock car racing and the production-based racing that preceded it 
was to race current “new” cars that appeared completely stock. Before the formation of 
NASCAR, the term “stock car racing” covered nearly any form of motor sport dependent 
on production based cars. Though some of these early “stock car” races were well 
regulated, well promoted, and featured close contests between skilled drivers, more 
often than not, they were regarded as a marginal form of motor sport.  
Before NASCAR, stock car races were often disorderly, dangerous and 
potentially corrupt undertakings.284 Many early “stock car” races were contests between 
jalopies, held on small dirt “bull rings” without benefit of codified rules or competent and 
scrupulous race officials. Among racers, the epithet “stock car” also carried a pejorative 
tone garnered through association with rough, dirty races on smaller, ill governed tracks. 
These tracks most often featured cars of “stock” origin, that were older, heavily modified, 
and often all but completely “used up.” Marginalized as the lowest, meanest form of 
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racing, pre-war stock car racing frequently attracted crowds of less than upstanding 
reputation. As veteran dirt track racer Russ Truelove describes it, “Every Saturday night 
there was a fight, and sometimes a race broke out.”285 
From the perspective of NASCAR, an exterior closely resembling production 
automobiles was essential to legitimacy as a sanctioning body. In addition to helping 
make the case that the cars on the track were just like those on the showroom, a stock 
appearance helped build the association between fans and the sport. Strictly stock 
appearance, achieved through use of production car body panels, helped present a vast 
field of tidy racecars and facilitated vicarious association with the competitors. By 
highlighting racing competition between brands, NASCAR encouraged fans to choose a 
make of vehicle to cheer for.286  
With increased factory participation during the 1950s, stock-appearing bodywork 
on the racecars was the “meal ticket” for NASCAR stock car racing. During the first 
quarter-century, this external resemblance to production stock was carefully maintained. 
Though the exterior remained stock by production standards, changes in materials and 
construction techniques permitted subtle gains in performance. By the mid 1960s, 
bodies made available to racers were built from thinner, lighter stampings.287 During the 
Ford “Total Performance” years, new, dedicated tooling stamped duplicate aluminum 
body trim where stock components proved too heavy. The exact location of bodywork on 
the chassis could also be altered to enhance performance as long as the silhouette 
remained the same. By the mid 1970s, hand-made panels closely resembling stock 
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sheet metal began to replace doors and fenders. Even when chassis design bore no 
resemblance to actual production vehicles, in order to be legal for competition, 
dissimilarities that existed between a true production car and a “stock” car had to be 
covered with stock “appearing” bodywork.288  
Innovations made by racers could also become conventions if they were in the 
interest of safety. The moral dimension associated with technologies that might enhance 
safety permitted very broad interpretation of the term of “strictly stock.”  Few critics were 
willing to argue that stock cars should remain less safe in order to be truly stock. (And 
fewer critics still were willing to suggest that the safest course was not racing at all.) To 
maintain a positive public image, keep fans interested, and attract competitors, NASCAR 
presented racing action that was dangerous enough to attract fans, but not so 
dangerous as to discourage competition or prompt public rebuke. For NASCAR as an 
institution, it was crucial that, despite possible increase in danger brought about by 
higher speeds and closer competition, adjustments to the race vehicles made in the 
interest of safety also kept competition close and very fast.  
Acting in the interest of safety most often associates an institution with 
convincing claim to the moral high ground. Indeed, public demand and the danger of bad 
publicity encourage associations like NASCAR to work towards safer racing. Claiming 
the responsibility for managing the creation and improvement of safe racecars was an 
integral part of the NASCAR sanctioning mandate.289 As early as the first meeting at the 
Streamline Motel, and in many press releases and advertisements after the formation of 
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NASCAR, safety consciousness was a prevalent issue. Assumption of this responsibility 
allowed NASCAR broad latitude in bending the notion of “stock” production vehicle 
around the demands of safety. From the beginning, cars were altered in ways expected 
to help make them safer. Because no systematic analysis exists detailing which “safety” 
improvements actually worked and which did not, the safety evolution of the NASCAR 
stock car was largely an issue of increasing the strength of existing components.  
Weaknesses and subsequent failures were most often brought to the attention of 
competitors and NASCAR through dramatic, and sometimes fatal, crashes. Though this 
sort of empirical testing using human subjects seemed perhaps harsh, this was the 
accepted practice in determining the limits of car design in all forms of motor sport. 
Indeed, racing with too much safety, without a definite element of danger, would likely 
have been less appealing as entertainment. Admiration for performance in the face of 
danger did not, however, promote haphazard construction of the automobile. Racers 
wanted to race because it was dangerous, not because it was deadly. Though perhaps 
brave, they were not stupid and did not allow the lessons of wrecks, component failure, 
injury and death to pass unnoticed. Unlike automakers before 1963, when the first formal 
automotive crash testing began, NASCAR and competitors paid attention to the 
empiricism around them and usually followed up such costly lessons with design 
changes intended to remedy the design weakness.290   
Some fans, like Larry Gilham, were critical of design changes made in the 
interest of safety. He wrote a scathing letter to a national motor sport magazine 
dismissing NASCAR as a sham because it permitted the use of Ford truck hubs on 
Hudson stock cars. “Certainly the Ford hubs aren’t stock,” this angry fan wrote in 
reference to one race-winning Hornet.  
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Probably they are allowed under the provision ‘in the interest of safety.’ Sure it 
makes them stronger and safer, but it seems to me that when you alter or 
change a feature it ceases to be stock . . . stock seems so elastic. It also seems 
such a short distance from hi-compression heads, four and five carburetor 
manifolds, and 3/4 and more radical grind cams – all in the interest of safety. 291  
Mr. Gilham rightly identifies the flexibility of rules that permitted such broad technical 
latitude. NASCAR was not about to let a concept like the true definition of a “stock car” 
get in the way of regular, profitable competition.  
The Ford hubs referred to in Mr. Gilham’s letter were indeed not a stock part on a 
Hudson Hornet. Rather, they were a modification commonly applied to contemporary 
“Modified” racecars to increase the strength of wheels, hubs and brakes. Since the rules 
said that “It is recommended that wheels, hubs, steering parts, radius rods and sway 
bars be reinforced and strengthened in any manner” to ensure safety, the Ford truck 
hubs were legal even if they were not stock.292 Apparently the Hudsons were prone to 
rear axle failure so catastrophic that it “launched the car end over end” in a dramatic and 
potentially fatal roll.293 With inadequate hubs replaced, Hudson, the first automaker to 
respond to the promotional potential of NASCAR stock car racing, could remain an 
active participant in NASCAR events. Though little could be learned and applied to 
production vehicles, use of Ford truck hubs simultaneously satisfied the interest of 
racers, NASCAR and Hudson. For racers, the fix was familiar and inexpensive. For 
NASCAR, the fix kept cars safely in competition on the track. For Hudson, ad copy need 
                                                 
291 Larry Gilham, “Strictly Stock, Motorsport Magazine, February 1952, p.4. A “3/4 
grind” cam typically offers performance between stock and full race.  
292 NASCAR, 1950 Stock Car Racing Rule Book, (Daytona Beach: NASCAR,1950), 
p.15. 
293 Yunick, p.37, Smokey was Herb Thomas’ mechanic for the 1951, 1953 and 1955 
Southern 500.  
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not mention that the first place finish in Daytona was achieved using parts engineered in 
Dearborn.294 
Ironically, the modifications that provided greater safety for NASCAR drivers, 
also frequently made racing faster. Though NASCAR ostensibly permitted modifications 
or reinforcement of suspension and steering parts in order to promote safe racing, it 
seems likely that a desire for enhanced speed helped motivate this decision. It is 
important to note that if the hubs were strengthened to not fail, rather than to fail safely, 
cars could go faster, and competition was more likely to remain close. Such 
augmentation was typically accomplished by substituting, as in the case of the wheel 
hubs of the Hudson Hornet, stronger stock components from a heavier car or truck. 
Where the substitution of production components was not practical or possible, simple 
construction techniques were employed.  
Gradual changes engineered by NASCAR participants were not always only 
about safety.  The chassis stiffening protective roll cage, for example, had the net effect 
of making racecars faster, safer, more evenly matched and more durable. Even Bill 
France did not try to separate the combined safety and speed benefits possible with a 
roll cage.295 “The biggest reinforcement to the frame is the addition of roll bars,” he wrote 
in 1963, “Primarily they are intended to protect the driver in case of a roll-over or other 
mishaps. These stout steel bars, padded after placed in position, also add rigidity to the 
automobile.” Despite this admission, NASCAR never elaborated on how a roll cage 
made a vehicle decidedly un-stock. In 1953, the “Specifications for Grand National Stock 
Cars” stated that “Roll-over bars inside car are optional but recommended” on most 
models and “compulsory in hard-top models with no center door panel to support 
                                                 
294 Roger Huntington, “Detroit Corner,” Speed Age, December 1952, p.48.  
295 Britt and France, p.75 
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roof”.296 By 1955, roll bars were compulsory in all cars, and NASCAR began providing 
pictures describing how best to install a roll bar in a sedan. In 1957, NASCAR rules 
required that car builders install a “roll cage” inside the passenger compartment, and that 
“Roll bars must be padded and taped with foam rubber from bottom of left window to 




Figure 3: Roll Cage from the 1960 NASCAR Rule Book 
 
Image courtesy:  International Motorsports Hall Of Fame archives, Talladega, AL. 
 
 
In 1960, NASCAR specified the exact type of tubing and method of construction. 
The rule book states that, “Roll bars must be welded, and must be not less than 1 3/4 
                                                 
296 NASCAR, 1953 Stock Car Racing Rule Book, (Daytona Beach: NASCAR, 1953), 
p. 23. 
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inches in outside diameter and walls must not be less than .090 inch thick. No pipe 
fittings allowed.” A few years later, the cage design was strengthened through the 
addition of thick steel gusset plates at each welded connection. Over the course of a 
decade, NASCAR had mandated that all cars have identical cages built from standard 
generic components. 
Over time the cage would grow to match the experiences and needs of NASCAR. The 
development method employed was somewhat crude. Typically it involved reactive 
amendment to existing practice spurred by catastrophic or deadly failures. As stock car 
driver turned builder, Ralph Moody, comments, 
 They wanted stock cars, but if you are running 100 miles an hour in a stock car 
and something happens, you get killed. You have to put safety equipment in it. I 
can remember when we took two Thunderbirds, one for Curtis Turner and one for 
Joe Weatherly at Darlington, and the rules said you had to have doors with 
hinges on them. You could close the door and put two slabs of iron [with] bolts 
through it around the doorposts. Hell, you were always ripping those damn doors 
off. Guys were sitting with no protection, didn’t have any sides, just a roof and a 
top. And they’d just squash the car. I kept saying that I was going to install a roll 
bar, put the loop on top, side bars, brace bars, cross bars, and three high-door 
bars. We went to Darlington, and the NASCAR officials made us take it off. 
Afterward we went to Atlanta, and Nelson Stacey got hit, a car broke right 
through, busted up his pelvis, legs, ribs, goddam about ruined him. Then they 
decided, ‘What did you do there? Let’s look at that.’297  
Such bloody empiricism was common in motor sport, but was influenced by the 
demands of maintaining a stock façade. In the case of the roll cage described by Ralph 
                                                 
297 Peter Golenbock, American Zoom, (New York: Macmillan, 1993), p.115 
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Moody, the safety modification initially violated the stock appearance and was 
disallowed. Only after serious injury from competition was the modification accepted. 
In 1964 and 1965 the NASCAR cage design gained more protective bars and 
more structural strength as bars were added to the cage at seat height, and stiffening 





Figure 4: Roll Cage from the 1963 NASCAR Rule Book 
 




By 1967, the cage had grown still more elaborate, with a protective grid of bars in 
each front door to protect the driver, and more diagonal superstructure stiffening the 




Figure 5: Roll Cage from the 1967 NASCAR Rule Book 
 
Image courtesy:  International Motorsports Hall Of Fame archives, Talladega, AL. 
 
 
The use of diagonals from the top of the roll cage to the frame above the rear 
axle effectively turned the chassis of the stock car into a simple truss. This design 
offered more protection of the fuel tank area and considerable stiffness to the rear of the 
car.  
As was suggested in the letter concerning the use of Ford wheel hubs on Hudson 
racecars, safety engineering can influence more than crash survivability for the driver. 
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Stiffness in chassis design offers greater structural protection for the drivers, and a more 
predictable basis for chassis tuning. The structural integrity lent by the ever increasing 
roll cage reduced the number of variables in tuning a chassis. As the protective roll cage 
removed twist from the stock frame, other components became the focus of tuning. The 
rigid trussed chassis offered racers the ability to predictably alter the behavior of the rear 
chassis of a car through adjusting spring compliance and shock absorber rates. While 
this did allow a higher degree of tuning and closer competition, it further invalidated any 
association between performance on the track and true production vehicles. 
A stronger, stiffer chassis also helped keep competitive racing action on the 
track. A cage built as suggested in the diagrams supplied in the Rule Book was less 
likely to fail completely in the event of a minor on-track incident. As the cage increased in 
size and complexity to protect the driver and vital mechanical components of the car, 
terminal mechanical failure from wrecks became less common. The robust chassis 
resulting from a substantial cage meant that cars could more easily be repaired and 
returned to action during a race. In contrast to other forms of motor sport, racers could 
often win points and money after crashing during the early stages of an event. Such 
durability meant more opportunities to finish well for competitors and more racing action 
for fans. 
The net effect of adding bars to the cage design in the interest of safety was to 
create a specification for a chassis that simultaneously suited the needs of NASCAR, 
race promoters, and racers. By 1973, the web of bars protecting the driver and stiffening 
the car had reached full development. 298  
                                                 
298 Wheelbase changes in 1975, 1979, and 1982 changed the overall chassis 




Figure 6: Integral Roll Cage and Chassis from the 1973 NASCAR Rule Book 
 
Image courtesy:  International Motorsports Hall Of Fame archives, Talladega, AL. 
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Though initially the NASCAR roll cage was little more than a system of bars 
intended to prevent roof collapse in the event of vehicle rollover, the roll cage evolved 
into a multifunction structure that comprised most of the stock car chassis. Through trial 
and error empiricism, it evolved to protect the driver in the event of an accident, and 
provide a more stable, more dependable platform for high performance.  
As the roll cage became the standard chassis design across makes during the 
early 1970s, it eliminated possible discrepancies in performance between production 
cars.299 In addition to encouraging close competition, uniformity between car chassis 
allowed racers to transfer tuning and driving skills between makes. By the late 1970s 
stock car mechanics and drivers were able to shift between a Chevrolet stock car and a 
Ford stock car without mastering a new body of knowledge about chassis tuning. This 
encouraged the transfer of talent, technical details, and procedure between race teams. 
The constant shift of talent between teams, an off-season phenomenon that came to be 
known as “silly season.” This annual rearrangement of talent among race teams is a 
good example of how porous boundaries between specialized producers served the 
interests of stock car racers as a group. Philip Scranton describes this phenomenon as a 
“sociocultural asset renewed through routines of interaction.”300 Routines of interaction at 
the track, and in frequent changes among personnel at race shops kept technological 
development even throughout the racing community. Remixing skills and techniques 
contributed to close competition by preventing the accumulation of too much technical 
expertise on a single team. This annual mix-up of personnel between teams also 
promoted a sense of community among racers who were linked by common experience 
with near-identical technologies.  
                                                 
299 Craft, p.104, NASCAR, 1975 Stock Car Racing Rule Book, (Daytona Beach: 
NASCAR, 1975), p.128-132. 
300 Philip Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American 
Industrialization, 1865-1925, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), p.19. 
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Technological changes intended to promote fast, consistent action on the track 
had to be accessible to most racers. To be accessible, technologies had to be readily 
available, inexpensive, and easy to implement. With grass-roots enthusiasm for fast cars 
running high during the 1950s and 1960s, creating a willing cadre of racers was mainly a 
matter of keeping the economic barriers to competition modest. Keeping the equipment 
affordable was crucial to allowing part-time and small-time racers to fill out the field. 
Providing organization to grass roots racers was, after all, one of the reasons NASCAR 
was formed. In order to keep growing, NASCAR had to keep the stands full of fans, and 
ticket sales depended on keeping the track full of competition. Most of the technological 
innovation operated within these constraints. Typically parts found acceptable were 
borrowed from a single model and made legal for use on all cars. A good example of this 
scenario is the adoption of front wheel spindles from a 1956 Ford Galaxie as standard 
equipment for all racers. Though not specified in the rule book, these parts, as built and 
sold by Ford’s stock car racing concern, Holman and Moody, were accepted on all 
makes of cars by 1960.  
In assiduously pursing equal access to modification components for all 
competitors, NASCAR inevitably fostered uniformity in the design and construction of the 
race vehicle. The final manifestation of the NASCAR stock car was largely a 
conglomeration of affordable, robust and plentiful components borrowed from stock 
models in production during some part of the first thirty years of stock car racing.  
Using suitable technologies borrowed from trucks, heavier sedans, or medium 
priced sedans with robust designs was a technique long familiar to “Modified” racers and 
“hot rodders.” NASCAR mechanic interacted with the material world in a manner 
described by Claude Levi-Strauss who coined the term “bricoleurs” to describe creative 
enterprise that depended upon application of a diverse array of “Many sets of tools and 
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materials”.301 Borrowing a variety of components from the spectrum of mass-produced 
automobiles also made sense for budget-minded racers undertaking a technological 
development program. Junkyards, parts inventories, and even vehicles composed the 
palette of elements that racers borrowed, modified, and reconfigured in novel ways. Use 
of this “bricolage” of components meant that most deign experiments began with an 
inventory of parts of potential utility rather than a drawing board.302  Indeed, the 
production-based format of NASCAR stock car racing demanded that race mechanics 
achieve innovation through modification and novel combinations of existing mechanical 
elements. As many NASCAR mechanics spent time working on regular “street” 
machines, they were familiar with the production components from which test samples 
were borrowed.  Empirically derived knowledge of design, construction, manufacture and 
strength earned with hours of junkyard searches, skinned knuckles, and weekends at 
the race track helped offer guidance in the development process. 
A good example of this process of innovation at work is the lower, rear 
suspension links developed by Junior Johnson to replace the original equipment of 
manufacture trailing arms of the 1963 Chevy. “When I started building the [1963 
Chevrolet] cars,” recalled Junior,  
I had a crew from North Wilkesboro that worked on my cars down in Daytona and 
we were building them at Ray Fox’s shop. I started looking around for something 
else to go on the suspension on the back because I didn’t like that kind of 
suspension, it was too radical movement. One of the boys that worked there had 
a Chevrolet pickup setting out there in the yard. I went out there and dropped 
down on the ground and looked up under it and saw those long trailing arms 
about six feet long, man, right there is what I need. So I jacked it up and take it 
                                                 
301 Ibid, p.17. 
302  Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1966), p.16-36. 
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out from under the truck and left it setting there, put them under the racecar, was 
about a month before we got him some more trailing arms for his pickup. When 
we got done with it – everything we did – NASCAR approved it because it was 
part of Chevrolet’s stuff. We went to the racetrack and it was absolutely a dream 
to drive because of what it was underneath, the suspension and stuff.303 
 
Despite the fact that the parts were in no way stock on the car that used them, 
NASCAR permitted the changes. The use of a Chevrolet truck component on a “stock 
car” was accepted partly because NASCAR officials desperately wanted to get Chevrolet 
back into racing, but also because the modification was simple and cheap. Junior 
continues,  
From that day on every car that runs today has them long trailing arms on there. 
I’ve tried to better them, the factories have tried to make a better system for 
them. Every time you get away from them you hurt [handling and speed of] the 
car. Everybody still runs the exact same thing as the ’63 Chevrolet today. It’s 
very rare that you luck up on something you can’t do better.304   
 
                                                 





Figure 7: “Truck Arm” rear suspension on a NASCAR Winston Cup racecar as seen from 
below.  
 
Image from author’s collection.  
 
 
Junior’s contribution to the stock car chassis design is a good example of how 
innovation was allowed in NASCAR. Years of driving experience led Junior to dislike 
how the existing suspension control arm felt. Through experience with race chassis, 
Junior then suspected how the longer control arm from the pickup truck would react in 
the chassis. These appraisals were based on tacit understanding of vehicle “feel” found 
only through years of experience driving racecars on the threshold of adhesion, and 
searching junkyards for solutions to engineering problems. They were a combination of 
inspiration, intuition and empiricism. 
As Junior points out, NASCAR approved the change because it used stock 
Chevrolet parts. Using stock components, even if borrowed from a pickup truck and 
utterly unlike those on the production Chevrolet sedan, was in keeping with the stock 
flavor of the racing series. Most importantly, stock components were economical. Racers 
interested in trying “truck arms” on their chassis, or racers in need of wreck replacement, 
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could find reasonably priced truck arms in Chevy dealers and junkyards across the 
nation. Dependence on stock components, even if borrowed from a different make, kept 
most NASCAR innovations easily within the budget of race teams. 
There was another result of this modification that led to this technology being 
universally adopted by NASCAR stock car racers. The “truck arm” suspension permitted 
rapid chassis tuning. The long, trailing arms used coil springs to support the chassis. 
One end of the “arm” attached to the axle while the other was attached to a pivoting 
point farther forward on the frame. As the rear axle moved up and down, the arm hinged 
toward the frame compressing a coil spring. In this arrangement, the spring serves as a 
compressible fulcrum for a lever attached to the frame at the front end, and to the rear 
axle at the other. These coil springs, arranged as they were in the middle of a hinged 
lever, were very easy to change or adjust.305 Soon, adjustable “spring perches,” 
threaded into the frame, permitted rapid adjustment of the relative pressure exerted on 
the rear axle by each spring. This adjustment, known as cross-weight or “wedge” is 
crucial to managing the weight of an oval track car. More tuning time for racers at the 
track helped facilitate faster and more evenly matched cars. 
 
                                                 
305 John Craft, p.47,115. 
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Figure 8: Schematic of “Truck Arm” suspension 
 
Drawing by the author 
 
The sort of modification undertaken by Junior can be called wholesale 
substitution. It involved swapping the entire chassis system from one production-based 
vehicle to another. Because Junior was a driver of consummate sensitivity, a gifted 
natural mechanic, and perhaps a bit lucky, this modification worked well. Though other 
radical shifts were approved by NASCAR, radical shifts such as this were the exception 
rather than the norm.306  
Usually, NASCAR prohibited wholesale substitution because it threatened the 
notion of strictly stock. Rather, most innovation within NASCAR stock car racing 
occurred as the result of incremental, empirical shifts in the arrangement or modification 
                                                 
306 For truck “full floating” hubs used to replace weak chassis components on the 
Hudson, Bobby Allison’s use of “front steer” steering box of the ‘67 Camaro, and the 
adoption of the Ford “9 inch” rear axle are other examples of wholesale substitution. 
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of production-based components. This sort of innovation still required the NASCAR 
mechanic to act and think like a bricoleur, to borrow elements from a diverse palette of 
production components. However, it also demanded the sort of informed empiricism that 
is at the root of experimentation. Race mechanics made informed design choices, then 
created a number of slightly different mechanical configurations reflecting these design 
choices. On the track during testing or perhaps even in the midst of a race, these 
choices, as rendered in steel and rubber, were applied to the car and the results were 
noted. Working in an environment with plenty of mass-produced components made it 
easier to build and test rather than work from a theoretical perspective. 
The efforts of master mechanic Smokey Yunick produced evidence of this sort of 
informed empiricism. When charged with improving the front suspension of a Chevrolet 
Chevelle, Smokey built varying configurations of lower control arms to test on the car. 





Figure 9: Three Iterations of a Chevrolet ‘Chevelle’ Front Lower “A Arm” 
 
Image from author’s collection. 
 
 
Of the three control arms pictured, one is truly stock and the others have been 
gusseted to take the loading of a stiffly sprung stock car.307  A close-up photo of the 
stock A-arm shows that it is a triangular heavy-gauge stamping with two pivoting hinges 
where the inboard “points” mount to the frame, and a universally pivoting “ball joint” on 
the outer end. To hold the weight of the car, a coil spring presses with one end into the 
                                                 
307 The “A-Arms” or “control arms” were typically used on the front suspensions of 
American sedans. Two steel frames, roughly “A” shaped were arranged above one 
another parallel to the ground . The lower A-Arm was hinged at the bottom of each 
“leg” to the frame. At the point of the A, a pivoting “King Pin” connected the upper 
and lower A-Arms. At the center of the King Pin, a Spindle held the front wheel on 
the car. A coil spring, interposed between the bridge of the “A” and an upper spring 
perch fixed to the frame kept the lower A-Arm hinged parallel to the ground.  
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“spring pan” in the center of this triangular component and against a spring perch on the 




Figure 10: Unmodified Stamped Steel “A Arm” 
 
Image from author’s collection. 
 
 
Both of the two modified A-arms have been altered to improve their strength and 
suitability to NASCAR stock car racing. The two modified arms were both boxed using a 
steel plate welded to create a stronger A-arm of hollow section. The “spring pans” on 
these reinforced A-arms were also raised to accommodate shorter, stiffer springs. In 
addition, the spring perch area of the A-arm has been reinforced with a steel bar, and 
two shock mounting eyes were welded and received two shock absorber mounting eyes. 
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The alterations to one of the modified arms amount to reinforcement of the existing stock 




Figure 11: Reinforced “A Arm” with added shock absorber mounts 
 
Image from author’s collection 
 
 
One of the modified A-arms has been radically altered to affect the ride height 
(and likely through that the aerodynamics) of the racecar. The version pictured at far 
right in the group photo, was modified to effectively lower the front of the car. It too was 
boxed, reinforced and altered to accept two shock absorbers and a shorter spring. 
However, the geometry of its outer mounting point or “ball joint” was also altered.  The 
car was lowered by removing, gusseting and re-welding the outer end so that the 
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suspension spring that holds the car up rested lower relative to the attachment point on 
the wheel. The consequences of this change would have altered the geometry to such 




Figure 12: Reinforced and “Dropped” ‘Chevelle’ “A Arm” 
 
Image from author’s collection 
 
 
Testing components either during practice before a race, or on a track during an 
off week, allowed drivers and mechanics to experiment with and learn from new, subtle 
alterations. Reports from the driver regarding handling characteristics, and any changes 
in lap times helped Smokey and other mechanics in similar circumstances make 
decisions about how to build or improve a car. This process, a series of informed 
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empirical constructs and tests, is the method through which much of NASCAR 
technology evolved. It is useful to note that it bears no relation to any process that might 
serve to test the merits or deficiencies of a true production car. 
The production-based format helped keep NASCAR racing affordable, and 
helped keep factory money pouring into the sport. Yet even with the allegiance to a 
production-based formula for car construction, items straight from the assembly line at 
times proved too innovative for NASCAR. The notion of accessibility also limited the 
technological direction of innovation in NASCAR stock car racing. This feature of the 
competitive environment set NASCAR racers apart in stark contrast from Hot Rodders. 
Within the speed culture of Hot Rodding and Drag racing, technical creativity was held at 
a premium. Within NASCAR circles it was constrained by the logic of promoting, and 
therefore closely resembling, production-based cars. The original set of NASCAR 
“strictly stock” rules was formed by racers and promoters directly involved in the process 
of making a living in racing. As a result the means of innovation, like the parameters of 
the technology, were suited to the expertise of the racing community.  Bill France and 
NASCAR were careful to keep, insofar as possible, larger institutions from gaining too 
much power developing the stock car. The development of the induction systems on 
NASCAR stock cars provides a telling example of how innovation was curbed to suit the 
budgets and abilities of the stock car racing community.  
In the beginning of the Grand National series, NASCAR permitted whatever 
induction system manufacturers used as stock. In 1947, American auto makers 
universally relied on carburetor induction.308 Typically, on six cylinder engines, this was a 
                                                 
308 A carburetor is a device that mixes fuel and air. Air is drawn into the engine 
through a venturi creating a slight vacuum that draws fuel from a small reservoir into 
the air stream through an orifice commonly known as a “jet.” Carburetors also 
usually have a small piston pump called the “accelerator pump” that mechanically 
pumps a metered amount of fuel directly into the incoming air stream through a 
separate orifice. When building high performance engines it is usually better to have 
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single one-venturi down draft carburetor, while V8 engines had two-venturi down draft 
carburetors. With the introduction and acceptance by NASCAR of the Twin H Power 
option for the six cylinder Hudson Hornet, a dual carburetor setup that boosted 
horsepower to competitive heights, the induction race was on. Throughout the 1950s, 
factories moved to add horsepower by adding more induction capacity by first building 
four venturi and eventually forced induction system. A new generation of overhead valve 
V8s introduced between 1949 and 1953 were soon offered with four venturi carburetors, 
soon known as “four-barrel” carburetors, as optional equipment. The publicity possible 
with horsepower claims and racing performance meant that manufacturers soon offered 
high output engines and options throughout their model ranges. One 1956 Automobile 
Industries article commented that,  
The fierce struggle for the coveted first four places in passenger car registrations 
appears to have generated many potential new entries in stock car competition. 
Many motor car producers saw prestige value in competitive events and are 
readying themselves for the variety of stock racing events in the coming year.  
Best evidence of this is the emergence of super-powered stock or optional 
engines not only in sports models but in cars down to the lowest priced 
classes.309  
 
Mechanical fuel injection systems perfected for use with airplane engines during 
the Second World War were known to offer better performance than carburetion 
systems.310 Refined by manufacturers of speed parts for Hot Rods, fuel injection soon 
                                                                                                                                           
more or larger carburetors that will “flow”  and mix greater quantities of air/fuel 
mixture.  
309 Joseph Geschelin, “Super-powered Engines for Stock Model Cars,” Automotive 
Industries, November 15, 1956, p.64. 
310 “Flash: Fuel Injection is Here,” Motor Trend, February 1956, p.49,  
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found limited high performance applications.311 During the early 1950s, American 
automotive literature began touting the marvels of fuel injection, printing articles on the 
popularity of simple fuel injection systems used by hot rodders, noting the use of fuel 
injection on purpose built European racing cars, and predicting the application of this 
marvelous technology to American production cars.312   
Though widely discussed in the technical and business literature of the 1950s, 
fuel injection had not received the same popular application in the US that it enjoyed in 
Europe. But this situation did not last for long. The potential horsepower gains possible 
with efficient mechanical fuel injection, as well as the technical romance of a system 
whose performance was proven during the Second World War, no doubt motivated the 
adoption of fuel injection. Numerous accounts in popular and trade magazines, as well 
as applications on the racetrack, indicated that his new fuel mixture technology was to 
be the next step in the evolution of automotive induction systems for American 
production cars.313 Indeed, it was fuel injection, offered as an option on the Chevrolet 
                                                 
311 Fuel injection, unlike carburetion, relies on mechanical means to transfer fuel into 
the stream of air flowing into an engine. Pressure is maintained on a system of 
injectors that, when actuated, spray atomized gasoline into the inlet tract. The 
difficulty in using fuel injection is accurately timing the spray of fuel so that it 
coincides with the flow of air into a cylinder. The advantages offered by fuel injection 
include diminished flow restrictions (such as venturi) in the inlet tract, and more linear 
throttle response because of direct rather than vacuum actuation of main jet fuel 
flow.  
312 “Unique Fuel Injection System Does Not Use Timing Device,” Automotive 
Industries,  May 1, 1949, p.45. H. Scherenberg, “Why An Unblown Engine With Fuel 
Injection Was Selected For Mercedes Benz Racing Cars,” Automotive Industries, 
April 15, 1957, p.62-63,106. The article on unique timing described the constant flow, 
orifice controlled system developed by Stu Hiborn and popularized by Hot Rodders 
nationwide and the Mercedes-Benz article described the superior efficiency possible 
with fuel injection. 
313 “Bendix Introduces Electronic Fuel Injection,” Automotive Industries, October 1, 
1956, p.49, “The Shuttle Piston Fuel Injection System,” Automotive Industries, 
October 1, 1956, p.52, “The Marvel-Schebler Fuel Injection System,” Automotive 
Industries, January 15, 1957, p.58, “Details of the Lucas Fuel Injection System, 
Automotive Industries, February 1, 1957, p.52-53, A. H. Winkler and R.W. Sutton, 
“The Bendix Electrojector Provides Timed Intake Port Fuel Injection,” Automotive 
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Corvette and available for the Chevrolet Bel Air in 1956 that helped keep the smaller 
displacement Chevrolet engine competitive. 
Not to be outdone, the following year Ford offered a McCulloch supercharger as 
a high performance option on the Thunderbird model.314 This induction system used a 
belt-driven centrifugal supercharger to force more fuel/air mixture into the engine than 
the engine could normally suck in on its own. As with fuel injection, tuning a car with a 
supercharger for maximum performance required knowledge and skills beyond those of 
most NASCAR Grand National mechanics. Additionaly, superchargers and fuel injection 
added another level of cost to the car building process.  
In June of 1957, the NASCAR Grand National rules outlawed all forms of 
induction except the four barrel carburetor.315 Contemporary automotive correspondents 
read this move as an attempt to curb the very public and very controversial horsepower 
race between factories.316 Limiting the form of induction also helped diminish any 
technological advantage enjoyed by factory teams by settling on a very common 
standard form of induction. Four barrel carburetors had become commonplace on higher 
performance American sedans since the early 1950s and were therefore inexpensive to 
obtain. The ubiquity of the four-barrel also meant that most mechanics already knew 
how to tune them. 
In 1957 induction technology began moving beyond the means and expertise of 
NASCAR racers as Chevrolet adopted a Rochester mechanical fuel injection as a high 
performance option. This is not to say that NASCAR mechanics of the day could not 
master the fuel injection systems. Indeed, NASCAR mechanic Smokey Yunick was 
                                                                                                                                           
Industries, February 15, 1957, p.50-53. William Carroll, “Fuel Injection,” Motor 
Trend, August 1957, p.30-31. 
314 Al Outcalt, “Why Detroit Censors Speed,” Speed Age, October 1957, p.62. 
315 Nascar Newsletter, March 22, 1957, p.4, NASCAR, 1957 Stock Car Racing Rule 
Book, (Daytona Beach: NASCAR) 1957, p.31. 
316 Al Outcalt, “Why Detroit Censors Speed,” Speed Age, October 1957, p.62. 
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employed by Chevrolet to help groom their Rochester fuel injection system for racing 
applications.317 When working for Ford the following year, the new McCulloch 
superchargers were also tuned by Yunick to meet the needs of track competition.318 It 
seems likely that NASCAR suspected that the factories and perhaps a few select racers 
would have a monopoly on the latest and best induction technology. With huge testing 
and development facilities, staffed by legions of engineers, manufacturers had an 
advantage in developing these new technologies for the track. The simplicity of 
carburetor induction, and the established expertise of NASCAR racers, would help 
prevent domination of racing technology by factories. 
In addition to keeping technology well within the mastery and control of the stock 
car racing community, the prohibition of exotic induction technology influenced where 
factories spent their research dollars. 319  In a perversion of the advertised relationship 
between racing and production automakers, engineers for the “big three” seem to be 
taking cues from the rule book rather than performance data from the track.  
With the carburetor legislation, NASCAR broke decisively from the established 
model of regulating production technology to create competitive racing. By specifying 
how many venturi were legal, rules contrary to technological development by 
automakers were established. While no doubt saving American automakers countless 
thousands on development of these more sophisticated technologies, prohibiting 
alternatives to carburetors also marked the departure of the NASCAR formula stock 
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319 NASCAR’s decision to prohibit fuel injection may have delayed acceptance of this 
induction systems for production cars. The decision to remove fuel injection from the 
performance arena probably encouraged automakers to squander their early lead in 
the development of this technology. While automakers of other nations developed 
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1960s, American cars did not enjoy the benefits of fuel injection until the mid-1980s. 
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Volkswagen all had production fuel injection systems by the middle-1970s. 
 159
racecar specifications from prevalent contemporary production technology. From this 
point onward NASCAR began to assume more control over what legitimate production 
components were legal for competition.  
Perhaps the most important tenet governing the development of the NASCAR 
stock car was the intent to guarantee close competition. As the phrase came to be 
known in the NASCAR rule book, all equipment had to be built “in the spirit of 
competition. This phrase, when added to the rule book in 1953 allowed NASCAR 
officials broad latitude in determining what innovations and what vehicles were allowed 
on the track.320 By building discretionary power to accept or deny technologies, even as 
late as the morning of a race, NASCAR could carefully ensure that the cars on the track 
were evenly matched and therefore likely to render a close, competitive race.  
Like safety, the “spirit of competition” is a morally attractive notion. It was natural 
and normal, NASCAR argued, to want to see a good race. As a sanctioning body, 
NASCAR was responsible for ensuring fair competition. Yet fair competition, when a 
large part of performance depends on a car, is antithetical to technological innovation. 
Like the liberal interpretations of vehicle modifications made in the interest of safety, 
administering rules to preserve the spirit of competition was directly opposed to the idea 
that racing might improve the breed. Unlike other forms of production based racing, 
modified, strictly stock racing retained close exterior association with production cars 
found on showroom floors. This association, and general acceptance of racing as a 
pastime, was strengthened by the historical assertion that race tracks were the best 
place to test and develop automotive technology.  
There is evidence to suggest that this notion had a long life before the creation of 
NASCAR. When managing the Indianapolis Motor Speedway during the 1920s, World 
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War One ace Eddie Rickenbacker promoted the idea that racing was a great way to test 
cars. The 1947 AAA rule book states,  
Since it is the purpose of speed trials and record attempts to demonstrate to the 
public what may be expected in the way of performance of the motor vehicles 
which are sold by dealers, any changes – mechanical or structural – which affect 
the performance of the motor vehicle would defeat this purpose and are not 
permitted.321  
For obvious promotional reasons, the association between racing and product 
development was made all the more frequently when production-based cars were the 
implements of competition.  
During the 1950’s this testing aspect served the interests of racing organizations 
like the AAA and NASCAR by linking the activities on the track with then popular 
concepts of legitimate scientific method and test procedure. For manufacturers of 
automobiles or related supplies, this association implied that the vehicles available in the 
showroom could withstand and perform under the rigors of competition. In an interview 
published in the August 1954 edition of Speed Age, Bill France suggested that valuable 
information about vehicle safety, engine efficiency and mechanical design was gleaned 
from hours of free testing ancillary to the use of the automobile in sporting 
competition.322  Not surprisingly, accounts of the virtues of racing for automotive 
development seldom alluded to the vast differences between daily operation of a car for 
primarily utilitarian purposes and the labor intensive preparation and use of a car for 
racing. Such accounts also do not describe the mechanism of feedback from the 
racetrack to automakers. Though there was a time when, it can be argued, contests of 
speed and endurance did provide valuable engineering information to automakers, 
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322 John Painter, “NASCAR Prexy Talks,” Speed Age, August 1954, p.55. 
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useful feedback from racing competition was best suited to custom production at the 
dawn of the motoring age. During this phase of automotive development, mechanical 
reliability was such that winning a contest was as much about finishing as moving fast. 
With mass production and road building, motoring became more often an act of 
necessity rather than sport. Most cars were built to parameters other than top 
performance or endurance, and the utility of racetrack testing at the limits of mechanical 
capacity waned. As the distinction between custom-built racecars and road cars 
increased throughout the 1920s, 30s and 40s, the applicability of engineering lessons 
learned on the track decreased. 
That is not to say that most automakers plowed under their test tracks. On the 
contrary, all of the big three built new testing facilities during the 1940s and 1950s in 
order to test production vehicles.323 Increased use of test tracks suggests that using 
racing as a laboratory was not enough. While lessons learned on the track could be 
incorporated in future models, in-house testing likely provided more useful information 
from testing within normal operating parameters. Because of tooling costs, and the 
importance of production engineering, mass production was not amenable to design 
updates made available through the constant sort of test-to-failure, repair and retest 
agenda necessary in motor sport.  
Other dissimilarities between racing and normal use limited the value of 
information gathered in competition. Racing cars of all types were, typically, allowed to 
be stripped of unnecessary mechanical options and thoroughly lightened, therefore any 
information gathered about chassis or engine performance was of dubious value. 
Similarly, because races were typically conducted using high octane race gas, 
information regarding thermal efficiency, ignition timing or combustion efficiency was of 
limited value.  
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Organizational impediments also militated against racing improving the breed. 
The creation of dedicated racing departments within manufacturers insulated the bulk of 
engineers and designers from improvements pioneered on the track. Either race 
programs were run entirely in house, where mechanics, drivers and engineers all worked 
together on the company payroll, or factories provided material, financial and technical 
support to racers working out of their own shops. The latter form typically prevailed in 
American racing after the 1920s. Typically, engineers were assigned to support racers, 
not the other way around so little information traveled back to the drafting rooms of 
production cars.   
A review of Ford’s internal literature from the 1960’s indicates that the 
relationship between the performance division and other divisions was not conducive to 
gathering information about production cars on the track. Numerous, often agitated, 
correspondence between Ford Racing Director Leo Bebe and the head of Ford Motor 
Sports and the head of Ford’s Engine and Foundry division about the production 
schedule of Ford’s overhead cam 427 racing engine illustrate this point. The 
fundamental distinctions between racing on oval tracks and manufacturing regular 
production cars kept the design of the two utterly separated within automakers. The 
fundamental dissimilarity between the demands of the track, and the demands of the 
average automotive users driving routines as expressed in the specifications of cars built 
to suit either environment effectively prevented feedback of technical knowledge from 
the racetrack. 
Despite the thin the connection between building a better racecar, and building a 
better car for the consumer, the famous line, “win on Sunday, sell on Monday”324 has 
been a consistent reminder of the promotional origins of stock car racing. Since the 
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earliest trials of truly “stock” cars held during the 1900s and 1910s, participants and 
promoters involved in the use of production machines for racing have touted the 
correlation between track performance and sales. Hudson advertising copy provides an 
example of the association often made between the demands of racing and everyday 
driving, Quoting Daytona Beach Classis winner Marshall Teague, “I know, from plenty of 
experience behind the wheel in America’s toughest stock car races, that the Hudson 
Hornet offers more performance, more stamina, and more safety than any other car. . . 
And these great advantages are just as important to you in regular driving as they are to 
me in winning races.” 325 Though advertisers seldom bothered to describe how 
mechanical attributes useful for racing on an oval track for 200 miles were equally well 
suited to use in the daily commute of the American consumer, the linkage between 
performance on the racetrack and desirability as a “street” car persisted.  
The “spirit of competition,” therefore, can be seen as the element of NASCAR 
procedure and culture that maintained the associations crucial to justifying the sport. 
Flexible standards kept the competition close to keep fans returning to the tracks for 
exciting action. The closely maintained exterior of the cars maintained the illusion that 
the cars were stock while the changing conventions of chassis and drivetrain kept 
competition close. This symbolic association of the exterior helped NASCAR justify 
racing as an enterprise useful for the development of the car and helped factories use 
racing as a promotional tool. Close competition kept fans engaged and racers, who 
wanted to stay competitive, loyal. Calculated regulation of the technology of competition 
in the name of maintaining the “spirit of competition” allowed NASCAR the latitude to 
build a symbolic universe inside the speedway. To no small extent this symbolism was 
cultivated and maintained by the racers. Their complicity can be summarized as some 
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combination of a willingness to submit to authority in order to compete with one another, 
a desire to tinker with racecars, or simply a need to make a living. 
The oligopolistic nature of the American automotive industry reflected a similar 
“competitive détente.” In the case of automakers, a spirit of competition had long been 
maintained by the threat of anti-trust legislation, as well as communal sense of 
cooperation.326 Perhaps because of this precedent, automakers seemed willing to accept 
managed competition and paced technological change as long as everyone was in on 
some profits. As with the case of Chrysler supplying bodies to Packard, even when their 
internal demands required outsourcing, general (if occasionally grudging) acceptance of 
NASCAR rulemaking to protect close competition was a guarantee of common interest 
and mutual survival. 327 Ford, for example, never bothered to advertise that its wheel 
spindles and hubs were used on all NASCAR stock cars. Competition was more 
important than winning, especially in the maintenance of competition as an ideal dear to 
the consumer. 
As with most communities, there were mavericks. Not everyone was willing to 
settle for the status quo. For the automotive industry, Preston Tucker was perhaps such 
a figure.328 The failed launch of the technically revolutionary automobile bearing his 
name defied existing conventions and normative business relationships within the 
American automotive industry. Such individuals probe the boundaries of tacit 
agreements in an effort to satisfy personal ambition and intellectual curiosity. Few 
racecar builders wrangled longer, or more fiercely with NASCAR’s  “spirit of competition” 
than Smokey Yunick. Through unconventional interpretation of the rules, Smokey 
constantly probed the frontier of innovation. In 1968, Yunick built a racecar covered with 
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1966 Chevrolet Chevelle bodywork that was legal according to a strict interpretation of 
the rules. For example, the rules stated that the engine had to be mounted on the 
centerline of the frame.329 Because distributing weight toward the left side of the car 
offered better traction, Yunick moved the entire frame under the body of the car to 
achieve better weight distribution. Because the rules only specified that the engine had 
to be centered in the frame, not that the frame had to be centered under the car, the 
configuration was in some ways of thinking, legal.  
Not content with minor technological advantage, Yunick worked every trick he 
could find into the Chevelle for 1968. As he explains,  
For the car in ’68 I decided it was best to do everything in Daytona. I use a lot of 
good stuff Musser and Winchel taught me ‘bout chassis and this time I used all I 
knew ‘bout aerodynamics.330  I pulled the grill out, cut the air entrance in half and 
drained the air from the front and back of the wheel wells by creating negative air 
pressure pockets just behind all of ‘em. I split the front bumper lengthwise and 
add[ed] two inches. This kept air out from under the car and, together with the 
wheel well modifications, really helped eliminate front lift from packing air into the 
engine compartment. On the trunk lid we were allowed li’l chickenshit spoilers, 
but they were nowheres near enough. So I still had a small rear roof spoiler, and 
slid the body back a couple of inches and moved the wheel wells to fit the new 
contours front and rear. You might say this was just sloppy measurement on my 
part. With all of these little changes, I had a pretty good control on the balance of 
down force front to rear.331  
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For NASCAR, this departure from status quo was a threat to competition. In a 
legendary exercise of discretion, NASCAR virtually disqualified the car by suggesting, 
with only a few hours remaining before qualification, that the frame be replaced. Despite 
not actually having a rule that forbid moving the weight of a car around or moving the 
frame under the car body, and providing a descriptive drawings of a highly modified 
frame in their rule book, NASCAR ruled that the car had to have its frame replaced with 
a stock unit. To quote Smokey about this Chevelle, “… a cheater, damn right it was, but 
not according to the NASCAR rule book.”332 Smokey knew that his car violated the spirit, 
though not the letter of the rules. The important caveat  printed in the rule book granting 
NASCAR officials discretion to disqualify cars or procedure “not in the spirit of 
competition” ensured disqualification of Yunick’s entry. Perhaps because of his 
contentious nature, because he enjoyed developing technological advantages, and likely 
because he realized getting kicked out would create as much publicity as racing, 
Smokey built a car utterly out of keeping with conventional practice.  
 The advantages offered by Yunick’s package of innovations were too much. 
NASCAR wanted control over the pace and direction of innovation, not just the technical 
parameters. NASCAR permitted the gradual uniform adoption of single innovations like 
Junior’s “truck arm” rear suspension, because it was inexpensive, helped with chassis 
tuning and ultimately improved competition. NASCAR also facilitated the adoption of 
truck hubs to prevent rollovers, this kept cars on the track and minimized responsibility 
for wrecks. However, in the case of Smokey’s Chevelle, NASCAR could not afford to 
have so many conventions rewritten in one swoop. Like fuel injection and supercharging, 
Yunick’s innovations were too much, too fast. The technological advantages employed in 
his radical “stock car” could not be matched by the other competitors, at least not in time 
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for the race that afternoon. Smokey claimed the gray area of rules interpretation for 
himself, and suffered the consequences.  
Though Smokey’s Chevelle never raced a lap, it well illustrates the control 
NASCAR extended over the pace and direction of technological innovation. As 
controlled by NASCAR, the development of the stock car amounted to gradual, 
controlled elimination of gray areas in the rules that allowed for creative application of 
empirical method. New approaches challenged the gray area of interpretation 
surrounding NASCAR’s rather general rules conventions were established within the 
community of racers. As the NASCAR stock car series developed, racers were 
continuously applying their tacit knowledge about the conditions and performance of 
stock and stock based components on the track to the problem of building an 
inexpensive, competitive racecar from production components.  
Knowledge about how best to race could only be acquired through experience. 
Because the systems comprising any car are numerous and complex, and the systems 
comprising a NASCAR stock car were a conglomeration of purposeful adaptations of 
production components from different manufacturers, the NASCAR chassis was a 
device only NASCAR racers were familiar with. As engineer Mark Donohue describes of 
his transition from Porsche factory team racing program to NASCAR stock car 
competition,  
When the car was first put together, we all went down to Charlotte to look it over 
and run it on the superspeedway. I spent three days driving it around the track, 
while Hutch, Port, and J.C. [experienced stock car racers] tried to teach me all 
the tricks of the trade. First we ran the springs they recommended. Then they 
showed me how cross-jacking with different springs affects the handling, and I 
tried out every other spring they had – before finally coming back to their setup 
as the best. They showed me a little about ride heights, and how rake affects the 
 168
aerodynamics, and what sort of line was best on those tracks. And all the time I 
was thinking, ‘Boy if we had prepared the car ourselves….’ I reckoned the roll 
cage was wrong, and it had all rubber bushings in the suspension, and it had 
drum brakes that were just totally inadequate to my standards. The plan had 
been to start with their ideas first and go on from there. It seemed to be such a 
basket case that I knew we could improve it at our shops before the first race.333 
 
With an engineering degree and experience with more sophisticated machinery 
in road racing, Donohue remained certain that he could outperform the experienced 
stock car racers. The actual race proved that the local knowledge held by working 
NASCAR mechanics was crucial for success in stock car racing. “Nevertheless, the car 
was fast,” Donohue continued,  
and everyone was very happy and enthusiastic…. The first race was at 
Riverside, only a few weeks away, so J. C. and Port brought the car to our shops 
and did their maintenance there, while we did our thing. We changed the 
suspension a little, and reinforced the frame here and there, and fitted disc 
brakes…. We had hoped to be quickest on a road course, but we soon learned 
that you can’t walk in and immediately be the best in such a highly specialized 
area as stock car racing. As Junior Johnson told Roger [Penske], we aren’t 
Supermen. Everybody has to serve an apprenticeship in a new racing game…. 
The car started getting sick in the first laps, and it got progressively worse until I 
had to stop. The locating linkage for the rear axle pulled right out of the frame.334  
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In this instance road racing champion Donohue and his very experienced car 
owner Roger Penske, tried to apply what they knew from racing purpose built cars to the 
demands of stock car racing. He remained convinced of his own experience and 
training, unwilling to accept the empirically constructed knowledge of the NASCAR 
racing fraternity. I refused to pay attention to all the old rules they had,” he admitted,  
like ‘you never put a sawed-off forty-five-inch trammel bar on at Darlington.’ They 
knew everything from years of experience on al those track. I felt the car should 
handle a certain way, and I would work for that. But because of the weight and 
the oversize front tires, it just wouldn’t handle like a road-racing car. The behavior 
was quite sluggish, and it wouldn’t respond to treatment. Besides that, those cars 
run all the time at wide-open throttle, and usually peak cornering forces with a lot 
of suspension deflection. You end up with entirely different circumstances from 
road racing…. I was really out of my element, and because of my stubbornness – 
my refusal to play their rules – it took a long time to learn how to do it.335  
 
Without developing the tacit knowledge necessary to tune a NASCAR legal stock 
car chassis, Donohue, Penske and their crew were clearly lost. His experience could not 
have prepared him for the complex behavior of a production-derived chassis heavily 
loaded by 4000 pound vehicle weight, momentum, and the banking of an asphalt oval. 
Despite being Sports Car Club of America Pro (SCCA) road racing champion, 1972 
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winner of the Indy 500, an experienced racecar designer, and a test driver and 
engineering consultant for the Porsche factory racing efforts, Donohue was unable to 
master tuning a NASCAR chassis.  
Rather than allow testing, engineering and research to guide innovation, the 
NASCAR strictly stock rules promoted the sort of gradual “cut and try”336 innovation that 
suited the talents of competitors. Such heavily empirical method of stock car innovation 
depended on intuitive understanding of the physics of racing, experience with machines, 
extensive knowledge of automobile parts suitable for experimental use and, most 
importantly, time on the racetrack. The technology created in this manner also required a 
degree of empiricism to understand and operate effectively. After driving or observing a 
car in action, drivers and race mechanics were particularly well suited to developing 
technical changes that might increase performance. Using components borrowed from 
other makes and models was the same sort of parts swapping common among hot 
rodders, modified racers and other grass-roots speed enthusiasts of the era. 
Mark Donohue wrote,  
For the last race of the season I went to Rockingham just to watch them race, 
and I learned more that way than in all the races I had driven. I could take time to 
talk to people about how it was done, and I could see what everyone was doing 
on the track…. I learned how a driver would determine what was wrong with his 
car’s balance, and have the mechanics correct it during a pitstop. I might have 
been able to figure out how to drive better if only I had been humble enough to 
watch them from the outset.337  
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Though no slouch at transferring skills from one sort of racing to another, it took 
Donohue six races over two seasons to realize that the NASCAR stock car was a device 
born of expedience and politics, not engineering logic. Though by his 1972 debut, 
NASCAR stock cars were virtually purpose-built racecars, their performance was 
somewhat less than other purpose built cars from contemporary racing series. Indeed, 
the NASCAR formula was built to negate much of the possible contribution of engineers 
like Donohue. Rather than a technical exercise in how to cover distance most quickly 
and efficiently, it was a device suited primarily to facilitating inexpensive, close, 
competitive race entertainment among brethren drivers and mechanics. 
The net effect of NASCAR’s regulation of innovation produced a racecar 
thoroughly adapted to the process of racing. By 1979, the specifications for chassis, 
front suspension geometry, rear axle, engine size, engine layout, safety cage, and 
wheelbase of the NASCAR stock car formula were codified. No longer was the series a 
race between cars that could legitimately claim to be of production origin. Convention 
and regulation dictated that a legal NASCAR stock car was composed of elements 
borrowed from American production automobiles from the previous thirty years. The 
conglomeration included Chevrolet Camaro steering components, Ford Galaxie front 
spindles, Ford Truck front wheel hubs, a tubular space frame chassis grafted atop a 
Ford Galaxie frame, Chevrolet Pickup Truck rear suspension arms, and a Ford 3/4 ton 
Pickup Truck rear axle. The engine specified was a to have V8 pushrod layout and 
displace 358 cubic inches, and transmissions were four speed designs based on either 
the Borg Warner ”T-10” or the Ford “top loader.”338 
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With successive subsystems within the NASCAR stock car, innovations became 
accepted practice or a specific rule. As new ways of building a better (cheaper, faster, 
more durable, safer) stock car were sorted out, fewer areas of the chassis remained 
open for development. Each transition of experimental execution also meant another 
chunk of tacit knowledge about manipulating production technology in pursuit of speed 
was made explicit. Such explication existed in part as the evolving written specifications 
of the rule book, and in part in the physical artifacts used in competition. Though always 
subject to further interpretation, the rules crystallized much of the design of the stock car. 
Where still inexplicit, conventions held by the stock car racing community were passed 
from team to team, and car to car.  As most NASCAR racers were willing to “read” the 
artifact, to look at the chassis and determine how and why much of it was built the way it 
was, these artifacts served to capture much of the remaining territory for the exercise of 
tacit knowledge. Keeping with the state of the art, where unspecific NASCAR rules still 
allowed interpretation, was usually required to avoid disqualification.339 Though the net 
result was elimination of experimentation and the exercise of tacit knowledge from the 
process of creating a stock car chassis, the resulting car was very well suited to the 
demands of stock car racing and preserved the essential tuning operations that are 
central to the sport. Indeed, the negotiations and demands of the environment from 
which it sprang are reflected in its physical form. Because of the circumstance of its 
creation, the NASCAR stock car is at once inexpensive, durable, simple, safe, and the 
near perfect prop for producing racing entertainment. 
                                                                                                                                           
the stronger, so-called “Top Loader” in 1965? A strengthened version of the Ford 
Top-Loader is currently standard in NASCAR stock cars. See Appendix A  




THE RACING FRATERNITY 
 
 
NASCAR formed to sanction a national production based racing series; it achieved 
success by organizing racing spectacle. In order to compete for the race fan’s dollar, NASCAR 
racing had to provide consistently close action frequently enough to satisfy growing demand. 
Little evidence suggests that NASCAR pursued these ends with any sort of master plan. Rather, 
like the racers it relied on for labor, innovation, and talent, NASCAR constantly adapted to the 
changing atmosphere of motor sport. The power focused in the hands of Bill France allowed the 
sanctioning body to change direction quickly. Implementing these changes within the community 
of was a more complex matter bound up with the social context of stock car racing.  
As their sport became an established phenomenon during the 1950s, stock car racers 
began to form a close-knit community linked by racing activity more than geography or class. 
Common experience and competitive camaraderie bound racers originating from diverse 
locations such as Apopka, Florida; Stuart, Virginia; and Chicago, Illinois. In addition, these 
drivers came from vocational backgrounds as diverse as timber dealer, airline pilot, and 
moonshiner.340 The circumstance of its creation and the demands competing under the aegis of 
NASCAR shaped this community. The racers shared experience using production-based 
equipment, and responding to NASCAR rules helped create a particular form of brotherhood 
which provided a technical and political resource for racers. The racers also constructed a 
series of technical conventions and contextual best practice that governed the building of their 
cars and conduct at the track. These same conventions also served to keep most women and 
African Americans from the ranks of competitors. 
Yet this fraternity of racers was not sustained by practical considerations alone. Its 
members shared intense experiences with, and profound appreciation for the technologies that 
define motor sport. These common bonds often transcended the social, economic, and, on one 
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occasion, racial relationships prevailing in larger society. As the sport matured, the community 
developed as a practical extension of the act of racing, providing of mutual support, 
organization, and practical education to its members. It evolved into an informal yet pervasive 
institution that maintained boundaries, created identity, and offered social structure for its 
members. Often used in the popular literature of motor sport, the term “racing fraternity” aptly 
describes the association between racers that grew with NASCAR Grand National racing.   
Though many racers were not southern by birth, the focus of stock car racing 
activity in the southern states influenced the composition of the racing fraternity. A racing 
career, though stringent and demanding, provided an opportunity to escape life on the 
farm or in a Piedmont cotton mill. Some of the notable racers who rejected meager 
working class wages to join NASCAR culture were Lee Petty, David Pearson, Bobby 
Issac, Rex White, and Ned Jarrett.341 Like racers from outside the South, these were 
predominantly young, working class men. There were numerous practical implications of 
the working class roots of most NASCAR competitors. The tenuous financial foundation 
that accompanied many departures from the working class influenced the careers of 
many racers. Ironically, unlike most other areas of motor sport there was relative ease of 
entry. Stock car racers could afford the initial investment in a vehicle because the mass 
production roots of Grand National racing kept the cars affordable. These small 
businesses also needed cash flow for maintenance, repairs, and possibly upgrades. 
NASCAR recognized from the beginning that paying prize money deep into the ranks of 
competitors would help maintain a field of competitors by permitting driver/owner 
entrepreneurs to keep racing.342  
After accumulating the necessary initial capital, men who were talented enough 
and willing to be mechanic, manager, and tow-truck driver, could engage in racing as a 
small business. The case of Jack Ingram illustrates the sort of opportunity stock car 
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racing offered ambitious working class white men who were bitten by the “speed bug.” 
After accumulating capital enough to build a car, he began racing for a living. “I wanted 
to race so bad that learning to be a plumber or pipe fitter was a tool to be able to do 
that,” He recalls, 
I served in an apprenticeship. I was a journeyman by the time I was twenty-one 
years old and I made a lot of money.  Basically, I’d go work in these shut downs 
and around these paper mills and things and work a lot of overtime and I made a 
horrendous amount of money to be able to start racing and once I started making 
money with the racecar, then I of course, completely quit that.343  
Ingram, like Lee Petty, Ralph Moody, and Glen Wood before him, had saved sufficient 
capital then embarked on a career in the racing business.344 
The initial incarnation of NASCAR stock car racing intended to keep the cost of 
racing low and the reward structure sufficient to promote participation. The production-
based vehicle formula, prize payment structure and frequency of events made “racing for 
a living” a possibility. Attention to cost, though it perhaps retarded technical 
development, kept NASCAR Grand National racing within the means of the entrepreneur 
well into the 1970s.345 Though the economic structure of teams would change, the cost 
of racing in NASCAR never approached expenses in other racing series. 
Frequently these racing ventures were small family businesses employing sons, 
siblings and wives that became consistent participants in NASCAR stock car racing. 
Often they matured into racing dynasties, some of which dominated the sport. Early 
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NASCAR champion Lee Petty quit a small hauling business to take up racing. As his 
wife Elizabeth Petty describes,  
We had a reaper shed.  My dad was raised on a farm and he had a reaper that 
he cut the grain with.  And that’s where we started.  It was just a top on it, didn’t 
have sides, when we moved here.  And Lee put sides on the building and it had a 
dirt floor, and that’s where they worked on the car for several years. Then I 
suppose they put a cement floor in and then we built part of the building that’s 
still there, the two story part of the building is out here.  And then they just build a 
little at a time and progressed.  Good or bad, that’s where it happened.346  
Like many small enterprises, the Petty racing effort involved much of the family. Lee’s 
sons Richard and Maurice helped prepare the cars and served as pit crew while wife 
Elizabeth managed the household and the books for the racing business.  
Growth of the sport during the 1950s, changed the structure of the teams. 
Though family teams remained a strong part of the sport, the mid fifties saw the 
emergence of other units like the Ford racing team under the direction of Indy champion 
Pete DePaolo, and a team of Chryslers run by Mercury outboard engine mogul Carl 
Kiekhaefer. Smaller teams like those run by specialist mechanics Smokey Yunick, 
Cotton Owens, Ray Fox, and Banjo Matthews also emerged during the 1950s. These 
teams, with specialist mechanics, fabricators, and part time help at the track would form 
the pattern for the bulk of teams as time wore on. 
Though many families continued to manage race teams, the amount of labor and 
expertise necessary to finish well in stock car races changed during the 1960s. It 
became unrealistic for a family-based privateer racer to build, and drive his own car and 
consistently run near the front. Family-run race teams persisted, but only if they 
assumed the form of other, more professional race teams. Typically this entailed some 
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family members specializing in certain areas or managing specialized talent in the shop 
and on the track. The training of family talent into the sport as it developed would 
populate NASCAR stock car racing with a large number of family dynasties. 
The efforts of the Wood Brothers epitomize this trend in development. During the 
late 1950s, team manager Glen Wood recognized that his organizational talents 
exceeded his ability as a driver. Instead of quitting the sport, he and brother Leonard 
concentrated on building excellent racecars, attracting sponsors and top drivers, and 
rationalizing the procedure and equipment of pit stops. While Glen assumed more 
management responsibility, brother Leonard concentrated on building chassis and 
engines. To staff the race shop and provide support at the track, relatives and friends 
were recruited to join the business. Glen and Leonard relied on the efforts of brothers 
Clay, Ray and Delano in addition to the services of their cousin Ralph Edwards and 
family friend Kenny Martin.347 So successful was their transition into management that 
the Wood Brothers became known as “Kings of the Superspeedway.” Indeed, their 
careful preparation and revolutionary speed in the pit stop brought them fame in the 
larger racing community. The Wood Brothers pit crew, which included Leonard and 
Glen, could complete pit stops so quickly that they were brought to the Indianapolis 500 
by Ford to manage the pit stops of the winning Ford effort in 1965.348  
Massive expenditures by Ford, GM and Chrysler during the 1960s helped 
change the personnel structure of most teams.349 But despite increasing technical 
demands and the more rigorous schedule introduced by involvement from automakers, 
the transition away from a family-based business did not occur completely. Some 
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transitioned to larger enterprises employing relatives to manage specialized help. Other 
privateers continued to campaign Grand National cars using only siblings, children, 
spouses and pick-up help. Among others, Wendell Scott, the only African American 
driver ever to consistently campaign a car in Grand National events, and his friend 
Henley Grey managed to continue simple, largely solitary racing campaigns into the 
1970s.350 Though the demands of keeping up with the NASCAR schedule would 
eventually force owner/mechanic/drivers into the slower ranks of competition, the model 
of the individual entrepreneur persisted into the 1970s.351 These “small business racers” 
enhanced the entertainment value of events, by filling the field of competitors and 
perpetuating a regional grass-roots association with the sport.  
Because the “formula” for a NASCAR stock car depended on mass-produced 
components, the cost never approached that of racing a purpose built racecar. Even 
where components were replaced with stronger parts, purpose-built for stock car racing, 
their original design was typically derived from a simple production component. This 
simplicity of design, combined with weight limits and specifications that prohibited 
special materials, kept the cost of parts low. For NASCAR, lowering the threshold of 
entry helped fill the field with competitors and thus the grandstands with paying 
customers. Over time, the logic of maintaining low cost for participants, encouraging 
consistent participation, and reliably presenting entertaining spectacle secured the 
relationship between NASCAR and the community of stock car racers. 
Though modest, the consistent income from prize money of NASCAR Grand 
national racing did allow many working class whites to begin small racing businesses. 
Unlike other forms of motor sport, NASCAR stock car racing paid prize money deep into 
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the ranks of finishers. This relatively flat distribution of prize money helped offset the 
expenses of those racers finishing in the top 20 places. The two percent of total prize 
money offered the 20th place finisher in Grand National events was far greater than other 
national forms of motor sport. In AAA, for example, prize money payouts seldom 
reached below tenth place.352 The payout structure for NASCAR sanctioned events 
clearly intended to provide enough economic reward to attract consistent fields of 
competitors. Even if during the early 1950s the total purse might have been meager 
compared to AAA Big Car championship races, the spoils were spread widely.  
From the onset of NASCAR competition, the flat pay structure helped build a 
loyal base of racers. Early participants, if they were committed and talented, were able to 
make a modest career of stock car racing. The opportunity to build, own and race a car 
in a national championship was unique to NASCAR. This form of entrepreneurial racing 
was more common among mechanically inclined working class men. Unlike those who 
raced using purpose-built cars, individuals like Lee Petty, Marshall Teague, Ralph 
Moody and Glen Wood could expect to make a decent living as entrepreneurial stock car 
racers. In the Big Championship car series, the Sprint series and even at the top levels 
of Midget racing sanctioned by the AAA, the roles of driver and owner were typically 
distinct. By building their own car, transporting it to competition themselves, and finishing 
most of the time, stock car racers could realize a decent living. This form of ownership 
and participation, drawn directly from more humble ranks of modified stock car racing, 
was possible because of the pay structure. In turn, the commitment necessary for this 
form of ownership built close ties among the community of racers. 
Though this pay structure was, no doubt, popular among racers, it also served 
the best interest of NASCAR. Pay deep into the ranks at the close of each contest 
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helped keep racers involved and the starting grid full at the beginning of each race. For 
some racers, even meager winnings often made the difference between competing and 
skipping an event. When asked about her role as bookkeeper for her family’s race team, 
Elizabeth Petty modestly commented, “Well, when you don’t have a lot it don’t take a lot. 
You just have to hold on a little tighter.”353  Early stock car racers mainly considered 
competition a subsistence-level business as much as a sport. When asked about getting 
ahead in the stock car business, Mother Petty comments that,  “I never looked at it like 
that.  Whether the men are living, and if we did real good on Sunday, we didn’t do any 
different that week.  We’d have gotten another part for the car but outside of that, we just 
went and enjoyed it.”354 For the Petty’s, though wining was important for making a living, 
sustaining a life in racing was the first goal.  
Throughout the 1960s, even as NASCAR racing began to attract large 
sponsorships from nationally known businesses, NASCAR maintained a schedule suited 
to the needs of the small entrepreneur racer. In order to make a go of racing as a career, 
drivers needed ample opportunities to win money, and reasonable assurance that their 
competitive efforts would yield some amount of payout. Though some of the larger 
factory teams only went to high-publicity superspeedway events, NASCAR continued to 
sanction large number of race events in the Grand National series. Having as many as 
sixty-two events each season offered small-time competitors ample opportunity to win 
prize money.355 Frequent opportunities to win money, even with only a mid-pack finish, 
helped keep small-time efforts viable. 
NASCAR also cultivated allegiance among the small-time racers who composed 
the bulk of their labor force by provided disincentive to racing in events staged by other 
sanctioning bodies. In response to similar actions by the AAA, NASCAR rules for 1951 
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prohibited members from competing in races not sanctioned by NASCAR.356 Racers who 
raced in unsanctioned events faced the possibility of losing any points they had earned 
toward the NASCAR national championship. Persistent participation in such events, as 
was the case with racers like Marshall Teague, and Frank Mundy, led to suspension and 
eventually permanent expulsion from NASCAR. With the demise of the AAA contest 
board in 1955, and the subsequent creation of the USAC sanctioning body in 1956, the 
NASCAR prohibition against racing under other sanction was maintained until June of 
1965 when NASCAR and USAC agreed to use the same set of rules for cars, effectively 
making USAC a farm league for NASCAR.357  
Linking enough tracks together to form a truly national championship for 
production-based cars was the first key to creating a motor sport where commercial 
concerns, rather than the largess of car owners, would dominate the course and conduct 
of events. Linking enough levels of grass roots racing together to perpetuate production-
based racing supported the success of the Grand National series. Most of participants 
came to NASCAR Grand National from a seemingly endless supply of racers with 
experience in small-time, grass roots racing. In laying claim to all production-based 
racing activity when formed, NASCAR effectively set up farm leagues to feed racers into 
its premier series. Though the AAA had sanctioned strictly stock racing before and after 
World War II, it was regarded as second rate by much of the contest board. Promoters, 
racers and localities that could not afford or attract exhibitions of purpose built racecars 
in competition often “settled” for events using stock-based equipment. By sanctioning 
races for modified, and sportsman classes of cars, NASCAR tapped into a vast quantity 
of local, grass roots racing enthusiasm. By providing centralized planning, rules, and 
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record keeping, NASCAR controlled an entire constellation of grass roots motor sport 
that had grown as outlaw racing venues, equipment and events outside the sanction of 
the AAA. By organizing several ranks of racing that utilized production-based cars, 
NASCAR encouraged racers to work up the ranks into the Grand National series.  
Despite the possibility of working into the premier Grand National Series, a racing 
career was not necessarily easier than working as a tradesman or machine operator. 
Jack Ingram recalled the sort of commitment required to make a business out of racing.  
There’s been hundreds of time that I’d be coming home from a trip to a racetrack 
and getting daylight Sunday morning and see people dragging their boats to the 
lake and beer cooler in the back and going to have a big time and the time I got 
home on Sunday, I was so tired I couldn’t even move until Monday some time, 
but I was still doing what I wanted to do but you couldn’t accomplish that in racing 
if you took these times off to do these things.  There was no time.  There was 
absolutely no time.  Anyone that does anything good spends a horrendous 
amount of time doing it.358  
Even if it was more demanding than wage work, racing offered the intrinsic reward of 
challenges met. 
Any career in stock car racing during the late 1950s and early 1960s demanded 
a huge amount of time and effort. As two-time NASCAR Grand National champion Ned 
Jarrett recalls,  
we were running from 45 to 60 races a year back then.  And many of those, the 
majority of them were 100 mile events, 200 laps on a half a mile track basically.  
If it was a quarter of a mile track which we ran some of those, you might run a 
250 lap race. And that was the situation too where you would just go in for the 
day, practice maybe for an hour and qualify and then run the race that same 
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evening.  So it was not uncommon back then to run as many as three races a 
week.359  
As Ingram indicates, racing for a living left little time for friendships or experiences 
outside of the racing community. A strong passion for machines, speed, and winning, 
second only to plenty of time to devote to racing, seemed a prerequisite for successful 
racers.  
Enthusiasm for the attention of fans, profound fascination with machines, and joy 
in the competition of motor sport helped offset the personal demands racing imposed. 
Racing mechanic Ray Fox described the difficulty of balancing business obligations and 
family responsibilities. “Back in them days you worked your life — you worked night and 
day racing -- doing something on the racecar, doing something on an engine, talking to 
your wife to keep from getting a divorce because you were gone all of the time.  It was 
really rough.” 360  
If the opportunities offered by stock car racing were no less work than life in a 
textile mill, or as a pipe fitter, why did people choose a life in racing?  The risk of 
financial insolvency or personal injury far outweighed the potential for profit and status 
that accompanied a successful racing career. It seems clear that choosing racing was 
not just a business decision. As Robert C. Post has suggested for drag racers, perhaps 
the combination of “ingenuity and action” offered as powerful an inducement as fame 
and financial reward.361 Racers working in the NASCAR Grand National series were 
bound together by common enthusiasm for competition utilizing technology. These guys 
simply loved cars, and loved to race. This fascination with cars and automotive 
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competition was powerful enough to draw some racers to NASCAR events from an early 
age. As Jack Ingram recalls,  
Basically, I got interested in racing probably when I was about fourteen years old.  
I didn’t even know that there was a racetrack in our part of the country, which 
was Asheville-Weaverville. I saw a poster on a telephone pole such as they use 
to put for racing and wrestling and all kind of things.  That’s the only way they 
had to advertise and I saw this poster and we was about twenty-fives miles away 
from Weaverville Speedway where we lived and a couple of us, believe it or not, 
rode bicycles all the way to there and back and we never — got back way late 
Sunday night.  The dirt track was dusty all over.  But just from seeing those 
racecars on that poster — I’d never saw one of them.  The letters and the 
wheels, fenders cut out the numbers and all that stuff, it just amazed me. We 
would walk to the store and whatever, like everybody else did back in those days 
in the country and country store and every car come by — I could name every 
car and what model it was and I was always interested in cars and once I saw 
that race, every opportunity I had to get around the racecar that’s what I did.”362  
 
Mechanic Ray Fox experienced similar enthusiasm. He recalls, “I loved racing, I 
love to see racing, I love to read the stories about racing that went on back in them days 
you know when they raced on the beach and did record runs on the beach and things 
like that. I used to love that. I ate that up.”363  
For NASCAR stock car racers, a powerful fascination with using machines in 
competition, and perhaps the lure of a racing lifestyle, helped them make the decision to 
work as a racer. 
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Bobby Ingram also suggests that, racers shared a fundamental fascination with 
automotive technology. Their experience with racing translated this fascination with 
machinery into powerful sensory experiences. Racers were closest to the speeds, 
smells, heat and sounds of racing competition. Experiences with high performance 
equipment strengthened community by offering common reference for members of the 
community. For example, competition using complex technological systems provided 
circumstances where innumerable factors could provoke failure. Automobile racing was 
a capricious undertaking. An error in judgment, lax component quality control on the 
assembly line, or even the weather can bring about utter failure just as quickly as 
inexperience or poor preparation. As a part of weekly competition, intense and 
unpredictable struggles with human and technological performance occurred in close 
proximity to other racers in the garages, paddocks, and pit roads of the race circuit. The 
capricious fortunes inherent in auto racing provided ample opportunity for celebration or 
commiseration of shared experiences. 
 Competing regularly required intense commitment from stock car drivers, 
mechanics and owners. Strong devotion to such a dangerous sport automatically set 
racers apart from ordinary, risk-averse citizens. The time required to be a racer allowed 
little opportunity to share the interests and experiences of “normal” folk. Instead, racers 
mastered esoteric subject matter and shared a nomadic existence following a full 
schedule of racing events. Separation was also fostered by generally held perceptions of 
racers as rough, irresponsible hooligans, a perception that was not wholly inaccurate.364 
Always traveling from show to show, they were regarded in a manner similar to circus 
folk or gypsies. Indeed, one of NASCAR’s greatest challenges was selling stock car 
racing as a respectable activity. As Ned Jarrett recalls,  
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After that first race my dad set me down and we had a long talk.  I was 19 then 
and he pointed out how hard he had tried to work to build respect in the 
community and he didn’t see where my participating with the people who were 
involved in racing back then could do too much to add to the image that he’d 
worked so hard to try to build in the community.  Because most of the drivers 
back then were either considered to be bootleggers or just a bunch of fools that 
didn’t have any better sense then to get out there and risk their necks.365  
 
If enthusiasm, long hours, and danger set racers apart from society, it also 
helped bind racers together. Persistence, mechanical aptitude, hard work, fearlessness, 
and a highly competitive personality were the criteria by which racers judged each other. 
In describing the acceptance of her father in the world of NASCAR stock car racing, 
Janice Davis recalls that her father, the African-American Wendell Scott, “earned their 
respect. They knew he was an excellent driver,” She continued. 
 I’ve seen him turn over, get out one night in Greenville.  The car was sitting up 
on the side and he jumped out of it. They threw the caution flag out but they 
didn’t need it for him.  He jumped down, rocked his car back down on all four 
wheels and took off again.  He was adamant about racing, he loved it and he did 
a wonderful job.  I’ve seen other drivers spin out and Daddy would miss the 
wreck and you wonder how in the world did he get through that pile of mess and 
here he comes.  He’s just a real go-getter and super skillful driver.366  
Though the segregationist context no doubt made skin color an issue among NASCAR 
racers on occasion, Davis recalls a community where achievement and competence 
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were often valued above race or ethnicity. Performance with technology more than 
social conventions shaped relationships within NASCAR. 
The rigors of a schedule built around the championship circuit, a yearly journey 
that takes teams to venues spread around the country, also helped cultivate a sense of 
cohesion around the daily trials of being a racer. For around forty weeks a year, racers 
worked alongside each other to create competitive spectacle. Racing schedules that 
typically included long hours of work at the track and exhausted nights sequestered in 
hotels helped build community through shared experiences. This close-knit community 
functioned in many ways like a fraternity.  
Though the label “fraternity” conjures familiar images like houses filled with beer 
guzzling undergraduates, or service-minded lodges replete with middle-aged burghers, 
unusual hats, and bingo tournaments, fraternal structure offers a useful organizational 
description. Indeed, the often-used term “racing fraternity” describes an organizational 
matrix that closely resembles more formally defined fraternities. That NASCAR is not 
formally regarded as a fraternity does not mean that its rules and practice form a tacit 
fraternity equivalent to more traditional masculine organizations. By defining the practice 
and boundaries of the racing fraternity, we can compare it to a traditional fraternal 
structure while developing an understanding of the negotiations and regulations that 
created and preserve gender as an organizing bias within the sport.  
Though not formally defined as a brotherhood, racers act in many ways to 
promulgate and enjoy the advantages of fraternal membership. Besides occasional 
reference to themselves as a fraternity, NASCAR racers exhibit other features of more 
traditional fraternities such as the Masons, Moose or Knights of Pythia. In her masterful 
discussion of the elements of fraternal construction, Mary Ann Clawson describes 
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several distinguishing features. 367 As with Clawson’s example, members of the 
NASCAR community employ masculinity, ritual, a perspective organizing their immediate 
world into groups, and proprietary information to create distinction between themselves 
and larger society.  
Perhaps the most obvious and most conventional of these features was its 
masculine constituency. Racers are almost exclusively male. Culturally defined gender 
roles suggested that where not working in a controlled environment, women should be 
confined to the domestic sphere. In 1950s America, it was generally thought that women 
should not engage in dangerous professional sports. Though NASCAR racing initially 
welcomed women drivers, they were not able to continue competing much past the initial 
organizational phase. Though Sara Christian, Ethel Flock, and Louise Smith were 
competitive when they participated (Christian finished as high as fifth in the seven races 
she competed in), but their appearances were likely as much a publicity ploy as an 
attempt to bring women into motor sport.368 Traditionally it was thought to be bad luck to 
have women track-side, and by the mid-1950s, NASCAR Grand National racers were all 
men. This masculine exclusivity was even institutionalized. By 1955, women were 
officially excluded from participation in the sport. As Drew Bledsoe writes,  
To be a race queen is about the only way a woman can be involved in big-time 
stock car racing. Oh, wives and girlfriends of drivers are allowed to keep lap 
scores, but there are no women drivers, no women mechanics, or crew 
members. No women but race queens. . . Indeed, until 1973, when a female 
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photographer threatened to bring suit, women were not allowed in the pits of 
most of the big stock car tracks.369  
As a fraternity, NASCAR racers defined themselves through engaging in activities that 
were primarily considered masculine by larger society.  
In “Shop Floor Culture, Masculinity and the Wage Form,” Paul Willis writes, “One 
of the marks of the lived and contemporary culture of the shop floor is a development of 
this half-mythical primitive confrontation with the task. It is a familiarity and experiential 
sense of control of technology, or at least of sharing its power.”370 This relation to 
technology, though describing factory production, is consistent with the rural tradition 
described by Ronald Kline and Trevor Pinch where, “competence in the repair and 
operation of machinery formed a defining element of masculinity.”371 As a publicly visible 
shop floor built through the patronage of largely rural fans, the pit arena reinforces 
conventions that suggest technically difficult and physically demanding work is best left 
to male hands.372 Within racing, especially within the pits, we find a re-creation of the 
masculine circumstance of production. Willis describes this gendered arena, a place 
such as the “hot pits,” where “Difficult, uncomfortable or dangerous conditions are seen . 
. . for their appropriateness to a masculine readiness and hardness.”373 The absence of 
women from the scene of competitive action infers that they are somehow unsuited to 
the intense, technically demanding productive efforts of the racing world. 
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The idea that stock car racing celebrates mechanized danger is not new. Among 
historians of Southern culture, stock car racing is regarded as a modern extension of 
traditionally violent and competitive themes in Southern life. Historian Pete Daniel 
asserts that “Stock car racing combines Southerners’ love of automobiles, daring, 
violence, heroes, and hell-raising.”374 In Honor and Violence in the Old South, Historian 
Bertram Wyatt-Brown describes how “Southerners . . . loved sports, hunting, games of 
chance and skill - in fact, any event that promised the excitement of deciding the 
inequalities of prowess among men, or among men and beasts.” 375 Twentieth century 
substitution of racecars for swift horses continues such dangerous contests wherein 
Southern men assert their masculinity. 
The aura of violence surrounding stock car racing was most likely a consequence 
of the production origins of the racecars and the culture within which they were raced. 
Though racers died with regularity in open wheeled cars, wrecks during those events 
were an exception, not the norm. Also, racers who perished in a purpose-built, open-
wheeled racing car were operating equipment outside the experience of most observers. 
Some-time NASCAR competitors Jimmy Clark, Swede Savage, and Marc Donohue all 
died racing purpose-built cars far from any NASCAR event. Yet stock car racing was 
considered dangerous and violent because the cars let it appear so. First, the cars 
looked like regular street cars, so any violence or injury in competition appeared more 
threatening to the public. The vicarious association possible between street cars and the 
cars on the track that served as such a powerful sales tool, also amplified any negative 
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connotations of stock cars on the track. Wrecks were considered more violent because 
observers could identify with the equipment involved. Second, the production origins of 
the NASCAR racecar allowed more frequent contact on the track. Unlike the open wheel 
racers at the Indianapolis 500, or the lightweight sports cars and dragsters, the rugged 
NASCAR stock car could withstand dramatic amounts of damage before it was disabled 
and the occupant killed or maimed. The affordability of stock cars and the robust roll 
cage required by NASCAR also permitted more frequent contact between competitors. 
Consequently, most crashes were not exceptional events. Competitors routinely bumped 
as part of competition. Physical contact between competing vehicles was not tolerated or 
even possible in other forms of motor sport. The perceived rough and tumble nature of 
many stock car events brought on the disdain of competitors, fans, and journalists 
accustomed to more traditional motor sport.  
That the cars could withstand punishment did not, of course, guarantee that 
dangerous fender-banging would occur.  The background of many of the competitors 
further enhanced the possibility of violence. When asked how occasional rough racing 
was handled off the track, two-time national champion, race track manager, and racing 
broadcast announcer Ned Jarrett explains of one competitor,  
Well Ralph Earnhardt normally would come to you and put his arm around your 
shoulder and he would make an excuse.  But you knew back… in the back of 
your mind that you was going to get him back.  And normally did, but he was one 
driver that you could never catch up with.  I mean you know if you pushed him off 
the track once, he’d get you twice and you knew that going in but you still had to 
do it every once in awhile and that’s the way most of the time that it would be 
settled is that you’d just return the favor somewhere along the way.   
You never wanted to wreck anywhere where there would be a possibility of them 
getting hurt. But if you nudged them out of the way, knock them up in the groove 
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where you could get by me, well you know that was sort of accepted back then.  
Maybe, didn’t like it but you know that’s just the way it was.376 
Ned Jarrett, is by no means alone among NASCAR racers in occasionally resorting to 
force. Numerous accounts by drivers, mechanics, and even NASCAR officials document 
the presence of violent behavior in competition and elsewhere at the track.377 Clearly the 
use of violence was accepted by stock car racers as justified when it served a noble, or 
at least useful, end.  
Regarding the occasional continuance of racing conflict in the infield after race’s 
end, Jarrett comments that,  
occasionally people’s tempers would flair to the point that they would get in a 
fight, either the drivers or the crew members or a mixture of them, whatever it 
might be.  Sometimes there’d be some pretty good brawls.  You might have six, 
eight, ten, fifteen people involved in a fight and you know that was just sort of the 
way that it was too.  I was one of those that didn’t necessarily think that was the 
way to do it because first of all I didn’t want to get hurt and then next I’ve always 
felt that there is a better way to settle things than beating up on somebody’s body 
or letting them beat up on you.  I just never felt that was very smart.378 
Smart or not, the violence of contestants was an inevitable part of racing among highly 
competitive men in vehicles that could withstand aggressive tactics and an atmosphere 
that condoned the excitement produced by such tactics.  Violence was a frequent part of 
working class life in the South. Accepting violence as a part of racing was one pre-
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condition for inclusion in the informal fraternity of racers at the core of NASCAR 
competition. 
 Apparently being white was another pre-condition for membership in the 
NASCAR fraternity. During the ascendancy of NASCAR, tensions over desegregation, 
the civil rights movements and issues of race were minimal within the stock car racing 
community. This was likely because there was little chance of African Americans 
threatening the world of stock car racing. Though Wendell Scott, the sole African 
American competitor, was widely respected as a racer, there were no other sustained 
attempts by other persons of color to participate in stock car racing. The presence of 
such a close-knit community of white racers was probably intimidating to any outsider. 
Moreover, the difficulty of succeeding even if you did not draw controversy because of 
your skin color, most likely quelled the ambitions of most would-be African American 
stock car racers. The racial strife outside of NASCAR was probably not much of an issue 
because only one African American driver was willing to participate. Under these 
circumstances Scott was accepted by the predominantly white racing fraternity. Scott’s 
daughter recalls how many stalwart NASCAR competitors were friends with her father. 
She lists, “Earl Brooks, Tommy Pistone. I think was his name.  And of course Richard 
Petty, David Pearson, Cale Yarbrough. What’s this other man’s name? He had a round 
head, gray hair? … Henley Gray.” 379 It should be noted that these racers were not on 
the periphery of the racing fraternity. Rather, they compiled some of the more active and 
successful careers in the sport, with over 3000 starts and 13 national championships 
between them.380 
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Yet despite such acceptance of a token black participant, by the middle of the 
1960s much of NASCAR racing took place in a region noted for racism. Ashley Scott 
relates how, despite her father’s racial tolerance in the racing fraternity, acceptance was 
not universal. She describes one encounter with racism at the racetrack. “We were at, I 
don’t know which race it was, we were in the infield and the race was over with and 
Deborah and I were walking through the racing infield and a man came up and he said 
something ugly,” Scott recalls.  
I don’t know if my sister Deborah heard him or not but I did and I didn’t say 
anything ugly because I knew I wasn’t suppose to say a bad word.  So I just took 
my foot and I kicked him in his crotch because I knew that’s where it would hurt 
most and I grabbed Deborah’s hand, I said, ‘Deborah come on we got to go, we 
got to go’… I had thought I had won that little war, it probably wasn’t even a 
battle from the start but I just didn’t like what he said.  And what he said to me, 
Daddy I’m sure had been called that a million times but he was able to ignore it 
and I didn’t.381  
 
Her description is telling. It suggests that whatever appearances, skin color was 
never far from becoming an issue. Though Wendell was tolerated by all and a genuine 
friend to many, the barriers to entry, both financial and social, were likely too forbidding 
to facilitate the widespread participation of African Americans. These implicit constraints 
likely served to keep the constituency of the NASCAR fraternity white male. 
Another feature of stock car racers that is consistent with more conventional 
fraternities is the practice of public rituals to build solidarity. Like most sporting contests, 
racing is a highly ritualized phenomenon, and like other motor sport contests, NASCAR 
racing included specific public rituals. Qualifying, inspection, alignment of the racecars in 
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order on the starting grid before each race, rationalized ritual of the pit stop, and the 
victory circle ceremony immediately following the race are all elements of public ritual 
where the racers demonstrate what separates them from society at large.  
 The pit stop, an instance during competition where many members of each team 
are called on to contribute, offered an excellent opportunity to earn track position through 
rationalized and intensified accomplishment of maintenance tasks. Action to this end 
within the dangerous competitive arena enhanced the spectacle of competition and 
provided an opportunity for masculine confrontation with the competitive task. As a 
necessary break from action on the track, the pit stop came to constitute a vital part of 
the main shared resource of the racing fraternity, the spectacle of masculine work within 
a dangerous, potentially violent context. 
 Beginning in 1962 the Wood Brothers Racing transformed the pit stop ritual into 
part of competitive spectacle. By improving the tools and organization of the pit stop, 
organizing in detail each crew members responsibility and enlarging the pump cylinder 
of their hydraulic jacks to lift a car in three handle strokes, they shaved precious time off 
hitherto haphazard pit stops.382 Up until that time, pit stops were relatively disorganized 
and relaxed affairs using unmodified mechanics tools and no particular organization. 
Other teams continued to use slower conventional hydraulic floor jacks, requiring up to 
fourteen strokes, until they caught on to the Wood Brothers clever time-saver. Soon they 
too followed the closely planned division of labor, implementation of specialized tools, 
and management hierarchy. Through specialized modification of standard mechanics 
tools and time efficient organization of previously hurried but haphazard actions, the 
Wood brothers introduced the deliberate, mechanized rationalization of the pit stop ritual. 
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Because NASCAR prohibited additional development of the equipment, there was 
minimal subsequent adjustment to the pit stop ritual. 
 Competition between teams spread into the pits as the efforts of the pit crews 
became ever more important to the outcome of the race. The equipment of the pit stop - 
racecars, and familiar shop tools introduced elements of danger, power, speed, and 
routinely efficient action to which participants and fans responded with vigor. Exercising 
proprietary knowledge and arrayed hierarchically, the racers serviced their cars in a 
thoroughly rehearsed ritual of masculine mechanical virtue and productive organization.  
The one “exotic” piece of equipment used that has no direct relationship to 
equipment commonly found in a garage environment, was nevertheless of common 
origin. The eleven-gallon fuel “dump” cans that matched specialized receptacles on the 
cars to permit rapid tank refill were originally built of two five-gallon buckets welded 
together with a funnel on one end.383 The remainder of the equipment utilized in the pit 
stop closely resembled tools regularly found in most professional automotive shops, The 
cars were raised for tire changes with specially built, lightweight hydraulic jacks 
resembling the floor jacks of a typical automotive garage. Modified pneumatic impact 
wrenches, again similar to equipment used by the average mechanic, equipped with 
modified deep-well sockets were used to change tires quickly. Modifying regular tools to 
provide exceptional service in the pit stop was a cost effective way to keep ritual within 
the grasp of most racers. Also, by keeping the ritual familiar, the regular-looking 
equipment heightened the suggestion of special skills at work in the very rapid ritual of 
the pit stop. The implementation of specialized equipment and rehearsed actions 
allowed seven crew members to drop the time needed time to service a racecar from a 
few minutes in 1962 to under twenty seconds by 1979. 
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Besides masculine confrontation with technology, the fraternal format ensured 
adherence to and acceptance of hierarchy. The propriety of hierarchical relationships in 
traditional fraternities was organized around a system of degrees of brotherhood directly 
associated with levels of ritual achievement and experience.384 Within stock-car racing 
these degrees were defined in relation to skill accumulated and the responsibility of 
command during competition. One’s position within the racing fraternity’s hierarchy 
depended largely upon investments in time and subsequent mastery of race technology. 
Crew chiefs, the commanders of the pit area, were required to possess experience as 
crew members, mechanics, and often as a driver before they were given charge of 
managing a race. By keeping technological mastery contingent upon participation, and 
by revising the competitive terrain through application of the spirit of competition, 
NASCAR ensured that experiential knowledge and relationships were of paramount 
importance. In this way, the rules indirectly mandated hierarchy in the pits. The central 
governing institution, NASCAR, indirectly implemented a fraternal structure through the 
medium of the race vehicle.  
Ritual action also reinforced the gendered nature of the racing fraternity. 
Following each race, a beauty queen representing a major sponsor or the race promoter, 
bestowed a kiss upon the winning driver. The beauty queens typically wore a sash and a 
sheer dress or bikini, and were known by epithets such as “Miss Pure Firebird Gasoline” 
or “Miss Martinsville.”385 Though symbolic, the public award of physical favors 
represented fraternal conquest of the objectified woman. Although this ritual persisted, it 
was tamed over time through the gradual adoption of additional garments for the race 
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queen. By 1979, race queens typically wore less revealing halter tops and tight long 
pants.386 
Ritual also extended onto the racetrack and into the realm of competition where a 
code of behavior informed the actions of racers. Buddy Baker has described how on the 
track courtesy was important to Richard Petty. Because championship points were 
distributed deep into the field of finishers, and because one premium quality of a true 
racers is persistence, Richard Petty insisted on continuing in competition even when a 
top finish was impossible. Baker recalls,  
being around Richard probably helped me as much to grow up and understand 
that if you don’t win, if you do your best, I mean he had an old saying, if 
something happens to our car that it’s not 100 percent we stay out and let the 
guys that move over for us every week go by us and show them the courtesy.  
So when we’re running well the next week they’ll do the same for us.  We don’t 
pull in, we don’t quit.387  
By remaining in competition and extending courtesy to all other drivers, regardless of 
position in the championship race, Petty was fulfilling proper racing ritual.388   
In addition to behaving in a manner consistent with social conceptions of 
masculinity, stock car racers organize their world according to their public lives as 
racers. Put simply, fraternity members and stock car racers operate within a world 
defined by group identities. Like the local chapters or lodges of a typical national 
fraternity, race teams operate as the basic subsets within the larger racing fraternity. For 
members of the NASCAR racing community, the corporate idiom seemed to operate on 
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two levels. Racers identified themselves first as racers, and second as members of a 
specific team. The fluidity of personnel moving between racing teams suggests that for 
most racers an allegiance to the broader community of stock car racers was greater than 
loyalty to a specific team.  
As the series began to attract larger corporate sponsorships and uniforms 
became commonplace during the 1960s, the outward appearance of the automobiles 
and the racers began to convey the corporate idiom in literal fashion. As the 1960s saw 
the increased participation of automakers and direct sponsorship from large car 
dealerships, paint schemes and the outward exterior of the cars became valuable 
advertising space. The identity of racers and the team they were affiliated with became 
increasingly clear as trademarks and advertising appeared in ever enlarging form on the 
fenders and shirts of racing cars and teams. Like the car, the men that worked at the 
race track in public view advertised for a sponsor. The growing similarity in the visual 
appearance of car and clothing of team member became both a symbolic and practical 
representation of the commercial component of NASCAR racing culture.   
Racers also defined the boundaries of their sub-culture in ways similar to 
fraternities. Both groups, literal fraternities and the “racing fraternity,” rely on the control 
of information for cohesion. As Clawson describes, fraternal structure is defined and 
sustained through the creation and control of proprietary knowledge. Such secrets for 
racers generally include details of rules and current technology, knowledge of 
competitive techniques, and more mundane information such as what hotel parking lots 
can accommodate racecar trailers and the best locations to eat while traveling between 
races. Such knowledge can be applied to the day-to-day demands of racing and 
distinguishes members from non-members. Though purely practical for racers, much of 
this information, especially that dealing with racecar tuning has little practical use outside 
the competitive context.   
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 Such knowledge was shared only after a racer had earned the respect of his 
peers. Jack Ingram describes how a more experienced racer helped him master a 
difficult combination of car and track. “Ralph Earnhardt had the biggest impact early on 
in my career,” stated Ingram.  
When I first started driving at Asheville, Ralph was racing there -- weekly races 
and I was wrecking every time I got to the racetrack.  Well, Ralph never talked to 
people much.  He just kind of stayed to himself.  But he walked over to me one 
night after I’d been there about half the season in 1963.  He said, ‘Boy, if you quit 
driving that car faster than you’re driving it, you’d do just fine.’  He turned and 
walked away and I said you know old Ralph is trying to tell me something.  I’m 
gonna finish this race I don’t care who outruns me.  And I — prior to that I just 
tried to race with them people and obviously I couldn’t.  I’d lose control and 
wreck.  Well, that night I wound up finishing eighth or ninth out of about eleven 
cars finished and I was proud of myself.389  
Though not specific, Earnhardt’s philosophical message about the proper mindset for 
competition was useful within the fraternal idiom. 
 Though racing technique was important, probably the most extensive realm of 
proprietary knowledge was the understanding of rule interpretation possessed by an 
experienced racer. Though outlined in the Rule Book, NASCAR rules permit broad 
interpretation. As discussed in an earlier chapter, one example of such liberal 
interpretation was the caveat permitting modification of suspension and steering 
components in the interest of safety. In practice, these components were heavily 
modified in the interest of safety and performance. Knowing how far a design could be 
stretched was unwritten, proprietary knowledge common to stock car racers. 
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 Other knowledge, more experimental than tricks-of-the-trade, was significantly 
harder to come by. Smokey Yunick, one of the top NASCAR mechanics during the first 
twenty years of the sport, built his racecars in a concrete block shop separate from the 
truck repair shop that was his primary means of income. The isolation of his race shop, 
with translucent frosted windows to prevent prying eyes from discerning crucial details of 
his consistently quick cars, is analogous to other secret spaces maintained by traditional 
fraternities. Yunick would allow access, but only to certain other racers and never to his 
truck shop employees or the general public. 
 The formal structure of fraternal life as maintained and experienced by the 
NASCAR racing community served to build an exclusive community of working class, 
white men willing and able to commit to racing as a career. Clearly, while providing 
boundaries that protected and educated members, the structural elements of 
masculinity, ritual, collective identity and local knowledge also served to exclude. For this 
reason, while NASCAR was becoming one of the more successful racing series it also 
became one of the most homogenous. Even as other racing series embraced foreign 
and non-white racers during the 1960s, NASCAR racers became a tighter, less diverse 
community.390 For this reason, questions about how well other, non-white, non-male 
groups might have performed will forever remain unanswered. 
 Though identified with these attributes, the fraternal nature of the stock car 
community does not end with the behavior and disposition of racers themselves. As with 
more intentional fraternal organizations, the racers depended on centralized direction.  
The sanctioning bodies that regulate racing mimic the role of centralized governing 
entities within traditional fraternities. By writing and enforcing rules that organize and 
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sustain exclusive knowledge systems, public rituals, and the corporate idiom, NASCAR 
manages and sustains a structure composed of more than business relationships.  
NASCAR as the largest sanctioning body concerned with stock car racing 
performed functions analogous to the highest officers of traditional fraternities.391 It 
presided over the constitution of fraternal life by instituting systems of rules and 
organizing the location and creation of events. Such rules determine the location and 
duration of competition, criteria for victory, and most importantly, the configuration of the 
race technology. Part of NASCAR’s role as the sanctioning agency was publishing an 
annual rule book that described the procedure of racing events, the composition of 
teams, and the parameters of race vehicle technology, in some detail. The rule book 
also determined the composition and skill set of the racing fraternity. Because of 
established precedent, and obvious simplicity, the procedure of racing events conducted 
over a closed course left little room for interpretation. By requiring a driver and mechanic 
be registered for each car beginning in 1954, NASCAR did have specific input into the 
composition of the race teams.392 By 1964 rules governing details of the pit stop 
effectively enlarged the team by permitting each team to use seven members to 
complete a pit stop. Yet these changes, though crucial to the overall evolution of the 
sport, did not offer the same opportunity to encourage close competition as the rules 
governing technology.  
After assuming the initiative by organizing the sport, NASCAR became 
responsible for governing the technology and process of competition, and by extension, 
the material culture and actions of the racing fraternity. This control was largely 
established through an official Rule Book issued each year. Yet because unspecific rules 
allow flexibility in interpretation, and NASCAR claimed the responsibility of interpretation, 
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negotiations and adjustments occurred throughout the year. As NASCAR legend Junior 
Johnson comments,  
when I kept passing [the rule book] up with better ideas, as quick as they’d see 
what I had and was beating everybody with, they’d either make it illegal, or make 
it legal and tell everybody what it was, by announcing you can run so-and-so at 
the next race. You might as well just go having a meeting and say, ‘Hey, guys, 
Junior’s got this here, and if you don’t got it, you’d better be getting’ it.’393  
Conventions about the legality of technologies were manipulated as necessary. 
Operating within the gray area surrounding simple rules governing complex 
technologies, NASCAR evoked the “spirit of competition” caveat to keep racing 
entertaining. 
This gray area can best be described as a set of flexible standards. Though 
promulgated as a set of standards, the rules were vague enough to permit flexibility in 
interpretation. Interpretation often decided the legality of a racecar on the day of 
qualifying. It was always in the best interest of competition, and typically fell under a rule 
book caveat giving license to NASCAR to make any interpretation deemed necessary in 
“the spirit of competition.”394 Despite such explicit license being described in the rule 
book, NASCAR and Bill France still aroused the ire of contestants who stepped too far 
over conventional boundaries.  
Understanding how to build a car to remain competitive but not too far outside 
the rules required knowledge of the prevailing interpretation of the rules that govern the 
racing fraternity. For example, for the 1968 Daytona 500, innovative car builder Smokey 
Yunick showed up with a car sporting an offset frame which, while it maintained the 
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engine on center between frame rails as stipulated in the rules, moved weight 
advantageously to the left side of the car by shifting the whole chassis under the body. 
Though this car was built within the published rules, it was disqualified because of the 
tremendous advantage rendered by its unconventional construction.395 Smokey recalled 
Bill France’s application of the supple “spirit of competition” clause as “Chickenshit.”396 
Smokey, a figure known for not following rules, was a victim of his own ambition and 
ability. By innovating too far outside the conventions of the fraternity, even if within the 
rules, he came into conflict with the spirit of competition. 
As the chassis design converged into a single “formula stock” during the 1960s 
and 1970s, understanding how rules could be stretched was vital for success. 
Historically NASCAR seemed willing to allow fraternity members to bend the rules a lot if 
it suited the immediate needs of managing technology to keep competition close. At the 
Atlanta race in 1966, Junior Johnson brought out a 1965 Ford Galaxie with radical 
aerodynamic modifications intended to enhance the performance of the car on the high 
speed track. With the front sheet metal dipping so low that the lower half of the headlight 
was obscured behind the front bumper, and the rear sheet bodywork raised to act as a 
spoiler, the car only vaguely resembled a production Galaxie. Despite such heavy 
modification, NASCAR permitted the car to race. In this case Bill France himself bent the 
rules in this manner because Ford had withdrawn from all stock car racing as protest 
over the prohibition of an overhead cam V8 engine with a lot of horsepower and limited 
production.397 Dubbed the “yellow banana” by sports writers, the car was allowed to 
compete because NASCAR wanted the car to place well and hopefully lure Ford back 
into direct support of stock car racing. As Bill France commented, I admit the rules were 
bent in Atlanta . . . it sort of opened up the door for any of the other Ford drivers to return 
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to racing.”398  Over the long term, NASCAR recognized the benefits of having multiple 
models of cars represented. As Chrysler dominated Grand National competition with 
Ford on the sidelines, and GM corporate headquarters forbid direct division involvement 
in racing, NASCAR bent the rules to benefit stock car competition in the long run. 
Similarly, NASCAR was willing to make certain new developments legal if they 
served the ultimate end of enhancing competitive spectacle. For example, we have 
previously discussed how Leonard Wood enlarged the pump of the jack to lift a car in 
three strokes.399 Though harder to operate, the high capacity pump of this jack could 
raise one side of a car with a quarter as many strokes of the handle. During a pit stop, 
where a crew of seven rushes to change four tires and add 22 gallons of fuel, any time 
saving appliance offered tremendous advantage. One by one other teams caught on and 
modified their jacks to lift faster. When NASCAR discovered the innovation, rather than 
prohibit quick-lift jacks, they made little note of the refinement. NASCAR ruled that the 
equipment of the pit stop must be approved for safety, but the details of its operation 
remained a gray area open for innovation.400 It seems likely that one of the reasons 
NASCAR permitted such modifications was because this modification was simple and 
inexpensive.  In the long term this stance encouraged more competition during pit stops 
through further rationalization of equipment and procedure.  
Racers from outside the NASCAR fraternity understood that mastering the local 
knowledge of the NASCAR fraternity was essential. As mechanical engineer, SCCA 
champion, and Porsche racing development test driver Mark Donohue commented, 
“NASCAR rules are so vague it’s hard to know what to do. It would be foolish to read the 
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rule book, build a car, and go to the track with a $60,000 mistake.”401 Clearly 
participating in NASCAR Grand National culture was necessary to understand the 
crucial details of how a stock car could be built. Command of current local knowledge 
regarding the details of rule enforcement became ever more crucial as NASCAR Grand 
National racing departed from the strictly stock format during the late 1950s and early 
1960s.  
Informally spreading information about the details of rule interpretation meant 
that membership in the fraternity of racers was crucial to remaining competitive. For 
NASCAR, informally spreading the subtle technological details among fraternity 
members decreased the likelihood of revealing just how different their racecars were 
from genuine production vehicles. For racers, access to the gray area of interpretation 
and enforcement helped them compete, create spectacle, remain financially viable, and 
remain an active member of the tacit fraternity. Frequent negotiation of technological 
parameters already confused by annual model changes and myriad optional equipment 
demanded an organizational structure that was at once flexible and strong. The logic of 
this organizational scheme appealed to the pragmatic business interests of competitors 
while satisfying the requirements for technology and competition as entertainment.  
Additionally, reactive application of the “spirit of competition” was inexpensive. 
Racers had to break a rule and suffer censure or disqualification before they knew what 
might be legal. Alternatively, they could ask NASCAR if their plans would be accepted 
and risk having a competitive advantage publicized. Either way, NASCAR incurred little 
expense and created little confusion trying to maintain inspections to exacting standards. 
Instead, notoriously vague rules describing the technical details of racing equipment 
demanded constant negotiation between racers and NASCAR officials. 
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 NASCAR created a system of rules and enforcement that kept stock car racing, 
and the informal fraternity of stock car racers focused on commercial goals. As Robert J. 
Thomas writes,  
The technical system of an organization can be at one and the same time 
objective - that is reflexive of a logic, a set of rules and conditions independent of 
the social system - and infused with objectives - that is, reflective of the interests 
or goals of particular groups within the social system. Technology can appear as 
determinant when its objective features become indistinguishable from those who 
occupy a position of dominance.402  
The technical format dictated by NASCAR and rendered by stock car racers was such a 
circumstance; technology carried the agenda of a smaller group into a public sphere. 
Dominated by enthusiasm for the car but also informed by the demands of fraternal 
membership, the group most often the public face of NASCAR was the heroic drivers.  
During the mid 1950s NASCAR racing began to develop a cadre of superstars. 
Millionaire lumberman Curtis Turner, master of the dirt bullring; jokester and ex-
motorcycle champion Joe Weatherly; Glen “Fireball” Roberts, a model of studied 
consistency; and the businesslike Lee Petty were the most prominent emerging stars of 
NASCAR racing. Their dramatic exploits on the track helped NASCAR stock car racing 
attract the attention of more mainstream media. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
a new group of prominent racers augmented these stars. Men such as “gentleman” Ned 
Jarrett, ex-moonshiner and perennial underdog Junior Johnson, “Fast Freddie” 
Lorenzen, and second generation champion Richard “The King” Petty were the premier 
racers as NASCAR emerged from obscurity onto the pages of print media. These 
consistent winners, with interesting personalities and media-dubbed epithets, began to 
                                                 
402 Robert J. Thomas, What Machines Can’t Do: Politics and Technology in the 
Industrial Enterprise, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994) p.19. 
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develop superstar status as promotional print and numerous racing performances kept 
them in the public eye. The dramatic performances and occasional tragic death of racing 
superstars elevated the seriousness of the challenges and achievements possible in the 
racing world.  
Premier among the early superstars was Glen “Fireball” Roberts of Apopka 
Florida. An intelligent and engaging demeanor, matched with a careful driving style, 
catchy nickname, and considerable success on superspeedways, combined to create 
widespread celebrity.403 Fireball was one of the first drivers from the NASCAR ranks to 
land driving jobs outside stock car racing, driving for the Shelby American road racing 
team in 1963. He also explored new terrain using his celebrity as a driver. In the months 
before his death, Fireball landed a major contract as spokesperson for Carling 
Breweries.404 Always conscious of public scrutiny and how that might reflect on his 
career as a driver, Roberts seemed to understand the marketing potential his racing 
success could offer earlier than most racers. In one story, “Fireball” shook off insults 
from a drunken race fan explaining that “I can’t fight the guy or it will be all over the 
papers tomorrow.”405 Like some other drivers such as Ned Jarrett, who took Dale 
Carnegie public speaking courses as a young driver, Roberts grasped the possibilities of 
exploiting his status as a promotional tool well enough to cultivate a polished public 
image. 
Fireball Robert’s death from burns sustained at Charlotte Motor Speedway in 
May of the 1964 season, closely following Joe Weatherly’s death at Riverside raceway in 
January, sharpened understanding of the real danger associated with competition. Yet 
the publicity these tragedies prompted only heightened the celebrity of those who 
                                                 
403 Fireball was given his nickname when pitching for the Zellwood Mud Hens an 
American Legion baseball team headquartered just north of Apopka. 
404 Interview with Judy Judge, fiance of Glen “Fireball” Robert at the time of his death  
405 Ibid. 
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persevered amid such danger. This seriousness of competition, and the magnitude of 
spectacles carried out at high speeds on superspeedways, nourished a cult of 
personality that carried the sport farther from a contest between machines, toward a 
confrontation of individual personalities. Though fan loyalty to the competitive dimension 
pitting auto makers against each other persisted, the rising prominence of individual 
drivers steadily increased in significance.406 The subtle transition of emphasis from the 
“car and driver” to the “driver with car” was critical to selling the sport during the 1970s, 
when the technology of competition moved toward uniformity among makes and parity 
on the track. 
A 1965 Ford-sponsored marketing study picked up on the trend. “Who Gets 
Credit for Victory?” the report asked rhetorically. To which the report answered, “The 
biggest group – about 40% - consider a race to be a contest among men with courage 
and skill. This group develops strong ties with drivers and expresses sentiments 
bordering on hero worship.”407  The attraction of these racers was profound because 
fans could identify with them. Stock car racers embodied the ideals of action and daring 
attractive to working class whites privileged by race but constrained by class. This 
vicarious association was strengthened by the similarity of the racecars to street cars. 
The potential sales implications of such easy association between mass-produced 
consumer goods and the specialized cars on the track was not lost on those conducting 
Ford’s marketing survey. “There is very easy identification of the car which races with 
the car one sees driving in everyday life,” the study commented. “Every fan can see in 
the car on the track his own automobile.”408 Jerry Bledsoe describes the power of this 
identification for young working class men. “You could be poor and uneducated and 
                                                 
406 “Exploratory Research On Motivations and Characteristics Of Stock Car Racing 





scorned by society,” he writes, “but if you could learn to pick a guitar or drive a car, you 
just might luck out and find that glory, that pot of gold at Darlington or Nashville.”409  As 
one historian has commented, “Racing has become an accepted way (along with others, 
including singing and athletics) for a rural white man to achieve fame, money, and the 
trappings of success. . . They are folk heroes with whom the average southern male can 
identify.”410 Through hard work, exclusivity, and bravery in competition thee NASCAR 
fraternity created archetypical heroes. Enthusiasm for the exploits of these highly visible 
members of the racing fraternity drove the sport to new levels of popularity. 
                                                 
409 Bledsoe, p.34. 
410 David M. Johnson “Stock Car Racing,” Encyclopedia of Southern Culture, 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p.1241. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUPERSPEEDWAYS AND NATIONAL EMERGENCE 
 
 
Stock car racing’s contribution to the art of track design has become the 
Superspeedway. It combined all the modern benefits of a paved, banked racetrack with 
monumental scale. In addition to being clean and predictable, the drama of 
superspeedway racing offered more than simply automobile racing entertainment to 
fans. The speeds made possible by the size of the track and the inclination of its turns 
ensured that a popular allegory of technological progress could be played out by stock 
car racers. Manufacturers claimed more horsepower each year, tire manufacturers 
worked to steadily improve the capacity and longevity of race tires, tracks advertised 
steadily increasing speeds in competition, and constantly narrowing comparisons 
between “stock” cars on the track and purpose built racecars assured fans that American 
technological expertise could deliver it all.  
The powerful symbolic value of the superspeedway had a dramatic influence on 
the development of NASCAR stock car racing. The popular appeal of high speeds made 
possible by asphalt banking challenged more established notions of racing built on 
conventions and expectations relevant to dirt tracks. Though the years between 1946 
and 1969 would see most forms of big league American oval track racing take to 
asphalt, the shift was most dramatic among stock car racers.  
The high-banked, asphalt superspeedway offered the catalyst that finally 
separated stock car racing from its dirt track roots and brought respectability to the sport. 
In addition to reshaping racing techniques and equipment used in competition, the 
superspeedways at Darlington, Daytona Charlotte and Atlanta influenced the regional 
impact of stock car racing. For years before the influence of the superspeedway, even 
the nicest dirt tracks were filthy places. Muddy when wet and dusty when dry, the 
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physical filth seemed emblematic of regressive behavior thought to accompany each 
racing event.411 To build an exciting, and permanent entertainment series, NASCAR 
needed respectable venues in addition to evenly matched, late model racecars. Asphalt 
offered respectability on par with other forms of motor sport, the scale of the 
superspeedways suggested that NASCAR stock car racing was something bigger still. 
These large, high banked tracks foreshadowed national prominence and respectability 
for stock car racing. As they raised the profile of an emerging sports entertainment 
series, events at these superspeedways helped legitimize a sport during a time when the 
South, particularly working class southern whites, yearned for legitimacy.  
Though the superspeedway gained fame as a racing venue suited to NASCAR 
stock car racing, it was not a southern invention. The prototypical asphalt 
superspeedway was built in Oakland, California in 1946. It possessed features that 
came to define this genre of racing oval: a big, smooth track with high banked curves on 
opposite ends of long straightaways, claimed by builders to have been influenced by 
scientific principles for speed-sustaining design. Described as “The pattern for 
tomorrow’s speedways,” the “scientifically perfect track” at Oakland was an asphalt oval 
featuring thirty-four foot high banked corners.412 Though styled after the high speed, high 
banked board track velodromes and speedways of the teens and twenties, the new track 
in Oakland was built of graded earthen berm and asphalt to withstand frequent use and 
heavy production-based racecars. This design deviated considerably from the relatively 
flat oval dirt tracks that dominated the sport during the 1930s and foreshadowed the 
departure from the dirt tracks that had come to define American automobile racing.  
                                                 
411 Pete Daniel, Lost Revolutions: The South In the 1950s, (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2000), p.117, Smokey Yunick, Best Damn Garage In Town: 
The World According to Smokey, (Daytona Beach: Carbon Press, 2001) p.26 
412 “Oakland’s Speed Palace,” Speed Age, August, 1948, p.18 
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The innovative size, shape and surface were not the only novel elements 
introduced by the new track in Oakland. This track hosted the evolution of a new racing 
style more suited to high speeds possible on steep asphalt banking. In the inaugural 
race, a young local driver named Lennie Low pushed his Hudson Hornet around the 
upper rim of the track in what came to be known as the “high groove.”413 Leaving the 
more experienced dirt track racers to fight the shorter, tail-loose way around the inside of 
the oval, Low cruised to a win by employing the high velocities made possible by the 
shape of the track. This victory not only introduced a new driving style to production-
based racing, it also presaged the inevitable success of higher speed asphalt racing 
over dirt track contests. From the steep banks of Oakland Speedway, the 
“superspeedways” of NASCAR stock car racing emerged as high speed racing ovals in 
their most extreme form. Though the days of tail-loose, throttle steering racecars around 
relatively flat ovals did not end with the rise of the superspeedway, the speeds of 
contests held on dirt soon paled in significance to the velocities possible on pavement.   
During the early years, NASCAR was involved in a cooperative marketing 
arrangement with Speed Age, the earliest magazine devoted entirely to auto racing. 
Beginning in 1948, Speed Age advertised in the biweekly NASCAR News, a tri-fold 
bulletin sent to NASCAR members. In exchange, Speed Age magazine carried 
advertisements promoting fan membership in NASCAR and offered subscription 
discounts to all NASCAR members.414 Subsequent wide circulation of Speed Age among 
early NASCAR members likely spread details of the design of the banked asphalt track 
in Oakland to members of the fledgling racing community. It seems likely that a venue 
such as the new track at Oakland inspired a South Carolina heavy equipment dealer 
named Harold Brasington to build a huge paved stock car track in the rural uplands of 




eastern South Carolina. In early 1950, along with a group of investors, he began building 
a track near Darlington. That track hosted its first NASCAR Grand National race later the 
same year. 
Though the era of asphalt banking and stock cars technically began in California, 
and Indianapolis, Indiana claimed the most famous speedway in the world, a homespun 
track in the hinterlands of South Carolina would ultimately be known as the original 
superspeedway. Though nearly a decade passed between the opening of NASCAR’s 
first big paved oval and adoption of the epithet “superspeedway” by fans, sportswriters 
and promoters, the Darlington Motor Speedway defined the sort of scale and permitted 
the sorts of speeds that stock car racing needed to gain widespread acclaim and 
eventual acceptance. The design of the track facilitated speeds fast enough and drew 
the crowds large enough to permit comparison to established forms of motor sport, 
suggesting that NASCAR Grand National stock car racing was a credible enterprise. 
Less than three years after the meeting at the Streamline Bill France had the recipe for 
bringing stock car racing into its own as a legitimate form of motor sport. 
From the beginning, folks who followed stock car racing knew the new paved 
track at Darlington was something special.415 Big enough to seat the entire population of 
Darlington, in a era where few tracks on the circuit were over half a mile in length, and 
none were paved, the 1 1/4 mile oval was a symbol of respectability and progress. Most 
importantly, the paved track at Darlington offered the scale and facilitated the racing 
speeds necessary to enhance the legitimacy of production-based racing. Winning on the 
rough, high-banked track immediately became the pinnacle of success for competitors 
and sponsors on the budding NASCAR Grand National Circuit.  
                                                 
415 No track has ever officially been known as a “superspeedway.” This epithet was 
retroactively applied to the Darlington Speedway, after it was actively applied to 
Daytona International Speedway. The following year, the term was attached to the 
two other large tracks in the NASCAR circuit, Charlotte Motor Speedway and Atlanta 
International Raceway.  
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Similarities intended to associate the new racetrack at Darlington with the 
premier American race event in Indianapolis also brought notoriety to the stock car 
racing. Clearly the size of the venue, the high speeds possible with stock cars on a 
banked oval, and the five hundred mile length of the event combined to equate running 
production-based vehicles with long-established forms of racing elsewhere. One account 
describes Brasington’s motivation for building Darlington. “If Indianapolis was the Mecca 
of speed, he reasoned, he would accept that fact. But there was no reason for 
Indianapolis to be the only place of worship. There could be other denominations . . . 
and other Temples.”416 For the emergent sport, the similarities between the Southern 
500 and the Indy 500 offered credibility within American motor sport. The size of the 
venue and the high speeds possible demonstrated the legitimacy of NASCAR stock car 
racing to a nation fascinated with speed and scale. 
At the opening race in September 1950, many features of the track at Darlington 
signaled that stock car racing was out for respectability. Among these clues was the 
immediate association with the larger race in Indianapolis brought by the title “Southern 
500.” As NASCAR developed a regular series of races during the 1950s, the number 
500 was regularly evoked to provide association with the biggest single-day sporting 
event in the world, the Indianapolis 500. Even when races had 500 laps rather than 500 
miles of competition, they were often tagged with the 500 epithet. For example, the 
“Virgina 500” and the “Western North Carolina 500” were each only 250 miles long, five 
hundred laps on a half mile course.417 It was no coincidence that the big stock car race 
held in Darlington each year was named, out of deference to the Indianapolis 500, the 
Southern 500.  
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 216
As the first paved course used by NASCAR the facility also offered other, more 
tangible elements of prestige. Speed Age columnist Joe Stewart described Darlington in 
an article titled, “America’s Newest and Dixieland’s Pride,” commenting that “Almost 
overnight the Southland had become major league in something other than college 
football.”418 The concrete and steel grandstands were a departure from the rustic 
accumulation of timber grandstands and earthen berm common to most southern tracks. 
In addition to being larger and more sturdy, they permitted a view of the entire track. 
Stewart effused, “rest rooms and refreshment stands were located every 150 feet while 
the infield offered accommodations for both white and colored patrons.” Although this 
Southern concept of modernity maintained segregation, the aspiration was to create a 
motor sport venue on par with the great tracks of the country. By the standards of the 
day, particularly in the South, the facility was impressive.  
Stewart’s telling allusion to the popularity of college football suggests that the 
South had little else in the way of sports entertainment. While Southern college 
graduates could easily find sports allegiances, an increasingly mobile southern working 
class had few options for mass entertainment in a region all but devoid of conventional 
professional sports like baseball and football. Even Atlanta, the largest city in the New 
South, did not have any major league “stick and ball” sports franchises until 1966.419 As 
the working class South adopted stock car racing as a pastime, paved speedways 
added prestige and credibility to the sport. 
The one-and-a-quarter mile long track at Darlington afforded extra space within 
the oval to accommodate paying fans in addition to racers and their equipment. Though 
spectator accommodations were often not as good as those in the grandstand, the 
                                                 
418 Stewart, p.33. 
419 The Falcons and Braves moved to Atlanta in 1966. 
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infield became a notorious playground for working class fans.420 This was due in part to 
the numbers of traveling fans unable to find or afford suitable lodging who camped prior 
to the race. In addition, the practical and symbolic isolation offered by the infield 
encouraged an atmosphere of transgression. The fenced infeld area surrounded by an 
asphalt track busy with speeding cars provided an atmosphere conducive to liberal 
consumption of alcohol and experimentation with other vices. Drunken debauchery in 
the infield of NASCAR events, and at Darlington in particular, soon achieved legendary 
status as the best place for rebellious common folk to revel with impunity in plain sight of 
the larger community.  NASCAR lore is filled with tales of mobile whorehouses operated 
out of hearses, nude motorcyclists, salesmen pedaling moonshine as “cold tonic,” and 
scads of passed out fans on Darlington’s infield.421 
As eventual NASCAR Champion Ned Jarrett recalls, “A friend of mine and I 
decided we wanted to go to Darlington and just see, we’d heard so much about the 
things that went on in the infield on the night before the Southern 500 at Darlington.  So 
we went there and spent the night, basically slept in our car.  But it was, it was 
interesting to say the least.  You could see just about anything then there that you might 
be looking for and some that you weren’t.  There was a lot of drinking going on, a lot of 
sexual maneuvers and activities going on out in the open, they didn’t seem to mind who 
was watching or what was going on around them.” Clearly, safely inside the infield of a 
superspeedway, protected by a moat of racing cars, working class fans found relaxation 
and release with uninhibited vigor.  
Jarrett was not alone in his appraisal of the infield of Darlington. As Jerry Bledsoe 
writes, each year the infield of Darlington speedway “would be transformed into a gypsy 
city of more than thirty-five thousand people and thousands of vehicles. This happened 
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Racing Book, (Asheboro, NC: Down Home Press, 1975), p. 30-37. 
421 Yunick, p.38. 
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at other tracks, but at Darlington it was a tradition dating from the early days when 
thousands of people would arrive a day early for the race. There being no place to house 
them in the small town, the track had allowed then to camp in the infield. It had evolved 
into an annual party, the biggest, wildest, whoopingest, holleringest, drinkingest, 
gamblingest, carousingest, knock-down, fall-out blowout in the South. A lot of people 
came to Darlington more for the infield party than for the race, as was evident on race 
day, when they would be stretched out somewhere sleeping as the cars roared around 
the track.”422 Even if cars were not the lure, the size and scope of events at Darlington 
were a popular prototype for the infield of superspeedway events. Though it seems 
unlikely that reality matched the scale and scope of transgression passed through 
legend, like the dimensions of the venues, the unfettered festive atmosphere at 
superspeedways was a crucial component of their mystique. 
If NASCAR gained status among traditional race fans through pavement and 
concrete grandstands, so too did it benefit from the reputation built by the rowdier fans. 
Conveniently, such a vast track and large event offered plenty of space for the ambiguity 
of respectability and revelry to coincide. The track at Darlington, like the term 
superspeedway, could accommodate multiple meanings for groups with different 
interests. If for the production-based racing community Darlington was a big fast event, 
and for blue-collar or redneck fan, Darlington meant a big drunken party, so be it. As 
long as neither group was prevented from fulfilling its expectation, they both got what 
they wanted: something big in the South. 
As for racing entertainment, Darlington was immediately considered far and away 
superior to the regular dirt tracks of the day. To begin with it was much cleaner to run a 
race on asphalt. Fans could enjoy a race without the choking dust storm or nasty 
slinging mud that accompanied races on dirt. The substantial concrete grandstands and 
                                                 
422 Bledsoe, p.36. 
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high banking also permitted a view of the racing action around the entire track. Apart 
from the level and quantity of entertainment the new facility offered, as Joe Stewart 
suggested in his article, the size of the edifice, and choice of construction materials 
suggested permanence, stability and respectability.  
Though the Southern 500 was easier on the promoters and fans, it was much 
harder on the racers and their cars. Built with bulldozer in hand and the idea of super 
speeds in mind, the speedway’s design was, at best, unrefined. Though approximately 
well conceived for high speed competition, the track wore out production-based 
equipment at an alarming rate. Rough transitions connecting the straights and the turns 
pounded the stock suspensions on cars more accustomed to the relatively cushioned 
forgiveness of smaller dirt ovals. The differing corner radiuses of the egg-shaped oval 
race track, and the uneven sixteen degree asphalt banking, offered other new 
challenges for drivers and equipment. High temperatures generated by five hundred 
miles of “flat out” racing on the banks of the asphalt crucible melted engines, while the 
high speed turns quickly scrubbed the useful life out of tires. Only 28 cars out of a 
starting field of 75 completed the inaugural five hundred mile race. The winner, champ 
car racer Johnny Mantz, managed victory on truck tires at the car-saving pace of just 
over 75 miles an hour.423 Notwithstanding such mechanical calamities, and the financial 
burden remaining after, the inaugural race was considered a huge success.  
The inaugural Southern 500 demonstrated the ability of stock car racing to 
amuse larger audiences than normally occurred at the local dirt track events that 
comprised most of the Grand National schedule. Located off US Highway 1 near 
Florence, the Darlington raceway was able to draw fans from Columbia, South Carolina, 
the Carolina coast, Charlotte North, Carolina; and as far as Augusta, Georgia, 120 miles 
                                                 
423 Fielden, vol.1, p.33,  Champ car racing was the series that fed purpose built cars 
into the Indy 500. 
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distant. This accessible location and diligent promotion brought an estimated 30,000 
fans to the first race.424  
Despite such apparent success, developing immediate popularity among fans 
and the motor sport press proved expensive. In addition to being more popular than 
planned, Darlington was also more costly than anticipated. An expense of over two 
hundred thousand dollars in building the racetrack so overextended Brasington’s 
financial resources that he was forced to sell his share of the enterprise to his partner. 
Despite the expense, the track at Darlington fulfilled the premise of “build it and they will 
come.” 
Such was the potential of Darlington that after the first year the track was 
expanded to 1 3/8 miles with revised steeper banking to promote higher speeds and 
fewer tire blowouts. The grandstands were also expanded to accommodate 40,000 
seated patrons. Despite such improvements, the facility was hardly capable of 
containing eager fans. Spectacle on the scale of the Southern 500 at Darlington brought 
so many fans from across the South, that in 1955, the crush of an estimated 50,000 
spectators flattened fences and prompted the collapse of a pedestrian footbridge leading 
to the infield. Undeterred, he following year an estimated 70,000 fans showed up for the 
“500 miler”425 
Despite its success, Darlington was an outlier in the development of speedways 
for NASCAR Grand National competition. It was nine years before a second big track 
appeared on the NASCAR circuit, at Daytona. While the scale of Darlington could not 
easily be mimicked, many existing tracks adopted paved surfaces. During the fifteen 
years after the inaugural Southern 500, the high speeds of asphalt racing eclipsed the 
traditional dirt tracks throughout the sport of stock car racing. By 1965, clean, modern 
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asphalt tracks, either built from scratch or over existing dirt ovals, began to represent a 
substantial part of the schedule. (See Table 5) The apparent chaos and billowing filth of 
a dirt track was out of place in the era of the automotive tail fin. During the 1950s, fans 
committed to cold war notions of the progress and prowess American technology were 
clearly drawn to fantastic performances on a grand scale. The cleanliness and order of 
paved tracks suggested control over the natural world. Asphalt drained and dried in 
ways that dirt tracks could not. It did not turn to mud or dust, and did not become pock-
marked with holes, or grooved with ruts during racing. Paved tracks were predictable, 
stable, more sanitary, and modern. 



























































































Data Extracted From: Greg Fielden, Forty Years of Stock Car Racing , (Surfside, SC: Galfield Press, 1992), Vol. 1-4.
 
 
 For an aspiring young stock car racer named Bobby Allison, racing on a paved 
tracks was important for his career. While recalling a conversation with two other racers 
about leaving Florida in search of the prestige of paved tracks he comments that,  
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I wanted to run pavement too.  I thought that pavement was the steppingstone to 
the big speedways… So they said that ‘We’ve been up through Georgia for two 
weeks.  We’re going back.  We heard there’s good paved tracks in Alabama.’ I 
said, ‘I got this $95.  I’ll go with you.’ They said, ‘Fine, let’s go.  We’ll leave in the 
morning and drive up through Central Florida and go into Alabama and we’ll find 
the race tracks.’  Had no idea where to even start looking but we knew that 
Alabama was right next to Georgia.426 
 
 It seems likely that two additional factors informed the timing of pavement on 
tracks used by NASCAR. First, most racetrack owners forestalled paving their tracks 
until they were certain that NASCAR was an established fact. It seems no coincidence 
then, that few tracks besides Darlington were paved until the middle of the 1950s. 
Second, after the 1957 AMA ban on racing, stock car events became heavily 
concentrated in the Southern Piedmont. This suggests that tracks could count on 
enough stock car races to justify the expense of pavement.  Though it did provide a 
more stable surface for competition, and thus assured more predictable race 
presentation, asphalt ovals no doubt also represented a significant expense for smaller 
track owners.  
With the growth experienced by stock car racing during its first decade, venue 
grew in importance. As stock car racing prospered throughout the 1950s, NASCAR 
president Bill France began to express the need for a race track in keeping with 
NASCAR’s growing stature. In 1950, the beach race in Daytona, an event sanctioned 
and promoted by NASCAR and Bill France, attracted 9,500 fans. Later that year, the first 
                                                 
426 Bobby Allison interview, “Speed and Spirit: NASCAR in America,” Spring, 2001, 
Smithsonian Institution Transportation Collection, Washington, DC. 
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race on the pavement at Darlington attracted a crowd more than three times that size.427 
For Bill France, not being able to gather fees from all the fans was bad business. Legend 
has it that so many of the attending fans attending the race on the sands of Daytona 
Beach did not pay admission, that the following year France had “Beware of Snakes” 
signs planted among the dunes to encourage turnstile usage.428 Having your premier 
race set on Daytona Beach, the so-called “birthplace of speed,” upstaged by an event in 
the backwoods of South Carolina was bad publicity. Clearly, the sport was capable of 
attracting large crowds, and NASCAR was missing out on the profits and notoriety 
possible with a larger, modern venue.  As early as 1954, France announced his ambition 
to build a new Daytona Speedway to host sanctioned races and speed trials the 
following year. A series of delays related to gathering the consent of the citizens of 
Daytona, developing a design for the track, and gathering a large enough pile of money 
necessary to fund such a venture moved the opening of the Daytona International 
Speedway from the middle to then end of the decade.429 
In December 1957, clearing began on a 446-acre site off US 92 just west of 
Daytona. At the ground-breaking ceremony the following February, construction began 
in earnest as the first of over 800,000 cubic yards of earth was moved. The banked 2.5 
mile track was designed by Daytona city engineer C.H. Moneypenny, who drew upon 
research conducted by Ford and GM while designing their high speed test tracks in 
Michigan and Arizona. The theme of top speed dominated the thinking about the new 
track. Design information provided by manufacturers helped Moneypenny reproduce the 
crucial spiral transitions connecting the curves to the straightaways used on industry test 
tracks. He commented, “the problem of matching the entrances [between straightaway 
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and turns] and the turns so that a car can speed around the track continuously at top 
speed might appear simple. It wasn’t. Developing the basic formulas occupied the best 
brains of the auto industry for decades.”430 Though Moneypenny’s assessment of how 
much effort Detroit devoted to test track development may be hyperbole, it remains clear 
that the 31 degree banks of the Daytona Speedway were intended to support 
production-based racing at hitherto unimagined velocities.  
That such incredible speeds were possible using track designs intended for test 
tracks served the promotional emphasis of stock car racing very well. Because of the 
high banking and careful attention to the transitions between straight and curve, Daytona 
and later speedways permitted stock cars to achieve speeds on par with the purpose 
built racecars racing in Indianapolis. (See Table 6) Even with the first races on a 
superspeedway, the velocity of racing action compared favorably with the premier motor 
sport event in the United States. The winner of the first Daytona 500 in February of 1959 
averaged 135.52 miles an hour, while the winner of the Indianapolis 500 later that year 
bettered that speed only by a narrow margin averaging 135.85 miles an hour.431 As stock 
car racing expanded its audience, the promotional aspect of racing production cars 
blossomed. Simple comparison between the top speed of the stockers and the top 
speed of the vaunted Indy speedsters suggested that American production cars, like the 
men who raced them, were quite exceptional. For the purposes of NASCAR and 
participating automobile manufacturers, such comparisons rendered valuable publicity.  
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 225











































































Indianapolis 500 Southern 500 Daytona 500 Talladega 500




Clearly, a good part of the speeds possible with production-based cars depended 
on the special speedways on which they raced. After the only race on the Daytona 
International Speedway using purpose-built Indianapolis-style racecars, the speeds they 
achieved prohibited their return. Their premier on the high banks of Daytona had 
resulted in several serious wrecks and one fatality.432 The Indy cars topped 176 miles an 
hour on the high-banked facility, a speed far in excess of the capacity their tires. Despite 
this clear demonstration that much of the stocker’s speed was due to the radical track, 
the temptation to compare the Daytona 500 with the Indianapolis 500, the biggest race 
of them all, remained overwhelming for NASCAR enthusiasts.  
In addition to promoting very high speeds, the design of the Daytona 
International Speedway also incorporated a twist that lent increased profitability. Though 
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some tracks like the circular speedway at Langhorn Pennsylvania and the roughly 
rectangular Indianapolis Motor Speedway defied convention, most tracks throughout the 
United States were built as ovals.433 This popular configuration had parallel 
straightaways as the flat, straight stretches of raceway connecting two, sometimes 
banked, semi-circular turns to form an oval.  The start/finish lines and the “pits” (where 
cars received tires and fuel) were typically located on the inside of the front straightaway. 
Opposite pit road on the outside of the oval, the area where cars were refueled and 
given new tires during a race, the main grandstands were typically arranged parallel to 
the main straightaway. Because of the action of pit road, and the obvious significance of 
the start/finish line, the main grandstands were considered prime seating. In order to 
maximize this top-dollar seating, Moneypenny designed the Daytona track with a slightly 
curved, and thus longer, front straightaway. To promote continuous high speed racing, 
the front straightaway of this novel “tri-oval” shape incorporated a long arc and 18 
degree banking. That the “tri-oval” design maintained the possibility of high speeds while 
offering increased seating was crucial during an era when racing profits were based 
more on attendance than on revenues from television broadcasts. The new venue, 
touted as “the world’s first completely scientific track” but clearly conceived as a financial 
resource of tremendous potential, would bring more speed, more credibility and more 
fans to stock car racing than ever before.  
Following the creation of the “superspeedway” in Daytona, other tracks greater 
than a mile in length with high speed banking began to spring up throughout the South. 
Indeed, even before another venue could be constructed, the “superspeedway” moniker 
was retroactively applied to the Darlington International Motor Speedway.  In an effort to 
capture some of the growing prestige and economic benefit of NASCAR, new, big, tri-
                                                 
433 Langhorn was a virtually circular, flat, dirt one-mile track. The Indianapolis Motor 
Speedway was also not a true oval. It was more rectangular with four turns 
connected by two long, and two quite short “straightaways.” 
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oval tracks were begun outside both Atlanta and Charlotte in 1959. For much of the next 
decade, these four tracks would define the pinnacle of success for NASCAR racing. 
They would also help establish the NASCAR Grand National series as a legitimate form 
of racing. 
With large, mile-plus long paved tracks in Darlington, Daytona, Charlotte and 
Atlanta, each hosting two major events a year, NASCAR stock car racing aspired to new 
levels of respectability. Not until the close of the sixties, with the debut of Michigan 
International Speedway and the Alabama International Motor Speedway in Talladega in 
1969, would there by any new venues approaching the scale of these four big 
superspeedways. During the first nine years of the 1960s these tracks helped establish 
stock car racing during the crucial decade of automotive enthusiasm. After all, the 1960s 
saw the emergence of the American “Muscle Car,” international dominance of motor 
sport by Ford with the “Total Performance” campaign, and the emergence of the 
Superspeedway. Upon the completion of the Atlanta International Raceway, reporter Jim 
Minter wrote, “Automobile racing, of course, is nothing new to our section. It’s been an 
established sport for spectators and participants for a long time, but the layout at Atlanta 
International Raceway has given it a kind of class and bigness that it has never enjoyed 
before.”434 The glowing rhetoric describing the new Charlotte Motor Speedway echoed 
promises made for Atlanta’s new track. In a letter to fans printed in the inaugural race 
program, popular driver and president of the new speedway Curtis Turner wrote, “each 
of the races we plan at Charlotte Motor Speedway will be a “major league” race, the kind 
you like to see and the kind I like to drive.”435 By offering speed and scale equivalent to 
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races with purpose built racecars, the concept of superspeedway defined an effort to 
build respectability and credibility for the emerging South.  
But the dominating significance of these four large venues during the decade of 
the 1960s did more than add respectability through imposing scale. Events made 
popular at Daytona, Darlington, Atlanta, and Charlotte helped propel NASCAR into the 
general conscience of motoring enthusiasts across the nation and develop a sold core of 
devoted fans throughout the region. Atlanta Journal sports writer Furman Bisher 
understood the significance of the new tracks for Atlanta and for NASCAR. For the 
Sunday sports page on the day of the inaugural race in Atlanta, he wrote, “The impact of 
Atlanta International Raceway on automobile racing in the South is of some significance. 
It is the fourth spoke in a wheel of new tracks that offers racecar drivers and owners of 
the stock car class, which is NASCAR, a grand opportunity for a circuit of activity almost 
complete within itself.”436 Bisher understood the importance of developing an annual 
season of events, the sort of things traditions and statistics could be built on. In a world 
of stick and ball sports, where schedules and statistics were a hobby unto themselves, 
the temporal and intellectual edifice possible with a regular circuit of activity was crucial 
to legitimacy. He continued stating that, “Darlington Speedway, created out of cotton and 
peanut fields in South Carolina, has been in action for several years. Daytona Beach 
International Speedway, built by Bill France and friendly money-lenders, enjoys the 
prosperity of its second year. A new one and one-half mile speedway opened north of 
Charlotte, N.C., last month. Each offers two major racing events a year, plus lesser 
activity designed to increase the pocket change of driver, owner, and the track 
investors.”437  
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Despite such prescience and enthusiasm, Bisher and his colleagues paid little 
further attention to the track or NASCAR. Indeed, though important to NASCAR stock 
car racing, judging from the attention granted the new racetrack in the paper and the 
difficulties surrounding its creation, it is clear that Atlanta International Raceway was not 
very important to Atlantans. Though the initial race at the Atlanta International Raceway 
(AIR) on July 31, 1960 received several columns worth of attention in the sports sections 
of both the Atlanta Journal and the Atlanta Constitution, the following event held in mid-
October, got less ink than sport fishing.438 In following years, event coverage for AIR was 
limited to short articles published just before and just after each event.   
That most Atlantans with money were indifferent the construction of Atlanta’s 
Speedway can be divined by the indifference of investors during its construction. Though 
undercapitalization of bigger, private building projects was not uncommon in the cold war 
South, it is difficult to explain how the largest, wealthiest city in the region could not 
gather enough funds to outdo Daytona or Darlington. Such indifference may be due to 
the presence of two established, albeit much smaller tracks in Atlanta. Since 1949, the 
quarter-mile “Peach Bowl” and since the 1920s, the half mile dirt oval at the Lakewood 
fairgrounds had been providing racing entertainment.439 But these ventures were of a 
much smaller order of magnitude than the big track planned south of town and would 
offer little competition to a track the size of the new venue planned in Hampton, just 
south of town. 
Most likely, the unconventional nature of the racing promotion business and a 
deep-seated belief that respectable people didn’t racecars kept racing entrepreneurs 
separated from much of the local capital. Sports page editorials, event coverage, and the 
civic adoption of professional baseball and football teams before mid-decade make it 
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clear that Atlantans were more interested in the sort of traditional sports franchises 
active in larger metropolitan centers up east and out west. The aspirations of Atlanta’s 
sports fans and sport-minded investors seemed fixed on comparisons with other 
established urban centers outside the South. Despite obstacles such as a lack of 
enthusiasm at the city’s core and a dearth of capital, and numerous struggles for control 
over the emergent track, the lucrative vision of bringing big-time stock car racing to 
Atlanta prevailed.  
Impressive size, banked turns and the epithet superspeedway were not the only 
things the tracks at Daytona, Charlotte and Atlanta held in common. Difficulties funding 
construction, and battles for eventual control of the tracks were common to such 
ventures. Though NASCAR president Bill France was never faced with serious 
challenges to control over the Daytona International Speedway, finding enough cash to 
build the huge track was a problem that delayed construction. After three long years of 
trying to raise the funds from private sources, the Daytona International Speedway 
required a local bond referendum.440 Even such public assistance did not end cash flow 
problems for the new track. At the opening race, the tracks chose Pepsi products to 
stock concession stands over those of Coca-Cola because Pepsi was willing to extend 
credit to the new track. The Charlotte Motor Speedway was a struggle both to fund and 
control. Problems with huge rock outcroppings and poor construction estimates 
absorbed most of the fortune of millionaire lumberman and racer Curtis Turner. Low on 
resources, he turned to the Teamsters Union for capital in exchange for a promise to 
organize NASCAR drivers into a union. After failing to organize NASCAR drivers, Turner 
lost the capital guaranteed by the Teamsters, and eventually control of his track.441  
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The struggles over capital and control were just as fierce in the case of the 
Atlanta International Raceway. Announced in 1958 the track in Atlanta initially attracted 
capital from local businessmen and professionals. T. Walker Jackson, Lloyd Smith, 
Garland Bagley, Ralph Sceiano and Ike Supporter chipped in to begin selling stock to 
investors and building the speedway.442  When funds began to run low long before the 
conclusion of construction, a new round of investors jumped in. These new investors, Dr. 
William Gremmel, Bill Boyd, and Jack Black, would assume effective control over the 
speedway under the presidency of Art Lester. Lester had arranged his stake and 
presidency such that the day he was fired or quit, the $526,000 mortgage of the track 
would come due.443 Such leverage allowed Bagley, Lester, and the other later investors 
to maintain control over the Atlanta International Raceway Corporation through two 
proxy fights that accompanied completion of the track. Despite the timely influx of capital 
during the summer of 1960, then acting president, Lester faced a dire situation only 
months before the inaugural race. With the track incomplete, management posed 
promotional pictures on a paved section of track in front of completed grandstands to 
pre-sell enough tickets to the opening event to pay for the remainder of the paving.444 
Finally, successful businessman Nelson Weaver arrived from Birmingham, 
Alabama to settle the costly and disruptive struggles for control of the track. During the 
September following the first race, Weaver bought heavily into the AIR Corporation and 
soon became chairman of the board. Shortly after the second race in October 1960, 
Weaver paid off the mortgage and relieved Lester of his duties as president. Though a 
lack of records describing the relative merits of each faction prohibits meaningful 
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comparison, the apparent persistent lack of capital hints that building a superspeedway 
was more difficult than the original investors might have thought.  
Beyond the difficulties in remaining solvent and viable as a business venture, 
paving the high-banked superspeedways in Daytona, Atlanta and Charlotte offered its 
own set of technical challenges. In order to avoid a rough surface like that of the track at 
Darlington, numerous technical solutions had to be contrived. To operate at slow speeds 
on the steep banking, the heavy grading or paving equipment was held against the 
banking by cables attached to bulldozers circling the upper rim of the track.445 Asphalt 
and gravel were loaded into spreading equipment using cranes operating from the upper 
rim of the track because dump trucks could not load spreaders as they worked the 
banked portions of the track. These solutions, like the modification of production 
technology to build specialized racecars, reflect an ethic of adapting available equipment 
to original problems common to motor sport. In the case of building tracks, if there were 
profits to be made, determined businessmen found contractors that could employ 
homespun solutions to build. 
With the completion of the Atlanta International Raceway in July of 1960, the 
trajectory of the sport was set for the decade of the 1960s. Superspeedway events took 
on increasing significance as the sport matured into a national phenomenon. Punctuated 
by races held on holidays like Labor Day (“Southern 500”), Memorial Day (“World 600”), 
and Independence Day (“Firecracker 400”), and Easter (“Atlanta 500”), these four tracks 
enjoyed eight yearly events that served as foundation for the NASCAR season. In 
addition to borrowing significance from holidays, scheduling races during long holiday 
weekends offered a better opportunity for fans to break away from work to see a big 
race. That superspeedways were most often built close to interstate artieries suggests 
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that weekend access from across the region was a consideration when scheduling major 
events just as it was in planning major venues. Automobiles served as both performer 
and facilitator of stock car racing. As southern highway construction and use expanded 
during the decades following the Second World War, so too did the fortunes of track 
owners and NASCAR. Extensive development of the US highways and the Federal 
interstate system during the 1950’s helped end rural isolation and bring fans to NASCAR 
events. 
Over the next ten years, the four “Superspeedways” at Darlington, Daytona, 
Charlotte and Atlanta would host the largest events, attract the largest crowds, and 
entice the largest sponsors into stock car racing. The scale of competition first realized in 
asphalt and concrete at Darlington would, in combination with the momentum lent by the 
three large tracks completed in 1959 and 1960, come to dominate the sport. As a 
consequence of the attention brought by the huge tracks, huge crowds, and large race 
purses, NASCAR grew dramatically during the 1960s.  
As mobility increased, more, larger venues could expect full grandstands each 
week.  In light of these developments, it was no surprise that tracks were located, 
especially after the creation of the Interstate Highway system, to receive maximum 
benefit from federally subsidized roads. As Wolfe describes in The Last American Hero, 
“Miles and miles of eye-busting pastel cars on the expressway, which roar right up into 
the hills, going to the stock car races, and baseball—and the state of North Carolina 
alone used to have forty-four professional baseball teams—baseball is over with in the 
South. We were all in the middle of a wild new thing, the Southern car world, and 
heading down the road to see a breed such as sports never saw before.”446 National 
enthusiasm for the automobile helped build the interstates and highways that brought 
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southerners to races. Throughout the South, fans expressed the intensity of their 
enthusiasm by driving across the Southland to watch stock cars circle a track. 
After the tracks at Daytona, Charlotte and Atlanta began business, it was eight 
years before another Superspeedway opened. During 1969, a two-mile oval sixty miles 
west of Detroit called Michigan International Speedway and a 2.66-mile track forty miles 
east of Birmingham Alabama called Talladega hosted their First NASCAR Grand 
National events. Also in 1969, in an apparent move to capture some of the prestige 
associated with the speeds possible at superspeedways, the one-mile North Carolina 
Motor Speedway at Rockingham was rebuilt with 24 degree banking in the corners. The 
other new superspeedways were built with high banks and high speeds in mind from the 
beginning. The track in Michigan was built in rather conventional manner with long, flat 
straightaways and concave banking in the turns. The track at Talladega was designed to 
promote the fastest possible racing. At 2.66 miles in length, with 33 degree banking in 
the turns, Talladega instantly became the biggest, fastest superspeedway anywhere.  In 
time, the demands this track placed upon cars, especially tires, would represent prompt 
the end of the superspeedway era and the rise off restrictor plate racing. 
Apart from advantages rendered by bringing prestige to the south, moving from 
dirt to asphalt, and then from asphalt “bullrings” to big speedways made economic 
sense. While certainly cheaper to build, the common half-mile dirt track typically could 
not accommodate nearly as many fans as a superspeedway.  NASCAR and the 
promoters funding stock car events no doubt realized that the costs involved in staging 
one superspeedway event for 100,000 fans was more cost effective than staging ten 
events for 10,000 fans. A chart of average attendance per event (See Table 7) shows 
the gradual, continuous increase in average attendance possible with the introduction of 
larger venues. Though the dramatic increase in average attendance experienced during 
the mid-1960s can be partly attributed to increased publicity, the later spike during the 
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1970s is attributable to the presence of the superspeedway. In 1972, when the minimum 
length of races was set at 250 miles, smaller tracks on the series could no longer attract 
the top tier of stock car racing. Events on the Grand National level, which by then were 
known as the Winston Cup, were staged primarily at larger venues. Despite fewer races 
after 1972, these larger venues meant increased profits for track owners, promoters and 
NASCAR. For prestige and profit, bigger venues were the way to go.  



















































































The dramatic increase in average attendance for 1962, and subsequent dramatic decrease in average attendace for 
1963 is due to differing levels of reportage. In 1962, there exists data for 31of 53 events while in 1963, there are 
attendance figures for 48 of 55 events. Many of the events not reported were smaller races.
Data Extracted From: Greg Fielden, Forty Years of Stock Car Racing , (Surfside, SC: Galfield Press, 1992), Vol.1-4
 
 
Because racers were starting fewer races does not mean that they were racing 
fewer miles. As the number of racers and fans grew, promoters and track owners sought 
to enhance the prestige of their races and the number of paying customers by expanding 
the distance of the premier events they hosted each year. Superspeedways brought a 
trend toward fewer events, but these were invested with more gravity and importance. 
The total advertised racing mileage in 1950 Grand National races was 2,750 miles. By 
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1960, the sum of race mileage was over 7,585 miles. By 1968, on-track race miles 
covered by the Grand National circuit totaled over 11,000 miles. (See Table 8) During 
these same years, the average length of races jumped from just over 144 miles in 1950 
to 225 in 1968.447  





















































































Data Extracted From: Greg Fielden, Forty Years of Stock Car Racing , (Surfside, SC: Galfield Press, 1992), Vol. 1-4.
 
 
While providing more lengthy entertainment for fans, longer races also placed 
more demands upon racers and vehicles. Race machinery and conduct assumed a 
more radically competitive form, with pit stops and car preparation assuming as much 
importance as a race time action on the track. As NASCAR Champion Junior Johnson 
explains it, “You have to set the car up to make it do what it’s supposed to do on asphalt. 
On dirt, you could make it do what you wanted it to do.”448 The transition to high speeds 
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and asphalt made the strength and exact configuration of racecar technology more 
important.  
In addition to transforming the fans expectations of what constituted a proper 
venue, the superspeedway transformed the idea of what a race vehicle was supposed to 
be. Before the transition to paved tracks like Darlington, the vehicles in competition 
resembled, to a large degree, stock production models.449 In the beginning of NASCAR 
racing, the dirt tracks that for years had hosted contests between drivers in stripped 
down “Modifieds” and “Sportsman” cars offered a familiar environment for the new stock 
racers. Generally shorter in length, and banked less than later asphalt tracks, dirt tracks 
favored a “slideways” racing style wherein the rear end of the car was prompted to sling 
toward the outside of the track as the driver used the throttle to power the car through a 
turn. As Junior Johnson describes it, “I could sit and tease the back end of a car within 
an inch of running it wide open on dirt because I knew just how far they could go before 
they come all the way around. You had to keep with the front wheels because you got 
them cut to the right, it’s absolute feel of the seat of your pants to tell where that 
backend’s at all the time.”450 Though it made for dramatic racing, the traction limitations 
of dirt made slower overall contests. As a result, the formative years of NASCAR Grand 
National racing saw the successful utilization of generations of unsophisticated 
equipment built with blowtorches and bailing wire. Dog collars held doors shut, masking 
tape protected headlights, and rollbars were occasionally built of wood. While such 
homespun race preparation was suitable for the relatively slow dirt track production-
based racing typical throughout the thirties and forties, asphalt required vehicles capable 
of withstanding more severe use. The rigors of racing on asphalt ultimately shaped a 
robust racing chassis standardized across model and make. 
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Most of the initial changes increased the safety of the race vehicles. Throughout 
the fifties, though the motors remained production derivations, the stock car chassis 
began to reflect the elevated and frequently dangerous speed of operation in its paved 
environment. NASCAR permitted, later encouraged and finally mandated the use of 
redesigned rear axle hubs that would not allow wheels to detach if an axle broke under 
the strain of competition.451 Each fatal or particularly disastrous wreck prompted the 
addition of roll bars to the mandatory roll cage described in the rule books. Accident 
prevention, in the case of the rear axle, and mishap survival, in the case of the 
continually developing roll cage, helped create what was in effect, a completely new 
chassis suitable only for racing.  
The increasingly sophisticated nature of safe, competitive equipment prompted 
an increase in entrepreneurs and businesses engaged in racecar construction, 
component manufacture and racecar preparation. Teams that could afford to build cars 
suited to specific types of tracks were at an advantage. Indeed, the superspeedway 
efforts of Ford became so specialized that at various times during the mid-1960s their 
premier teams did not compete at the smaller races on short tracks. After the 
introduction of the restrictor plates at the close of the decade, the teams that could fund 
an engine development program specifically for the superspeedway were at a 
tremendous disadvantage. Ultimately the specialized equipment required for success on 
the superspeedways encouraged the trend toward larger racing teams, and larger 
sponsors. In time, the development of these specialized echelons of support made the 
part time racer or sponsorless privateer an exception rather than the norm. 
The transition from dirt to asphalt also changed the sort of engines that 
dominated races. For vehicles of stock weight using stock tires on dirt, only so much 
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horsepower is of use before traction is lost. When racing on short, dirt tracks, torque as a 
constituent of overall horsepower is most important for winning races. Cars with lots of 
torque, cars such as the Hudson Hornet, dominated the early days of NASCAR dirt track 
racing because they had the sort of power necessary to quickly move themselves out of 
turns. The long engine stroke and substantial rotating mass required to produce torque 
was a competitive disadvantage on the larger asphalt tracks where high speeds 
constitute a considerable portion of the overall race distance. Because of this, on asphalt 
there was also a clear advantage to having lots of high RPM power rather than lots of 
low RPM torque. The increase of smooth, paved tracks and the superior traction they 
afforded, meant that horsepower translated into speed rather than wheel spin. The 
transition to asphalt favored the more powerful, higher revving V8’s introduced by the big 
three during the 1950s. Thus teams which could afford more horsepower either through 
buying more powerful cars to begin with or spending time reworking stock components 
to build more horsepower were at an advantage. As racing became a profession, and 
race mechanics a necessity, a group of technical specialists developed around the 
necessity of modifying stock components for various race conditions. As argued 
previously, the convergence of American engine design, with each automaker producing 
a V8, meant that communities of users developed skills necessary to wring horsepower 
from production components. 
The possibility of racing in a production-based series, on a track that permitted 
incredible speeds, was a temptation that proved irresistible to the race minded engineers 
and executives in the auto manufacturers. Despite the din of protests from safety 
conscious insurance companies and a 1957 Automobile Manufacturers Association 
(AMA) ban on direct factory involvement  racing, Detroit continued to develop optional 
high performance components to compete on NASCAR tracks, even publishing 
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performance guides cataloging available equipment and relating detailed technical 
advice.452  
With the opening of Daytona International Speedway in 1959, the covert 
development of full race performance parts quickened. Famous NASCAR mechanic 
Smokey Yunick described the lengths that Pontiac went to help him win big races. In 
reference to the money spent developing new “optional equipment” to keep Pontiac 
racecars in front of the competition, he writes  
by the start of the 1960 season we are changing part numbers every 10 
minutes… we did ‘bout anything we wanted to, but had to have a part number in 
the book. In ’60 Russ Gee, a young Pontiac engineer … is hand-carrying cylinder 
heads and headers and parts on airlines to me in Daytona. Through his efforts 
we got aluminum brake parts, aluminum rear axle parts and we are playing two 
four barrels [carburetors] and three two barrels. I don’t want to see the aluminum 
body parts or aluminum brake and suspension parts, or the aluminum drive train 
pieces, but she’s out of control now.453  
Despite the AMA ban on racing, it is clear that Pontiac, and probably Chevrolet and 
Chrysler, were spending massive amounts of money putting optional parts in limited 
production. Though Bill France wanted to build a huge speedway in Daytona even 
before the withdrawal of factory support from racing, perhaps the greatest consequence 
of the superspeedways was that they proved irresistible to automakers. In an era 
marked by fascination with speed, demonstrating performance in a race between “stock” 
cars, even after entering into an agreement not to race, was too valuable a promotional 
exercise for automakers to resist. 
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The expenditure of effort to win at the superspeedways suggests that the bigger 
the track, the greater the public relations impact. The lure was great enough to help 
prompt the collapse of the voluntary AMA ban on racing. In June of 1962, Ford Motor 
Company announced that it no longer felt obliged to adhere to the AMA ban on racing. 
Because so many automakers had been campaigning virtual factory teams “out the back 
door” of engineering departments, through dealerships, and through seasoned NASCAR 
mechanics, Ford officially announced a “Total Performance” race program intended to 
dominate most forms of motor sport.454 Once Ford broke rank, Chrysler too went public 
with its racing efforts. Even though General Motors did not officially reject the ban, for all 
practical purposes it was defunct. The breakup of the AMA ban, and the subsequent 
battles between automakers, brought new attention to the superspeedways.  
After finishing off the 1962 season with lackluster performance, Ford spent the 
winter preparing for a showdown at the highly publicized Daytona 500 at the end of 
February. During the same month, albeit with less fanfare, Chevrolet racers at Daytona 
introduced a new 427 cubic inch engine developed  specifically for racing.455 This so-
called “mystery motor,” which never saw actual production, featured high performance 
valve configuration and intake design not well suited to volume production or use in a 
street vehicle.456 Despite the high horsepower possible with the experimental Chevrolet 
engine, Ford won the top five places and a huge public relations victory at the Daytona 
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500 in 1963. Following the speedway event, apparently fearing bad publicity from 
violation of the ban on racing, Chevrolet again withdrew from direct support of stock car 
racing for nearly two decades. Despite Chevrolet’s withdrawal, the battle over 
dominance continued. This time the war was between Chrysler and Ford. 
The so-called “engine wars” engaged between auto manufacturers during the 
1960s were played out on the banks of the superspeedways. Beginning with the 
introduction of the Chrysler 300 in 1955, the displacement and horsepower of 
manufacturer’s engines ballooned throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s. Typically 
high performance packages would be offered as options rather than standard. NASCAR 
required that only five hundred of a given option package be made available in order to 
deem a high performance item a stock production component.457 Initially, most 
performance options were similar to those sold on super duty or police vehicles. 
Factories could cheaply support racing by listing production speed parts without 
developing a completely new production model.458 In this way factories could develop 
and sell, stronger suspension components, multiple carburetors, heavy duty engine 
blocks, forged crankshafts, high load engine bearings, increased capacity cooling 
systems and high volume oil pumps without officially going racing. 
In 1964 Chrysler responded with its 426 “Hemi” engine. Featuring a centrally 
located spark plug in a high efficiency hemispherical combustion chamber, the “hemi” 
was a race engine built into a street engine.459 After Chrysler trounced the competition in 
                                                 
457 John Craft, The Anatomy and Development of the Stock Car, (Osceola, WI: MBI, 
1993), p.9 
458 Kim Chapin, Fast As White Lighting: The Story of Stock Car Racing,(New York: 
Three Rivers Press, 1998) p.103-106 
459 The flow efficiency of this design was excellent, but thermal efficiency was not 
high because of the large amount of surface area in the combustion chamber. 
Though first used by Peugeot in 1903, Chrysler introduced their first “Hemi” V8 in 
1953. In this design, deep hemispherical combustion chambers were cast into the 
cylinder head. The centrally located spark plug possible with this design promoted 
uniform and complete combustion as the flame front travels outward concentrically 
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1964, NASCAR decided to try and level the playing field. In response to rule changes 
clearly intended to end the dominance of one factory, Chrysler boycotted NASCAR 
racing in 1965. NASCAR lured Chrysler back into competition by limiting Ford’s 
advantage the following year. In response, Ford stayed out during 1966. Throughout the 
1960’s, Ford and Chrysler would battle it out as each lobbied with NASCAR to sanction 
the use of some “production” engine with exotic multiple carburetor configurations, roller 
camshafts, overhead cams, or some other high performance mechanical complexity. By 
1968 NASCAR had a handle on these so called “engine wars” by mandating the use of 
only one four barrel carburetor regardless of what was available as an option, and 
limiting the overall displacement to 427 cubic inches.460  
The engine wars had been about beating the competition at the big tracks in full 
view of large numbers of fans. By the mid-1960s, the marketing potential of NASCAR 
had been fully realized by the big three automakers. Ward’s Automotive Reports stated 
that Ford’s “28.3 percent market slice in the South Atlantic states in 1966, in the heart of 
the racing circuit, was its highest of any region in the United States.”461 Clearly money 
spent on racing could be justified in increased sales. But for NASCAR the tremendous 
performance gains generated by factory involvement were a mixed blessing. Realizing 
that close competition rather than dominance by a single manufacturer sold race tickets, 
NASCAR acted yearly to quench the creative fires of corporate engine designers. 
Assertion of control over spiraling annual enhancement of engine horsepower left the 
factories with two options: they could compete against each other on a level playing 
                                                                                                                                           
through each charge of fuel/air mixture. The hemispherical shape allowed larger 
valves because they could be set at an angle inside the head.  
460 NASCAR, 1967 Stock Car Competition Rule Book, (Daytona Beach: NASCAR, 
1967) p.56 
461 AR-86-71-482, Ford Motor Company Motorsports Collection, Papers 1960-1971, 
Ford Archives, Dearborn Michigan. 
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field, or search outside the engine compartment for some place to find a competitive 
advantage.   
As early as 1966, Ford had begun informally experimenting with aerodynamic 
body designs. Junior Johnson, who raced Fords before and during the factory boycott of 
1966, built a heavily modified Galaxie to compete in the spring race at the Atlanta 
International Raceway.462 Using advice from Ford’s engineering department and auto 
body work techniques not unlike those practiced by hot rodders, Johnson lowered the 
grille and the front edge of the hood and raised the back edge of the truck to produce an 
aerodynamically superior car. Lowering the hood decreased the frontal area and helped 
coax air over the top of the car. Sloping the back half of the car upward raised the back 
edge of the trunk lid into a crude, traction enhancing airfoil. Though this car was banned 
before its second race, the lessons of this exercise were not lost on the competition 
department in Dearborn.  
Picking up where Junior had left off, by 1969 famed stock car racer Ralph Moody 
had modified a stock Ford Torino body into an aerodynamically sophisticated fastback. 
Moody’s car reflected techniques pioneered by hot rodders and was essentially a 
chopped and sectioned street car with a tapered nose. Ford was so confident in Moody, 
and so willing to invest in racing, that they shipped him and his car to Dearborn to refine 
and help design a production model closely following this prototype.463  Called the 
“Torino Talladega” after the new NASCAR-owned superspeedway then under 
construction, the aerodynamic shape and well developed engine of the Ford’s limited 
production racer would dominate the big races at the big venues for two years. The 
success of the “Talladega” and its like-bodied stable mate the “Mercury Cyclone Spoiler” 
was not lost on other manufacturers.  
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Figure 13: Ford Torino “Talladega” limited production aerodynamic ‘stocker’ 
 
Image courtesy:  International Motorsports Hall Of Fame archives, Talladega, AL. 
 
 
As with the “engine wars” the aero wars consisted primarily of expensive 
development by one factory followed by more extensive (and typically more expensive) 
development by a competitor. The aerodynamic shape of the Torino Talladega was the 
first effort to build a car capable of combining race-legal engine technology and 
NASCAR’s minimum weight requirements with aerodynamic sophistication. The Dodge 
Charger “Daytona” represents the second round of the so-called “aero wars” that 
occupied the talent and resources of factory competition departments after NASCAR 
enforced a stalemate on horsepower.  When production began midway through 1969, 
over 2600 production “Daytonas” were built to satisfy NASCAR’s so-called homologation 
requirements, minimum quantity to be considered a true production car.464 The Dodge 
Daytona and the Plymouth Roadrunner were essentially the existing “B Body” production 
model Dodge Charger and Plymouth Satellite heavily modified through the application of 
a seven-foot-high spoiler and an aerodynamic nose cone. Developing the “Superbirds,” 
as the Daytona Charger and Plymouth Roadrunner came to be known, required a heavy 
expenditure of engineering and development time. Enough money was spent on 
                                                 
464 Ken Noffsinger historian for the National Chrysler “B Body” Association, phone 
interview with the author, January, 1999.  
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development and tooling to attract attention from the Society of Automotive Engineers 
(SAE). A 1970 SAE paper describes just how much effort went into developing the 
aerodynamics of Chrysler’s racecar. Two separate wind tunnel programs and a track 
testing program using recently developed on-board data acquisition techniques were 
carried out to refine the initial design. The preliminary wind tunnel testing involved 3/8 
scale models with interchangeable nose and rear window sections that facilitated 
assorted aerodynamic configurations. Extensive tests were carried out with the model in 
the Beech Aircraft Corporation wind tunnel at Wichita State. Tests on larger, more 
refined models were then conducted in the wind tunnel of aircraft manufacturer 
Lockheed in Marietta, Georgia before a full scale test version was ready for appraisal by 
test drivers.465 Period photographs reveal extensive testing at Chrysler’s Chelsea, 
Michigan proving grounds, including the use of aerodynamic test and data recording 
apparatus. The cost of engineering expertise and wind tunnel time must have been 
substantial. Such expenditure gives some idea of the value assigned to winning stock 
car races. 
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Figure 14: The Dodge Charger “Datyona”, built for competition on the 
“superspeedways,” was also known as the “Superbird.” 
 
Image courtesy:  International Motorsports Hall Of Fame archives, Talladega, AL. 
 
 
Clearly, successful participation in NASCAR big track racing was a corporate 
priority as the resources required to produce 2600 “factory racecars” no doubt exceeded 
the cost development by a wide margin. Corporate correspondence reveals that outside 
suppliers were contracted to build the spoiler wing sections to exact airfoil specifications 
while a significant amount of capital was invested in the tooling to stamp the nose cones 
from steel.466 At no small expense, a manufacturer had inverted the relationship between 
production and purpose built racecars by mass-producing a race chassis with little 
pretense about practicality or widespread market appeal.  
From the beginning, it was clear that neither Ford nor Chrysler were interested in 
recouping fixed production costs. Ford only made a few more than 750 “Torino 
                                                 
466 Greg Kiatakowski collection, correspondence dated September, 11, 1968, 
Kitakowski Chrysler employee and “superbird” enthusiast. 
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Talladegas,” hardly enough to recover tooling costs. Yet even at this limited production 
quantity, there were further tooling costs for very limited production parts suited only for 
use on the track. Artifacts found at Smokey Yunick’s “Best Damn Garage in Town” show 
the incredible lengths and expense that automakers were willing (and able) to go to in 




Figure 15: Torino “Talladega” headlight rims 
 
Image from author’s collection 
 
 
The artifacts pictured are headlight rims, artifacts that illustrate the depth and 
detail of expenditure made to win races. Of the three headlight rims pictured, the one on 
the right is a stock, chrome-plated die casting. The version in the center has been race 
                                                 
467 Found by the author while conducting an inventory of Smokey Yunick’s 
workshop, these headlight rims were part of a massive performance parts inventory 
received by Smokey in 1969 when he went to work briefly for Ford Motor Company. 
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modified with aluminum discs riveted to the inside of the casting, filling the headlight 
holes and cast grills to prevent air from entering the front of the car at speed. This 
version was probably built as a spare. The version on the left is a special aluminum 
stamping built to look similar to stock, but weigh much less. The cost of producing the 
tooling to stamp specialized lightweight components intended only for racing versions of 
an already specialized car must have been huge.  
Practical expenditures or even practicality in use were apparently not a 
consideration for Chrysler either. Quoted in the NASCAR Newsletter issued just 
following the introduction of the Dodge Daytona, Chrysler’s director of engineering 
Robert M. Rodgers stated, “The cars we engineer for stock car racing are developed to 
perform best on oval tracks at 180 miles an hour, not on the open highways at 60 or 
70.”468 At nearly nineteen feet in length, and close to seven feet tall at the rear spoiler, 
the superbirds were difficult to maneuver anywhere but on the racetrack. The tiny grill 
opening caused regular overheating if the cars were operated anywhere but the open 
road. Failure prone aerodynamic “pop-up” headlights added to the lack of utility. Though 
terribly fast on the superspeedways, superbirds were hardly a practical expression of the 
auto maker’s craft.  
The creation and use of “aero warrior” cars from Ford and Chrysler marked the 
high tide of direct corporate involvement in NASCAR. Uninhibited expenditure accrued 
tremendous advantage for Chrysler’s racing program during the second half of 1969 and 
1970 racing season. The “superbirds” were phenomenally successful, winning a higher 
percentage of races entered than any other make of vehicle in NASCAR history.469 
Despite this success, the superbird would ultimately bring about changes which would 
spell the end of the superspeedway era.  
                                                 
468 NASCAR Newsletter, July 15 1969, p.4 
469 http://aerowarriors.com 
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These changes began with the disastrous introduction of the Dodge “Daytona” at 
the inaugural race in Talladega on September 14, 1969. At this race, the technological 
capacity of the factory built race supercars clashed with the system of relations and 
business practice that governed NASCAR events. Talladega, the track that had given 
the Ford aero racer its name, was the biggest superspeedway built for NASCAR 
competition. At 2.66 miles in length, with curves banked to 33 degrees, the Talladega 
International Speedway was thought to be capable of sustaining tremendous speeds. 
During the week before the opening race, qualifying verified the capacity of Talladega 
and demonstrated the speed potential of the Dodge Daytona. The car recorded top 
speeds in excess of 199 miles an hour. Talladega was poised to become the supreme 




Figure 16: Aerial Photo of the Alabama International Motor Speedway at Talladega  
 
Image courtesy:  International Motorsports Hall Of Fame archives, Talladega, AL. 
 
 
But the debut of the superspeedway at Talladega was not without problems. 
During the course of realizing such phenomenal speeds, participants brought many 
troubles to light. The paving had been rushed and was rough. As a consequence, tires 
tended to last just a few laps. To make matters worse, drivers complained in public 
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about the harsh condition of the track. Driver David Pearson commented, “My dash 
rattled and my gearshift lever jumped around like it wasn’t fastened down. The first turn, 
the worst as far as I’m concerned, gives you the feeling that your stomach is tearing 
loose.”470 Other drivers complained that the rough conditions prompted temporary 
blindness and extreme fatigue while driving. 
Firestone withdrew its tires from the race, but NASCAR insisted that the 
show must go on regardless of the danger. Bobby Allison recalls a discussion he 
had with Bill France regarding the dangers of racing on the new track. He 
suggested that France, “get a representative from Dodge and a representative 
from Ford and Chrysler and Ford, a representative from the independents and go 
and disable everyone’s back barrels on their carburetors and make everybody 
run a two-barrel carburetor and we can have a great race.”  To which Bill France 
replied, “If you’re scared, go home.” 
At this crucial juncture it became clear that stock car racers were brave, but not 
stupid. Afraid that the Talladega 500 would become a parade of wrecks, the drivers 
organized to confront NASCAR president, Bill France. After rejecting a suggestion by Bill 
France that the drivers simply race at slower speeds, the newly formed “Professional 
Drivers Association” decided to withdraw its members from the race. Most of the top 
drivers, stars like David Pearson, Cale Yarborough, and Richard Petty, sat out the race. 
The race did go on, albeit with a greatly reduced field of competitors drawn up from 
lower racing divisions. NASCAR had run aground on its own ambition. Seeking status as 
the fastest racing on the biggest tracks, they had allowed factory technological 
development to outstrip the capacity of their drivers, the tire supplier, and their newest 
superspeedway.  
                                                 
470 Leonard Laye, “Talladega’s Troubled Baptism,” Motor Trend, November, 1969, 
p.35. 
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Later, as if to confirm that top speeds had reached excessive levels, it was 
determined that the discomfort described by the drivers was the “pogo” effect, a 
phenomenon discovered during the course of NASA testing.471 The “pogo” effect is 
caused by a combination of G-forces with vibration at specific frequency and amplitude. 
Symptoms include chest pains, momentary blindness, and nausea. Obviously NASCAR 
could not have predicted such disastrous consequences of joining a track built a bit 
rough with the latest rocket ships from Detroit. The crudely sprung chassis of the stock 
racecars, when driven on the rough pavement of the Talladega track fatally disrupted the 
delicate balance NASCAR had negotiated since its inception two decades before.472 
Needless to say, the first Grand National race at Talladega was a tremendous 
flop. It also effectively signaled a watershed for racing on the huge tracks at Daytona 
and Talladega. Though competitive racing continued on the giant ovals, it would never 
again rest upon a combination of unlimited corporate-funded science, unfettered pursuit 
of speed and mass entertainment.  The process that rendered the Dodge Daytona and 
ultimately the debacle at Talladega symbolizes the problem faced by NASCAR. The 
superspeedway had attracted the factories, and now that they were willing to throw their 
weight around, NASCAR had lost control of the technology. The disastrous boycott 
years of 1965 and 1966 were brought about by technological developments beyond 
reasonable application for racing and damaged the credibility of stock car racing. After 
both of the big factory efforts returned to the superspeedways, they produced racing of 
limited entertainment value. Ford dominance with the Torino Talladega and later the 
dominance of the high-winged Dodge Daytona began to render rather one sided races. 
                                                 
471 Bob Wright interview with Ken Noffsinger, June 2001. Wright was one of the 
Chrysler race engineers had been involved with the Apollo program. He calculated 
the frequency resulting from the undulations in the Talladega track, and determined 
that the temporary blindness and lack of breath described by drivers was due to the 
“pogo effect.” 
472 Layne, p.36. 
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The fact was that large business institutions had far more means to develop and 
produce technology than NASCAR had at its disposal for regulation. This made for 
boring racing and disgruntled racers. The cost and expertise required to develop a 
competitive racecar had blasted into orbit, far beyond the means of any racers but those 
supported by the big three. After 1971, Ford motor company withdrew from direct 
participation in racing. 
In 1970 and 1971, NASCAR introduced a series of rule changes designed to 
wrest technological initiative from the auto makers.473 Initially they instituted use of a 
restrictor that decreased the size of the carburetor venturi from 1 1&11/16 inches to 
1&1/4 inches.474 Later, they mandated that special aerodynamic cars would only be 
allowed to compete with the “small block” engines of each manufacturer.475 The changes 
made it clear that science, speed and entertainment were appropriate so long as 
NASCAR controlled all three. Too much science and speed, it had been demonstrated at 
Talladega, threatened to ruin the entertainment value, and thus the appeal of stock car 
racing. Chrysler and Ford experimented against each other to cheat the wind and find 
victory on the huge, high-banked oval at Talladega, only to surpass existing tire 
technology and reasonable limits of safety. Their engineering hubris also threatened to 
remove diving skill from the contest. Though races were still recognized as contests 
between drivers as well as machines, the dominance of cars like the Torino Talladega 
and Chrysler’s superbirds threatened to remove the heroes from NASCAR racing. 
                                                 
473 NASCAR, 1970 Stock Car Competition Rules, (Daytona Beach, FL: NASCAR, 
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NASCAR took the first step toward establishing a stock car formula for the design 
of racing chassis, engine selection and body configuration. Rather than rely on 
production figures to determine what a stock car was, NASCAR assumed the power to 
determine what was stock. In order to maintain competition, NASCAR would have to be 
specific, selecting what cars were appropriate for competition after the fact, not relying 
on production numbers to determine what was a “stock” vehicle. Existing aerodynamic 
automobile exotica were permitted to compete, but only with a severe handicap of 305 
cubic inches maximum engine displacement.476 By assuming control over the definition 
of stock, NASCAR reestablished its ability to determine the elements necessary to 
produce close competition, and reasserted its control over the entertainment spectacle. 
Though NASCAR nearly lost control of the speed and direction of technological 
development, the era of the superspeedway did bring precious publicity to stock car 
racing. Between 1955 and 1965, other periodicals such as Motor Trend, Car Life, Hot 
Rod, and Road and Track carried occasional references to stock car racing that could 
hardly be considered comprehensive coverage. Though these magazines did keep 
NASCAR at least on the periphery of motor sport reporting, the emphasis was not like 
that given to stock car racing during its initial boom period before 1957.  
The frequency and depth of articles covering stock car racing did not increase 
until the mid-1960s when the influx of capital contributed to the sport by Ford and 
Chrysler became too massive to be ignored by responsible motor sport journalists. The 
influential 1965 article by Tom Wolfe for Esquire magazine describing Junior Johnson as 
the “Last American Hero” also drew attention to the sport. During second half of the 
1960s, the coverage of stock car racing offered by general interest automotive 
magazines, and Motor Trend in particular, grew in scope and frequency. That this 
increased coverage coincided with a decade-long influx of factory funding is no 
                                                 
476 Fielden, Vol. 3, p.320. 
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coincidence. What began with Ford Motor Company dropping out of their part of AMA’s 
mutual ban on racing in 1963 resulted in a frenzy of expenditure by the three biggest 
American automakers. In 1965, Ford spent over 2.3 million dollars on Stock car racing 
alone.477 That Chrysler and Chevrolet stock cars remained competitive with Ford’s 
“factory” race teams suggests that they made similar investments during the decade. 
“Detroit began putting so much money into the sport”, Wolfe describes, “that it took on a 
kind of massive economic respectability.” “Motorsports is the second or third largest 
spectator sport in the country and Ford is the most prominent name in the sport,” echoed 
one Ford executive. “We therefore cannot make a move,” he continued, “without creating 
news, good or bad.”478 The heavy technical and financial support provided overtly by 
Ford and Chrysler, and covertly by General Motors helped energize a southern 
renaissance for stock car racing that would forever label stock car racing a regional 
phenomenon. Whatever the causes, the net effect is that stock car racing emerged from 
rustic southern obscurity bourn by the promotional wit of NASCAR and capital from 
Detroit. 
Other, more regional publications catered specifically to the stock car fan. The 
Southern Motorsports Journal began in 1961. Published in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, it 
offered detailed coverage of NASCAR events to diehard fans, some of whom apparently 
never attended an event. One letter to the editor from Aug 12, 1971 captured the 
powerful vicarious attraction of stock car racing. As one avid fan wrote, “We really enjoy 
your newspaper. It is really our only contact with racing and you can believe it settles lots 
of arguments when we get together down at the gas station.”479  Clearly the gang at the 
filling station gathered information through some means other than attending races. The 
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newspaper format of the Southern Motorsports Journal was supplemented by Stock Car 
magazine beginning in June of 1966.480 This slick, full-color magazine was the first such 
publication devoted specifically to stock car racing. The combination of veteran motor 
sport reportage, and upscale format (even the NASCAR News was published in two 
colors as a tri-fold mailer) helped publicize the growing prestige and credibility of factory 
supported stock car racing. Magazine coverage also kept racing stars in focus, 
heightening the level of celebrity just as major sponsors began using the sport for 
product exposure.  
In addition to promoting the development of heroes among fans, attention from 
the press also fueled the increasing attendance of stock car events. During the 1960s 
heyday of factory sponsorship, the average yearly attendance of NASCAR racing events 
increased steadily each year that did not include a boycott by factory supported 
teams.481 The most dramatic increase was between 1962 and 1963 when Ford and 
Chrysler resumed overt support of racing and annual attendance increased 64 
percent.482 (See Table 1) The commercial success of emphasis on the entertainment 
needs of the fans is born out in growing prominence of race events, and growing annual 
attendance figures. 
The culmination of the superspeedway era demonstrated that human artifice can 
stretch beyond human capacities. Two tides of technical developments had resulted 
from the irresistible scale and scope of the superspeedway. First, the “engine wars” 
prompted restriction, politicking and ultimately careful regulation. Second, the “aero 
wars” pushed beyond the exercise of reason and the capacity of regulation. 
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Manufacturers brought both notoriety and technical resources to the superspeedways, 
and as a consequence stock car racing left the small-time, dirt tracks of its origins 
behind. After the dust cleared, what remained was a racecar formula wholly determined 
by the sanctioning organization, a “specification” racecar that would carry NASCAR 
competition and commerce to new heights in its second quarter century.  
By placing a premium upon promotion of its sport as an entertainment business, 
NASCAR inverted the traditional role of motor sport sanctioning institutions. Whereas 
groups like the AAA, NHRA, and USAC directed their efforts primarily toward ensuring 
fair competition according to regulations, NASCAR chose to focus on consistently 
creating big racing spectacles. A 1970 survey of personnel at 155 enthusiast magazines, 
newspapers, and radio and television stations conduced by one of the “Big Three” 
automakers to determine the scope of their continued financial support of drag racing, 
“showed that stock car racing was the most popular with auto racing fans” with drag 
racing a distant fourth behind Indy car racing and sports car racing.483 The margin by 
which motor sport enthusiasts preferred production-based racing over forms such as 
USAC open-wheel Indy 500 style competition or drag racing was considerable. The 
report indicated that “Stock car racing was named first on 102 of 165 ballots” with Indy 
car, sports car, and drag racing scoring 32, 16, and 15 votes respectively. The article 
suggested that the “Work of the sanctioning bodies, the promoters, and the participation 
by auto manufacturers in promoting was credited with the advantages held by non-drag 
types of racing.” Clearly the efforts of NASCAR in conjunction with the scale possible on 
Superspeedways, placed stock car racing into the lead among motor sport.  
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The adoption of pavement and the superspeedway coincided with developments 
in business organization and refinement of the stock car racing chassis to change the 
sport in fundamental ways. As a dramatic step away from the dirt tracks of grass-roots 
motor sport, the huge Darlington venue helped boost the credibility of NASCAR stock 
car racing. The adoption of paved racing surfaces on numerous existing tracks 
throughout the 1950s perpetuated the movement of NASCAR stock car racing toward 
the respectability and modernity of pavement. At the close of NASCAR’s first decade, 
the new superspeedways at Daytona, Charlotte and Atlanta combined the respectability 
of a paved racing circuit with impressive scale. Larger tracks built at the close of the 
1960s in Talladega, Alabama and Brooklyn, Michigan helped build the national 
reputation of NASCAR stock car racing even as they tested the limits of racing 
technology. As a result of the dramatic technological changes prompted by the scale and 
potential speed of the high-banked superspeedway, NASCAR ultimately seized 
complete control over the definition of a “stock car.” Consolidation of control over the 
technical specifications of the race car during the first years of the 1970s severed any 
relationship between NASCAR stock car racing and a car from the stock of an 
automobile maker. Any residual association between stock car racing and automakers 
became purely symbolic.  
 Rather than suffer from the separation of production cars from production-based 
racing, NASCAR adapted to indirect association with the cars on the track. NASCAR 
was moving in a new direction toward using the cars as billboards promoting products. 
Sometimes these products were directly associated with automobiles, sometimes not. 
Again, by de-emphasizing the technical details of the car, and celebrating the 
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entertaining spectacle they helped produce, NASCAR was able to cultivate a new world 
of revenue from promotional association with the sport. Of primary importance among 
the new wave of sponsors in the 1970s was R.J. Reynolds tobacco. 
Other important changes accompanied NASCAR’s seizure of complete control 
over the specifications of the race car. The adoption of Grand National championship 
series by Reynolds Tobacco in 1971 fundamentally altered the business focus of 
NASCAR stock car racing and probably set the series on a course toward operating 
simultaneously as a motor sport and promotional medium. In 1970, Federal rulings 
prohibiting direct advertising using television left the tobacco industry with millions of 
dollars in advertising budgets and nowhere to spend it. By sponsoring a racing series, 
Winston could reap the benefits of national television exposure without violating the spirit 
of the advertising ban. This support included massive investments in print and billboard 
advertising, funding for improvements to tracks and a $100,000 contribution to the points 
championship. As a result the championship series was renamed the “Winston Cup”.484  
With this massive influx of capital and promotion, estimated to be near 40 million 
dollars during the 1970s, NASCAR could concentrate on addressing larger television 
markets.485  As track manager and racing promoter Bruton Smith describes, 
“RJR/Nabisco really developed this sport. They promoted; they spent money at the 
speedways. They also taught us something about marketing. They gave us tremendous 
lessons on what to do. The change, the growth came when RJR/Nabisco came into the 
sport. They knew marketing. Nobody in the sport knew marketing.”486 NASCAR had 
been a sport with the potential to entertain but largely for crowds assembled at local 
arenas. The promotional acumen and ample supplies of cash brought in with the 
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creation of the Winston Cup transformed the business of the sport from entertainment to 
product marketing and promotion primed for the broadcasting arena.  
There was a certain ease associated with the official linkage between NASCAR 
and Winston. North Carolina was the largest tobacco producing state in the country, and 
it also hosted the largest number of races. The headquarters of all of the major American 
cigarette producers were located in North Carolina. Furthermore, the 1970s saw 
increased concentration of race shops around Charlotte.487 The convergence of these 
elements meant that NASCAR and Big Tobacco were synonymous with the upland 
region of North Carolina. 
 The adoption of the entire series by R.J. Reynolds was, for NASCAR, a happy 
accident that helped transform the sport into a series of genuine national significance. 
How it happened was pure chance. As sponsorship money transformed the sport, racers 
were compelled to perform on behalf of their sponsors rather than simply for prize 
money. Finding sponsorship required the sort of networking possible only with a mature 
sport. By the close of the 1960s, the stature of NASCAR stock car racing was sufficient 
to begin “opening doors” for competitors in search of financial backing for their racing 
efforts. In one instance a hunch turned into a jackpot for NASCAR. As Junior Johnson 
relates,  
 The government has just pulled all television rights to stop people from 
advertising smoking on TV.  I knew a lot of people that worked in Reynolds 
Tobacco because it ain’t but forty miles from here. If they’re coming off of 
television, they have a tremendous amount of money to do something with.  I 
said, ‘I am going to go get an appointment and go see would they consider 
                                                 
487 The presence of influential racecar builder and parts supplier Holman Moody 
outside the Charlotte Airport, and the convenience to most races offered by locating 
in south central North Carolina prompted many teams to locate in the region. 
Throughout the 60s and 70s, shops in north Alabama, North Georgia, and Florida 
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sponsoring a race car.’  I got it all set up and I went to see them and I sat down at 
the table with all the guys that handle the marketing part of Reynolds Tobacco 
Company.  First thing that they hit me with is, ‘What would it cost to run a race 
car?’ Back in them days, eight or nine hundred thousand dollars was a big 
sponsor.  I told them, ‘I need somewhere between eight hundred and million 
dollars to run the car and run it right.’ Of course, they laughed. They said, ‘We 
have a budget of five hundred and seventy million dollars when we got hung out 
with television.’ They said, ‘That’s what we’re looking for, something that we can 
use that kind of money on.’  They could have owned the whole NASCAR and 
everything else for that kind of money. I said, ‘This is what I need.’ They said, 
‘What would you suggest that we can do to get deeper involved?’ I said, ‘If you 
get deeper involved you need to go talk to NASCAR, Bill France, Sr. and do 
something with the racing organization.’ They said, ‘We don’t know him. Will you 
hook him up with us?’ I called France and told him what had happened and I 
went in to get a car sponsorship and they wanted to get deeper involved. He got 
a hold of them and they kept working towards a bigger deal and that’s how the 
Winston Cup came about. It’s been kindly a lucky thing for the whole sport, I think 
Winston getting in allowed NASCAR to get on TV. The exposure was 
unbelievable from that day on. They promoted the races with billboards and all 
kind of show cars and went out and paid for a lot of race tracks to be painted and 
upgraded and put up signs. Winston was probably the first thing that elevated the 
sport a tremendous step... I think it was the first big push that they ever got.488 
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The first step in improving NASCAR stock car racing as a vehicle for promotion 
was increasing the stature and scale of events. The details of the sponsorship 
agreement made Winston Cigarettes the title sponsor for races over 250 miles, and 
created a $200,000 prize to be awarded to the series champion at the close of the 
season.489 The net result was that races of shorter length or those held on smaller tracks 
could not attract the star drivers and larger racing teams. Most of the races conducted 
on shorter tracks were phased out in 1972.490 The imposing size and high-speed asphalt 
competition of the superspeedway and larger, sponsored teams with specialized roles 
became standard almost overnight. As a consequence, the days of the privateer driver 
who built his own car drew to a close by the end of the decade.491 
Another, larger consequence of the changes bought by Winston dollars was the 
suitability of NASCAR racing for television. For R.J. Reynolds, Winston Cup racing was 
a way to get marketing for their product back on television. By staging large events on 
large speedways, NASCAR took on the sort of credibility that garnered television 
coverage. By the close of the decade, Winston dollars had sufficiently groomed the sport 
for consistent televised presentation. Broadcasting expanded the venue for NASCAR 
stock car racing far beyond the possibilities of the superspeedways. With this the 
possibilities for promotion and advertising using the “175 Mile-an-hour Billboards”492 
increased manifold.  
Despite fulfilling the potential for massive, profitable racing events, the 
superspeedway introduced practical limitations to the physical size of a sports venue. If 
NASCAR was to gain new fans, and a new level of respectability, it would have to be 
through broadcasting. In time, the enhanced exposure brought through radio and 
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television helped NASCAR transcend the limitations of venue and traditional motor sport 
audiences to become a mainstream entertainment and marketing phenomenon.  
As the largest motor sport event in the United States, the Indianapolis 500 was 
predictably ahead of other events in using broadcasting to sell the sport. In 1952, live 
radio broadcasts of the action began on Indianapolis radio station WIBC. These events 
were available for broadcast across the nation on International Motor Speedway Radio 
Network.493 Part of the Indianapolis 500s status as the largest single-day sporting event 
in the world depended on the national presence possible through radio broadcasts. 
Despite difficulties approaching the amount of media coverage offered the 
established “main event” in American auto racing, NASCAR too would use broadcasting 
to sell its sport. In 1957 NASCAR began building a radio broadcasting network presence 
by reporting the action of Speed Week activities on the Mutual Broadcasting System that 
aired nation-wide.494 Annual Speed week activities, including the Daytona 500 enjoyed 
radio coverage from this year forward. Information on the radio presence of smaller 
events is more difficult to find. The obvious conflict between promoters advertising to 
bring fans to the race and radio coverage that might discourage attendance, as well as 
the probable use of their own airtime to advertise radio coverage, limited the amount of 
printed information devoted to radio broadcasting. A Southern Motorsport Journal 
account from fans that followed racing closely but never actually attended races 
suggested that radio augmented the information received in print form.495 Given the 
desperate need for content suffered by smaller radio stations after the demise of network 
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entertainment, it is reasonable to assume that the locally produced programs were aired 
live or as delayed broadcasts.496 
In 1970 France created the Motor Racing Network (MRN), which helped bring 
uniform and reliable radio broadcasts of racing events to loyal fans. Though the MRN 
broadcasts as relayed throughout the South and in select markets nation wide did help 
to introduce the sport to new fans, it primarily served those already familiar with the 
sport.  
Yet radio had shortcomings that could not bring many new fans to the sport in the 
age of televised entertainment. Barney Hall, one of the radio announcers present at the 
formation of the MRN, describes the medium.” He notes, “There are only three things 
you can do on a race broadcast. One is telling people what’s happening out on the 
racetrack, and in the pits when there are stops going on. And you talk to the drivers 
when they’ve fallen out, had an accident or had a mechanical problem. If you cover three 
things there’s nothing you can do. That’s it.”497 Obvious limitations of the radio format 
meant that Bill France would not settle on radio alone to project NASCAR stock car 
racing across the country. Instead, it seems MRN was one more element ensuring 
complete coverage of the market of potential race fans. The ubiquity of NASCAR’s radio 
coverage served race fans who might otherwise be engaged and acquainted the curious 
listener with action on the track. Created as a component of France’s International 
Speedway Corporation, the same enterprise that owned Daytona International 
Speedway, and the Alabama Motor Speedway in Talladega, MRN was a simple and 
inexpensive way of expanding the race venue through radio. 
The ultimate expansion of venue occurred when motor sport became a staple on 
television. Televised races were initially somewhat of a novelty. Before the benefits of 
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continued television and radio presence were realized, the foundations of racing 
broadcasting were laid with short collaborations between the networks and NASCAR. 
On January 31, 1960, as part of the “CBS Sports Spectacular,” the two 20-mile Grand 
National qualifying heats that determined pole position were televised live from Daytona 
International Speedway. Apparently this exhibition was a success as some estimates 
placed the audience at 17,000,000 viewers. Twelve days later NBC televised a 
previously taped four-lap “Autolite Challenge” invitational exhibition race during the 
Today show. At the time, a 500-mile stock car race, the sort of event common to 
superspeedways and most likely to show well on TV, lasted around four hours.498 
Though neither CBS nor NBC considered broadcasting anything like an entire event, 
their participation in broadcasting snippets of NASCAR’s “Speed Week” action helped 
familiarize the networks and viewers to production-based racing. Though these first 
televised races were rather small events, they began a trend toward broadcasting that 
would transform the sport as NASCAR sought to expand even beyond the capacity of 
the superspeedway.  
Building a presence on television was important for NASCAR. The largest motor 
sport event in the world, the Indianapolis 500, was the obvious benchmark for televised 
racing and NASCAR aspired to mimic its success. Beginning in 1964, the Indianapolis 
500 was broadcast across the nation on ABC or tape delay. In order to limit competition 
with the live event, these broadcasts were taped and delayed in the Indianapolis area 
and elsewhere. The first iterations were delayed “same-day” coverage, then live with 
local blackouts. 
Apparently convinced of the entertainment value of stock car racing, CBS 
continued to air edited versions of Grand National races during the weekly CBS Sports 
                                                 
498 Fielden, Vol. 3. Autolite is a brand of spark plug. 
 
 266
Spectacular. Beginning in 1961, ABC entered the arena by broadcasting edited portions 
of the Firecracker 250 held at Daytona’s superspeedway. This presentation, shortened 
to a more digestible 45 minute chunk of racing, aired on ABC’s Wide World of Sports. In 
1967, NASCAR experimented with a different broadcasting format, making the entire 
Daytona 500 available on closed circuit television. This apparently met with limited 
success and was not repeated in subsequent years. During the 1960s, the edited-for-
television versions of NASCAR events continued to appear on the Sports Spectacular 
and Wide World of Sports programs.  The format of these shows proved to be well 
suited to edited versions of longer NASCAR races. By cutting out the less exciting 
portions of competition and providing forty to forty-five minutes of dramatic highlights 
sandwiched between commercials these programs introduced production-based racing 
to a broad viewing audience. 
During April 1971, ABC televised a delayed broadcast of all 100 laps of the 
“Greenville 200.” ABC continued televising the final hour or hour-and-a-half of selected 
events live on the Wide World of Sports through 1978. After a brief hiatus from stock car 
presentation during the late 1960s, rival network CBS resumed NASCAR broadcasting 
on a tape delayed basis in 1975.499 Even with limited exposure, NASCAR stock car 
racing entertainment continued to grow as a broadcasting subject. This growth would 
reach dramatic intensity during the winter of 1979. 
The dramatic conclusion of the 1979 Daytona 500 was immediately significant 
because of the huge television audience. Severe winter weather throughout the 
northeast put an unusually large number of viewers in front of their television sets. Of 
this number, the majority chose to watch the Daytona 500, aired live in its entirety for the 
first time. Sixteen million viewers, more than twice as many as watched a professional 
golf tournament airing at the same time, watched the race conclusion. In the dramatic 
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final lap of the race, superstars Bobby Allison and Cale Yarborough wrecked into each 
other and out of the race. Following their skidding, high-speed wreck into the infield of 
the Daytona tri-oval, the two competitors climbed out of their cars and began fighting. 
Television crews raced to the scene and captured the violence in close detail. Not until 
other racers stopped their cars at trackside and got out to restrain Allison and 
Yarborough was peace restored. Clearly the men participating in the 1979 Daytona 500 
were intensely competitive and unafraid to express their desire to win. It was a dramatic 
conclusion of an unusually entertaining race. In addition to seeing a fistfight between two 
stars of the sport, there had been numerous lead changes and heated pit stop action.   
For the first time many viewers were able to absorb just how big stock car racing 
had become and just how intense competition was among stock car racers. The venue 
was huge and packed with fans, the speed approached 200 miles-per-hour, the racing 
action was dramatic, and the scuffle between Allison and Yarborough was evidence of 
the passion with which competitors pursued this sport. Clearly for 120,000 fans packing 
the Daytona track, and for the racers brawling in the infield, this sport mattered. Most 
dramatically, fulfillment of violent potential the danger of stock car racing spectacle was 
revealed to audiences in graphic detail.  
The 1979 Daytona 500 was a colorful conclusion to a decade of NASCAR 
emergence from the South. During the decades that saw dramatic Southern advances in 
the national political arena, and dramatic growth in the Southern sector of the national 
economy the dominant distinctive regional pastime had been growing as well. Because 
of the period of retrenchment between 1959 and 1969, NASCAR now emerged as a fully 
formed sporting series from the nation’s most dynamic region. After a period of 
consolidation down south, stock car racing burst on the national scene in dramatic 
fashion. 
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Yet the dramatic action on the track and fisticuffs after the leader’s wreck were 
not the whole story. Most significantly, NASCAR stock car racing had proven itself as a 
televised entertainment event. Even though NASCAR had signed a five-year agreement 
with ABC to televise the Daytona 500 before the 1979 race, this was not permanent 
assurance of stock car programming. The ratings earned by the 1979 Daytona 
Broadcast, and the Emmy award the telecast won helped increase notoriety of stock car 
racing among the networks. The success of this and subsequent live broadcasts of the 
Daytona 500 initiated demand for televised racing. With growing live television coverage 
the final element for creation of a national sporting entertainment empire was in place. 
While superspeedways rendered tremendous profits and enhanced the status of stock 
car racing among motor sport enthusiasts, the only venue able to hold millions of 
viewers were the couches of America. Future expansion of audience, and therefore 
sponsorship, depended upon television. The ratings and notoriety this event helped build 
would mean that sponsors interested in a national advertising campaign could choose 
NASCAR and expect televised coverage every year. Consistently, the association 
between nationally marketed consumer products, stock car racing and television would 
grow. 
After stock car racing established regular television presence, NASCAR and its 
racers, promoters, and sponsors were no longer limited by the number of seats and 
parking a track could accommodate nor threatened by the rougher clientele seeking 
weekend diversion from careers at the mill or gas station. Electronic media allowed the 
trials and triumphs of competition to reach the homes of middle class America, the 
coveted demographic slice best suited to the emerging mass advertising and mass 
entertainment potential of the sport. 
With the stability offered by Winston, NASCAR and the stock car racing 
community could focus on capitalizing on the notoriety earned through two decades of 
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fierce racing competition. Among the earliest changes was the final resolution of the 
technical details of the competition equipment. With the withdrawal of Ford and Chrysler 
from active support of race teams during the first years of 1970, the final details of the 
competition equipment could be hammered out without interference from factories trying 
to gain a technological advantage. Put another way, with any conduits for direct 
feedback severed, the factories were no longer able or obliged to take any lessons 
learned from racing competition. By 1975, the chassis and engine combination were 
frozen to create a “formula stock.” The generosity of Winston ended any need for 
NASCAR to court factory involvement, so NASCAR could stop niggling with the details 
of new technological development.  
Having a sponsor that was able to fund the entire series allowed NASCAR subtly 
but surely to change from an enterprise whose main focus was sanctioning 
entertainment to one equally interested in facilitating promotion. NASCAR developed 
numerous levels of sponsorship designed to attract advertising investment on many 
levels. These levels included the sponsors of the series, sponsors of specific events 
within the series, and the sponsors paying for the efforts of specific competitors. With 
television as a catalyst, NASCAR expanded the market for the events it sanctioned. In 
addition to entertainment, another product offered by NASCAR became the attention of 
fans. This new product suited the interests of corporate sponsors. In this, NASCAR was 
adopting a strategy long held by racers. Significantly, the sale of entertainment spectacle 
as a vehicle for advertising was on different scale than selling a portion of race car 
bodywork as advertising space. Yet the fundamental idea was the same: selling 
sponsors something that held the attention of fans. The potential for large-scale 
advertising offered by television was the key to selling every race team and the entire 
series to sponsors. If spectators didn’t mind looking at advertising on the cars as they 
raced (and historically they didn’t) televised billboards at 175 miles an hour was an ideal 
 270
advertising medium. Though NASCAR had benefited from a fan base that was primarily 
Southern, with television, a major series sponsor, and large venues capable of 
accommodating huge numbers of fans, they were ready to bring stock car racing to the 
whole country. If spectators began associating with the products being advertised by 
racing heroes in their favorite make of car, so much the better. 
During the thirty years from 1949 through 1979, NASCAR and the racers it 
managed transformed localized, grass-roots racing into an entertainment and 
promotional phenomenon of massive proportions. This emergence and dominance was 
based directly on material circumstance resulting from mass production. Combining a 
postwar affinity for automotive speed as cultivated by Hot Rodders on the West coast 
with an abundance of cars possible through resumption of mass-production, NASCAR 
developed its own fusion of mass produced technology and entertainment for mass 
consumption. By borrowing the products of mass production as necessary to compose 
the specifications for the competition “stock car,” and representing the interest of 
automakers, NASCAR built an entertainment series.  
Using the financial proceeds, promotional imperative, and tangible products of 
American mass production distinguished NASCAR from the other racing series in 
important ways. Stock car racing emerged from obscurity because Bill France and the 
sanctioning body he helped build did not focus on promoting the technical development 
or sophistication of the vehicles used in competition. Other successful series such as the 
AAA championship car series or events staged by the SCCA were more about 
celebrating the technical sophistication of the racing automobile. In these series, the 
exotic nature of the technology that fascinated fans. In contrast, NASCAR racing 
practiced a different type of technological enthusiasm. Stock car racing focused more on 
the vehicle as a prop for entertainment and close personal association with the racers. It 
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depended on the ubiquity and familiarity suggested by the stock format to build 
association between fans and the sport.  
Ironically, a racing series that depended on the virtues of the American 
automobiles in competition, did very little to encourage technical development. Though 
NASCAR frequently suggested that it was the ideal testbed for the latest designs from 
Detroit, the opposite was true in practice. Consistently increasing top speeds, made 
possible by the creation of NASCAR’s “formula stock,” fueled this illusion. (See Table 9) 
Perhaps the illusion of improvement offered by the ever-increasing velocity of NASCAR 
“stock cars” in competition served to disguise the fact that the American automobile 
industry had become, as historian James Flink describes, “stagnant in both its product 
and its production technologies.”500 Rules consistently stifled technical innovations to 
maintain close competition and keep costs low. Even as NASCAR races were used to 
promote various models of automobile, NASCAR was extending its control over the 
technical details of competition to create its own competition machine under the 
production bodywork. 
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Pole speed offers a measure of the potential top speed for cars during a given year. Some of the increase in speed was due to the change in track 
surfaces and size. The tremendous spike in pole speed for 1971is due largely to an increase in the number of races on larger tracks.
 
 
Crucially, as NASCAR sought to maintain the stock appearance of the vehicles in 
competition, underneath the showroom skin development of the chassis and drivetrain, 
uniformity developed across models and makes. Indeed, the bodywork of late model 
production cars served as a perfect disguise for technological convergence in the name 
of competition. The suspension, transmission and axle were replaced with standardized 
components borrowed from heavier or heavy duty vehicles and a cage of steel tubing 
replaced the stock stamped steel frame. This internal transformation of the race vehicle 
served the needs of NASCAR and the stock car racing fraternity by maintaining the 
illusion of a production vehicle while promoting close competition and ever increasing 
speeds.  
The creation of spectacle was the chief asset of those participants who chose 
NASCAR racing as a career. Motivated by enthusiasm for motor sport and the 
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alternative to working class careers that stock car racing offered, the NASCAR fraternity 
helped build the sport. The hierarchical organization of more traditional fraternities, as 
mimicked by NASCAR racers, helped organize the sport according to skill and expertise. 
Yet along with networks of technical expertise and friendship and support, the fraternity 
adopted and perpetuated many of the biases found among southern whites in the 1950s, 
and never successfully resisted the prevailing control Bill France and NASCAR asserted 
over the sport. Despite these shortcomings, the NASCAR racing fraternity did meet the 
needs of its members and influence the development of the sport. It protected the 
interest of steady participants from those outside the sport, facilitated organizational 
hierarchies, was a social and technical resources for racers, and a gave a sense of 
identity to those willing to endure the trials of racing for a living. Most importantly, the 
enthusiasm for motor sport that bound fraternity members together at the most 
fundamental level was a source of continuity during the dramatic changes of NASCAR’s 
first thirty years.  
The adoption of the pavement by race tracks on the NASCAR circuit moved 
stock car racing from the periphery into the mainstream of American motor sport. 
Pavement gave stock car racing a fresh, more dignified aura and implied association 
with the largest motor sports event, the Indy 500. Construction of superspeedways 
increased this association and propelled NASCAR stock car racing to new levels of 
respectability. The commercial success of emphasis on enhancing the venues and 
exposure of the sport is born out in growing prominence of race events, and growing 
annual attendance figures. Between 1949 and 1979, the average number of fans per 
event increased nearly fourfold, from 12,300 to 47, 500. (See Table 7)  
Yet the increased scale of venues and competition was not without casualties. 
Racing during the 1960s and 1970s moved beyond the means of most small racers. The 
radical changes in the size and surface of racing venues demanded greater technical 
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specialization among racing teams. The cars became less like genuine production cars 
to match the speed and durability required for long events on the big tracks.  
NASCAR’s control over the technology of competition was nearly a casualty of 
the participation of huge factory teams. These teams were attracted to the exposure 
possible with the scale of the superspeedway. When automakers focused their 
resources on making cars suited to the superspeedways, a crisis of control over the 
technology of competition prompted NASCAR to assert its authority. As a result, the 
NASCAR “formula stock” racecar became completely separate from anything made by 
automakers.  
Occasionally, claims regarding the vehicle research and development function of 
NASCAR racing shaped the public image of NASCAR. From time to time, especially 
when Bill France wanted to encourage the financial participation of factories, the idea 
that the racing was somehow directly associated with a testing function was tossed 
about in the automotive press.501 Yet the experimental and developmental dimension of 
NASCAR racing activities were most often cast as justification for stock car racing 
versus other, more established forms of motor sport and never seriously impinged on a 
promotional emphasis consistently touting the entertaining qualities of NASCAR racing.  
More frequently, the emphasis on the function of NASCAR as a detached arbiter 
of fair competition simultaneously serving the interest of racer and fan was used as a 
tool for justifying NASCAR’s form of stock car racing regulation. When weaknesses of 
true production cars threatened continuous action on the track and limited the speed of 
competition, NASCAR permitted radical changes of stock components in the name of 
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improved safety.502 Later, when technological advantage born of corporations staking 
sales on racing victory threatened to diminish the competitive aspects of stock car 
racing, NASCAR stepped in to guarantee close technical parity.503 As discussed in 
Chapter 6, the factory racing efforts of Ford and Chrysler impinged on NASCAR’s 
authority and threatened the close competition vital to selling seats. By developing its 
own formula for vehicle construction, NASCAR abandoned all but superficial association 
with production cars in exchange for the capacity to manage competition in the name of 
entertainment. 
With control over the stock car well in hand, NASCAR turned its attention toward 
cultivating new commercial dimensions of the sport. The completion of the evolution of 
formula stock by 1975 coincided with transition to dual emphasis as a promotional and 
entertainment spectacle. NASCAR Grand National racing was renamed the NASCAR 
Winston Cup and became an advertising outlet for RJ Reynolds tobacco. Coincidentally, 
increased media exposure brought the spectacle and sponsors to national audiences. 
As a result of the growing significance of advertising space, in time the whole enterprise 
of stock car racing hung on the exterior of the racing automobiles. Initially the cars 
exterior helped separate each basic make of car and served as a point of identification 
for fans. Later, the bodywork disguised the transition from strictly stock to formula stock 
as NASCAR and the racers it sanctioned worked to fashion a chassis and powertrain 
perfectly suited to their needs. Finally, with the level of popularity offered first by the 
superspeedway and later by television, the exterior of the car became valuable billboard 
space. As product advertisements covered more and more of the precious terrain, they 
offered yet another diversion from the technological processes under the skin of the car. 
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During the 1970s, the NASCAR race car, (except for the constantly morphing exterior) 
achieved final form. With only slight adjustments in weight, and length, the same 
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